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3Abstract
The History of the Construction and Operation
of the German KNK 1I Fast Breeder Power Plant
This is a historical review of the German KNK fast breeder project, from its begin-
nings in 1957 up to permanent plant shutdown in 1991. The original design had been
for a sodium cooled, albeit thermal, reactor. However, while KNK I was being com-
missioned on the premises of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, conversion into
a fast nuclear power plant was decided, a process which had to overcome consider-
able licensing difficulties. KNK 11 attained high fuel element burnups, and the com-
pletion of the fuel cycle was achieved. Various technical problems encountered in
specific components are described in detail. After the termination of the SNR 300
fast breeder project in Kalkar for political reasons, KNK 11 was shut down for good in
August 1991.
Kurzfassung
Die Geschichte von Bau und Betrieb
des deutschen Schnellbrüter-Kernkraftwerks KNK 11
Der Bericht beschreibt das deutsche Schnellbrüterprojekt KNK von seinen Anfängen
1957 bis zur endgültigen Abschaltung im Jahre 1991. Der ursprünglichen Planung lag
ein natriumgekühlter, aber thermischer Reaktor zugrunde. Schon während der Inbe-
triebsetzung der KNK I im Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe wurde der Umbau auf
ein schnelles Kernkraftwerk beschlossen, wobei beträchtliche Genehmigungsschwie-
rigkeiten zu überwinden waren. KNK 11 erzielte hohe Brennelementabbrände, und es
gelang die Schließung des Brennstoffkreislaufs. Verschiedene technische Probleme
bei einzelnen Komponenten werden detailliert dargestellt. Nach der politisch verur-
sachten Beendigung des Schnellbrüterprojekts SNR 300 Kalkar wurde die KNK 11 im
August 1991 endgültig abgeschaltet.
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Preface
There is one fact which must not be forgotten in the politically motivated turmoil
surrounding the fast breeder development in Germany: There was a fast breeder
power plant designed and built in Germany which was operated successfully for
more than ten years. The KNK 11 plant on the premises of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Re-
search Center, planned and built by INTERATOM, operated by KBG, demonstrated
that it was possible, even in this country and under the familiar difficult political
conditions and licensing criteria, to make fast breeder technology succeed.
This report represents an attempt at retracing the history of that nuclear power
plant which, including the KNK I preparatory project, extended over the long period
between 1957 and 1991, i. e. more than 34 years. The project documentation covers
a stretch of files more than 250 m long. The main problem confronting this historical
survey was the need to condense the extraordinary wealth of material, work out the
major development Iines, and yet achieve an easy-to-read chronicle.
The achievements of individuals are emphasized in this report in the light of my sub-
jective feelings. However, it should be stated, for the sake of fairness, that a project
the size of KNK cannot be an achievement of a few, but only of all those who contri-
buted to it. It is for this reason that I would like to dedicate this retrospective report
to all my colleagues who cooperated in KNK, especially at
KfK, INTERATOM, and KBG,
but also with the
Ministries, Authorities and Expert Consultants.
It is only the sum total of all their efforts which made KNK succeed. Thanks are due
to all of them, and this report is meant to record their achievements.
Dr. Willy MARTH
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1 KNK - The Preparatory Stage to the Fast Breeder
1.1 The Beginnings
1.1.1 Early Atomic Power Programs
It all began in the pretty, small town of Eltville on the Rhine River.
Professor Karl Winnacker, Chief Executive Officer of Farbwerke Hoechst AG, had in-
vited the leaders of German industry and nuclear research to attend a c10sed meet-
ing at the guest mansion of his company in Eltville. Under the chairmanship of Pro-
fessor Maier-Leibnitz, the "Nuclear Reactors" Working Group was to draft the out-
line of a German atomic power program on January 26 - 27, 1957. 1,2
After World War 11, the Allied Powers had prohibited the Federal Republic of Ger-
many from ever venturing into nuclear technology again. However, as the country
regained its political sovereignty in the Paris Treaties, this ban was lifted in 1955; at
the same time, the young nation waived the production of atomic weapons. Partici-
pation in the first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
organized by the United Nations in Geneva in August 1955 had a "shock-like impact"
on some of the German participants, among them Leo Brandt, then Undersecretary
of State in the German Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia:
"All participants suddenly realized that big things in the atomic sciences
had developed in the world, completely independent of the problem of
the atomic bomb... The German public was deeply concerned that all
these profound changes might bypass Germany and make the country fall
behind forever. "3
The Eltville circle suggested an approach to nuclear power by way of the design and
construction of five technically different types of nuclear power plants of 100 MWe
power each. The group was able to fall back on the advice by several renowned Ger-
man electricity utilities and machine building companies, some of which had already
established small reactor development groups. So, Siemens suggested a heavy water
reactor of the pressure tube type, AEG proposed a light water reactor; the
BBC/Krupp consortium, a high-temperature reactor; and the Deutsche Bab-
cock & Wilcox, a natural uranium reactor of the British Calder Hall type.
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At the final meeting in December 1957, Demag CEO Dr. Hans Reuter introduced yet
another 100 MWe power plant, with an organic coolant and moderator, which was
to be completed by an independent subsidiary, Interatom GmbH; the company was
to be founded that same year. Professor Wirtz, finally, indicated the fundamental in-
te rest of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in the development of a sodium
cooled fast breeder without, however, implying in his remark any direct intentions
to build such a plant.
This "500 Megawatt Program, " later called "Eltville Program, 11 did govern the de-
bate in the years to come, but did not develop into a resounding success. Of the five
plants mentioned above, only one was ever built, namely the heavy water pressure
tube reactor plant proposed by Siemens, which materialized at Niederaichbach. In
retrospect, it would have been no disaster had it not been built. Newly founded
Interatom had to be tided over into the spring of 1961 before, finally, receiving a
DM 4 million project contract from the then Kernkraftwerk Baden-Württemberg
company for the development of a reactor with organic cooling. This type of reactor
was never built in the Federal Republic, although Euratom had temporarily offered
its su pport.
The 500 Megawatt Program failed mainly because of the firm resistance put up by
the electricity utilities, which had advised a cautious entry into nuclear power al-
ready at an earlier date.4 The Eltville Program reflected the interests chiefly of ven-
dors and of the Ministry for Atomic Affairs, and was not accepted by the electricity
utilities. They considered nuclear power plants of 100 MWe, at the time a relatively
large unit size, too much of an economic risk and, moreover, were miffed because
they had hardly been consulted about the choice of reactor lines.
In order to overcome the stagnation, which lasted for approximately two years, the
Ministry for Atomic Affairs in late 1959 suggested a "Program of Advanced Reac-
tors." This included a number of small experimental reactors of approximately
20 MWe power. They were to be built mainly with government support; the pro-
gram was not to be dependent on the electricity utilities.
Proposals for the project were filed in March 1960. AEG submitted a boiling water re-
actor with nuclear steam superheating; it was later built at Großwelzheim as the
HDR with apower of 23 MWe, commissioned in 1969, and decommissioned only two
years later because of technical fuel element problems. The Deutsche Bab-
cock & Wilcox and BBClKrupp each offered gas-cooled reactors which, however,
were not built. Independent of the two programs mentioned above, Siemens (out of
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their own pocket) developed a heavy water pressurized reactor. This was the MZFR,
later built on the premises of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, mainly with
government funds, and operated very successfully.
Interatom, finally, had proposed an organically cooled reactor, but while still prepar-
ing for this program, switched to a sodium ~ooled reactor to be moderated with solid
zirconium hydride. The reactor power was to be 10 MWe. 5
The plant was to be called KNK.
1.1.2 Founding Interatom
Who was this newcomer, Interatom, elbowing its way into the line of renowned Ger-
man companies, such as Siemens, AEG, or Krupp?
As we heard above, it owed its existence to a strategic concept hatched by
Dr. Hans Reuter, the Chief Executive Officer of Demag AG. He had looked for ways to
catch up with the lead the electrical companies mentioned above had meanwhile
gained in nuclear technology thanks to their existing reactor development groups.
Turning abroad, he established contacts with the U.S. Atomics International (AI) Di-
vision of North American Aviation Ine. (NAA) and its eloquent CEO, Chauncey Starr.
It was plain to see that the chemistry between these two gentlemen agreed
phantastically, and also the know-how held by both firms was mutually supplemen-
tary: Demag was a machine building company of worldwide renown, and Atomics
International had already scored some successes in the young field of nuclear tech-
nology. For instance, in one year, two reactor plants built by Atomics International
had been commissioned, namely the graphite moderated and sodium cooled
7.5 MWe SRE in the Santa Susana mountains north of Los Angeles in the spring of
1957, and the organically moderated and cooled OMRE experimental facility in Ida-
ho in the fall of the same year. 6,7
Agreement was reached quickly, and the Internationale Atomreaktorbau GmbH, or
INTERATOM for short, was established as a joint subsidiary of Demag and NAA on
December 13, 1957.8 The headquarters of the company initially was in Duisburg, but
already one year later Interatom moved to Bensberg near Cologne, where offices
were first set up in the old castle, but soon afterwards land was purchased in Moitz-
feld for laboratories,
shops, and administra-
tion buildings. The capi-
tal stock of the com-
pany initially was only
DM 100,000, but was
soon raised to
DM 6 million. Interatom
was to be a develop-
ment company; it pre-
served that character
although, for some
time (1972), it had held
the biggest contract ev-
er for a plant construc-
tion in the Federal Re-
public of Germany - the
SNR 300.9
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The fathers of INTERATOM:
Dr. Hans Reuter (right), Demag AG, and
Dr. Chauncey Starr, Atomics International, USA.
Under the company agreements, the German partner also had been given the op-
portunity to have his personnel trained free of charge at NAA for aperiod of five
years. Demag made ample use of that opportunity and sent its first staff members to
Atomics International as early as in mid-1958, among them Dr. Hans Mausbeck and
Dr. Rudolf Harde, who became Technical Managing Director of Interatom in 1966.
Of the two reactor Iines pursued by Atomics International (AI) - organic cooling and
sodium cooling -, only the latter line succeeded. The Piqua experimental power plant
built by AI on behalf of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) developed the
same technical difficulties soon after commissioning which had already haunted the
OMRE plant and had then been called "fouling." The radiation present in the reactor
decomposed terphenyl, the organic coolant, and deposits developed on the hot fuel
elements. The project therefore had to be abandoned. Interatom, which wanted to
benefit from the experiences of its American parent company for projects of its own,
as a consequence had to give up two reactor projects for which organic cooling had
been envisaged. The know-how acquired in handling sodium ultimately was used in
the KNK project, which is the topic of this report.
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Ownership in Interatom changed repeatedly in subsequent years, also 1966 when
the Deutsche Babcock became the third partner. In 1969, Siemens acquired a 60% in-
te rest in Interatom, when North American Aviation sold its' shares and the other
partners reduced their interests. At the same time, Siemens terminated its breeder
development activities and moved those staff members from Erlangen to Bensberg
who were prepared to go. Later on, also the other Interatom partners, Demag (1971)
and Deutsche Babcock & Wilcox (1972), gave up their interests, leaving Siemens as
the sole shareholder of Interatom. These shares were transferred to Kraftwerk-
Union in 1974, when the nuclear interests of Siemens and AEG were incorporated. In
1987, KWU became a corporate division of Siemens AG; this made Interatom a mem-
ber of the Siemens Group, but still as an independent private limited company, a
"GmbH" under German law. 10
The Managing Director for Commercial Affairs (Iater Chairman of the Managing
Board) of Interatom between 1962 and 1991 was Dr. Claus Berke; in that period of
time he witnessed the rise and fall of his company.
In memoriam: INTERATOM
As this report about KNK is being written, Interatom has ceased to exist:
In October 1991, after the politically motivated termination of the Kalkar project,
Interatom GmbH became an integral part of KWU, the power generation division of
SIEMENS AG. The name INTERATOM, under which the company had been known as
a reactor vendor and famous breeder firm, ceased to exist. With its name, the com-
pany had also lost its identity. But, for the time being, Bergisch Gladbach, formerly
called Bensberg, was to remain an independent location besides Erlangen and
Offenbach.
This concept was given up in a decree by Siemens on March 30, 199311. The Bergisch
Gladbach location will be abandoned by 1994. Most of the breeder experts will be
sent into (early) retirement, while the others will be scattered over other locations or
will simply be fired. The sodium test facilities built at a tremendous expenditure,
such as ILONA, or the 5 MW Facility, will be dismantled; the technical documents
which still exist will disappear in a safe (after having been microfilmed).
Only memories will remain. This report is to preserve them.
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1.2 The KNK Development Program
In 1960, the young Interatom company bravely had secured from the German Fed-
eral Ministry for Atomic Aftairs a contract for designing a nuclear power plant,
which it now had to fulfil!. The technical specifications had been rather vague ini-
tially. There was talk of a 10 MWe nuclear power plant using thermal neutrons; lat-
er, the power level became 20 MWe; the plant was to be cooled by sodium. This liq-
uid metal was supposed to offer at least two advantages: Sodium was a very efti-
cient coolant allowing conventional steam temperatures of approx. 500°C to be gen-
erated. It made for a very compact plant design which, at least at that time, was feit
to cut costs.
The project drew its name from this latter fact: "Compact Sodium Cooled Nuclear
Power Plant," or KNK for short. The letter Klater was associated with Karlsruhe, the
location of the plant. This association is incorrect because initially, for want of a util-
ity customer, the Jülich Nuclear Research Establishment had still been envisaged as a
location. Interest in moving to the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center was aroused
only after the Fast Breeder Project had been established there.
Interatom realized from the outset that the design of KNK would be viable only if
backed by a parallel development program. Consequently, the technical key issues
had to be identified early on and an R&D program had to be launched. The new
fields in which the German parent, Demag, was unable to ofter much support were
nuclear physics, reactor safety, specific materials requirements and, above all, the so-
dium coolant. Only those few staff memb€'rs who had been delegated to the
U.S. parent, Atomics International, for a couple of months had ever seen the liquid
sodium metal and had acquired some idea of its properties. That knowledge had to
be put on a broader base, disseminated among the design engineers, which required
the construction of experimental facilities. 12
At the time, the money spent on this experimental program was not negligible, al-
though it looks Iike peanuts to us now. 13 Between 1960 and 1966, DM 5 million was
spent on reactor physics experiments, and approx. DM 2.5 million on materials stud-
ies. The irradiation experiments, mainly for zirconium hydride, cost DM 1.2 million,
the technical safety experiments, DM 1.3 million. The most expensive item in the
R&D program accompanying the planning phase were the test rigs (DM 11 million),
especially the 5 MW Facility. However, compared with later expenditures for the
SNR 300, those were indeed discount prices.
1.2.1 Physics and Safety
Although KNK had been
planned as a thermal reactor
plant, its neutron physics dif-
fered greatly from that of the
light water reactors emerging at
that time. The hydrogen con-
centration of the zirconium
hydride to be used as a modera-
tor was comparable to that of
water at 250 oe.
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The young team at Interatom, mostly physicists, chemists, engineers, and metallur-
gists, enthusiastically tackled the technical problems which, because of their novel
character, could not yet be found in textbooks. Almost all staff members were below
thirty, firmly convinced of the need for nuclear power wh ich, in turn, was supported
by the positive attitude of politicians and the general public. Names, such as Harde,
Stöhr, Brandstetter, Berke, Hennies, Hübel, Memmert, Knecht, Ruppert, Guthmann,
Henssen, Mausbeck, Höchel, and Jansing, should be mentioned here vicariously for
many others. They soon gained Interatom the respect of the reactor development
groups in competing companies, such as Siemens or AEG.
Split-table facility for critical experiments
for KNK set up at GKSS in Geesthacht.
The volume ratio of moderator to fuel was lower than .in LWRs, for KNK was bound
to have a more heterogeneous materials arrangement because of the solid modera-
tor. Another difference relative to water reactors stemmed from the different de-
grees of temperature dependence of the moderator density; with zirconium hydride
moderation there was no highly negative temperature coefficient as in the pressur-
ized water system.
So, experiments were necessary to back the neutron physics properties of the KNK
reactor core. For this reason, numerous subcritical and critical experiments were run
in a broad program, most of them employing pulsed neutron fields.14, 15 Among oth-
er factors, the reactivity worths of various shutdown configurations, their depend-
ence on temperature, and the reflector action of a number of core materials were
studied. In addition, the neutron spectrum in zirconium hydride was measured at
temperatures of up to 550 oe.
Some of the critical experiments were run at the Geesthacht Reactor Center, later
GKSS, in a split-table facility specially built for the purpose. The critical KNK config-
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uration was made up of a matrix of aluminum tubes loaded with fuel, moderator
and reflector rods. The facility whieh, incidentally, was built by the later Managing
Direetor of Interatom, Amandus Brandstetter, was shut down by moving the two
halves of the matrix apart, or by ejeeting the fuel, or by inserting absorber rods. The
experimental program mainly served to determine the critical reaetor mass of var-
ious eore arrangements, and the effect of shutdown rods. A pile oscillator, which pe-
riodieally moved small specimens into the eore and out, was used to measure reaetiv-
ity worths and absorption cross seetions. These experiments were conducted by
Dr. Hans-Henning Hennies. For thirty years, he decisively eontributed to many phases
of the KNK I/KNK 11 projeet, first with Interatom, later at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Re-
search Center.16, 17
The safety analyses eondueted for KNK revealed the reactor core to have a positive
power coefficient at low power and high burnup. This was a eharaeteristie KNK had
in common with other reactors using solid moderators, i. e. the British and Freneh fa-
cilities eooled by C02 and moderated by graphite. In all these eases, the positive ef-
feet is created by the neutron speetrum hardening as the moderator temperature
rises, which results in a greater diffusion length and reduces parasitic absorption. 18
Naturally, this effeet made the licensing authority frown. Detailed studies of the ex-
cursion eharacteristics, as weil as extensive analyses of the safety system, were re-
quired. In the end, however, consensus was reaehed that the shutdown systems of
KNK fully met the usual safety requirements of thermal reaetors. 19,20
1.2.2 Materials Problems
Efforts in materials development were focused on an inexpensive way of producing
the zireonium hydride moderator and testing it under reactor eonditions. Moreover,
the suitability of ferritie steel grades for the eomponents, instead of the more costly
austenitic steel varieties, was determined suecessfully.
Zirconium hydride with hydrogen eontents between 61 and 63 atom pereent
(ZrH1.57 to ZrH1.7), which make the substanee attraetive for nuclear purposes, is a
ceramie-like material fully compatible with sodium and steel even at high tempera-
tures. It is produeed under carefully controlled conditions by pure hydrogen reacting
with zireonium meta!. After experiments extending over many years, Interatom suc-
eeeded in producing large solids economieally and with little waste. 21 ,22
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The relatively mobile hydrogen atoms in the zirconium hydride lattice made the de-
tection of hydrogen losses in reactor operation, and of potential relocations, one of
the most important topics of study. Attention was also devoted to cracking of the
moderator solids under thermal shock loads. Finally, resistance to radiation had to be
demonstrated, which was achieved in preliminary tests up to a dose of 1.2x1 021 neu-
trons/cm. 23
Cutaway view of the
fuel element of I<NI< I
with the inner and the
outer ZrH z moderators.
In choosing zirconium hydride as the moderator, the ma-
terials engineers of Interatom accepted a tremendous
risk. Their experienced American parent, Atomics Interna-
tional, had urged them to use graphite moderators, as
Atomics International had done in the SRE facility.
Dr. Harde, then Head of Development at Interatom and
the prime mover of the KNK project, worried about a po-
tential chemical reaction between graphite and sodium,
and also about the dimensional stability of the graphite
solids in the reactor (neutron swelling!) and, therefore,
decided to start developing a moderator of his own. This
turned out to be the right step, for both in KNK and later
in KNK 11, the zirconium hydride solids never caused any
problems.
Interatom was also fortunate in choosing ferritic steel
grades of high thermal stability for components, such as
the reactor vessel and sodium pipes. Compared to heat re-
sistant austenitic material, this not only meant major cost
savings, but also offered considerable technical benefits.
Thus, ferrites have better thermal conductivity, lower
thermal expansion and, in addition, are less sensitive to
stress corrosion cracking, a characteristic particularly im-
portant in the steam generator. 24
Low-alloy heat resistant ferritic steel grades with approx. 2.25% Crl1 % Mo release siz-
able amounts of carbon into the ambient sodium at temperatures above 480°C; this
may cause austenitic reactor components, such as the fuel rod c1addings, to
embrittle. However, if a certain quantity of niobium is added to this steel alloy, the
new material remains resistant to decarburization even at temperatures up to
600 oe. Specific additions of other alloying constituents helped to improve the ferritic
material used in KNK so that it could be processed as easily as the conventional low-
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alloy ferritic materials. Thus, the 5 MW Test Facility described in the section below
was made out of this carbon stabilized steel.
1.2.3 Experimental Facilities
In many cases, design basis data can be generated, or component behavior can be
verified, only by means of experimental facilities. For this reason, Interatom early on
built test rigs with gas, water, and sodium as the media. Thus, a water loop was de-
signed in which the flow conditions simulated those in KNK fuel elements; an air test
rig was used to observe fuel element cooling during handling phases.
The most important test fa-
cility, however, was the
5 MW Facility, which con-
stituted the experimental
base of KNK design. As the
name implies, it had a heat
transfer capacity of 5 MW.
Except for reactor radiation,
it simulated practically all
conditions in KNK. Its reac-
tor vessel, scaled down in
length, was equipped with
a rotating top shield and
with flow orifice adjust-
ment devices. Inside the ves-
sei, control rod drives and
reactor nozzles could be
studied at fast temperature
changes in the coolant.
Main sodium pump of KNK being tested
at the 5 MW Facility in Bensberg.
The sodium was heated by oil and forced through the intermediate heat exchanger,
steam generator and various valves and auxiliary systems by two mechanical pumps.
All components were representative of sodium cooled nuclear reactors. The
5 MW Facility was commissioned in early 1965 and turned out to be a smashing suc-
cess.25,26
23
The tendency of sodium to combine with oxygen contained in the air and in the wa-
ter required protective measures to be taken in the steam generator. Studies of mi-
nor water leakages in the steam tubes (approx. 1-20 gis) had indicated that nearby
steel structures thus were made to corrode in a relatively short span of time. As a
consequence, a hydrogen monitor was developed as a warning system indicating wa-
ter leakages. 27
A considerable amount of attention was devoted to studies of large steam pipe de-
fects, i. e. pipe breaks. Especially the severity and duration of pressure shocks and
their impacts on surrounding structures were investigated. These experiments were
interpreted also theoretically and on the basis of models and constituted the basis
for the design of the pressure relief system.28
Finally, the reaction mechanisms between hot sodium and air, and the mechanisms
of sodium fires, were studied from the outset. Clear instructions for their control
were elaborated for the subsequent operators.29
1.3 The Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center Comes in
1.3.1 From a Nuclear Reactor to a Nuclear Research Center
After Germany had been permitted by the Allied governments to engage again in
nuclear research, so-called reactor stations sprang up in many places in the Federal
Republic of Germany, for instance in Berlin, Geesthacht, Jülich, and Garching. The
Karlsruhe research institution was founded on the basis of an initiative by the Göt-
tingen Max Planck Institute for Physics and its Director, Professor Wer-
ner Heisenberg. In Göttingen, a group headed by Professor Karl Wirtz designed re-
search reactors based on natural uranium. Its studies of a heavy water cooled and
moderated research reactor 2 (FR 2) aroused the interest of major industrial firms,
such as Hoechst, GHH, Badenwerk, Siemens, and others which feit that they might
accumulate experience in reactor construction in this way without having to acquire
expensive licenses abroad.30,31
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After lengthy debates, a site for the FR 2
was agreed upon at Leopoldshafen near
Karlsruhe. The Kernreaktor Bau- und
Betriebs-GmbH was founded there on Ju-
Iy 19, 1956; the capital stock of the new
company was DM 30 million, 50% of which
was raised by 65 (Iater 92) industrial firms,
30% by the Federal Government, and 20%
by the State of Baden-Württemberg.3 2
Professor Wirtz was appointed Head of the
Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor
Engi neering (IN R). A Technical Department Signposts showing the way to the site
was to advance construction of the FR 2; in of the Nuclear Research Center (1956).
addition, there was an Institute for Radiochemistry and an Institute for
Radiobiology. The most important item under development c1early was the first
German-built reactor, FR 2. For staff members living in the vicinity, the "Reactor" for
many years was a beloved synonym describing a research objective and a job at the
same time.
At that time, people were still proud of working at the "Reactor."
One of the most important technical modifications introduced later was the increase
in reactor power of the FR 2 from an initial 6 MW to 12 and, later, to 44 MW; this
measure served to raise the neutron flux by a corresponding margin. The extra cost
this involved was borne by the industrial partners for some time only; the balance
later was raised by another company, called K 11, whose only shareholders were the
Federal and State Governments. After the FR 2 had been completed, industry with-
drew entirely, and in January 1964 the K 11 company was merged with the K I found-
ing company into the Gesellschaft für Kernforschung. Because of the abbreviation,
GfK, a dispute arose with the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung in Nuremberg,
which also used the GfK abbreviation. GfK Karlsruhe therefore decided in 1975 to
adopt the name" Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe" (Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
CenterL or KfK for short, which had been used for a long time already as a geo-
graphie term.
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Another change at Karlsruhe related to the research program. For the physicists, the
design of the FR 2 had been completed by 1958/59, and new goals were sought. One
of those, the fast breeder reactor, had already been an idea injected into the Eltville
Program by INR Director Wirtz, as reported above. The influential Working
Group 111/1, "Nuclear Reactors," of the Atomic Industrial Forum in 1958 recom-
mended that work on a breeder reactor be started, and the Federal Ministry for
Atomic Affairs authorized the first funds. In April 1960, the Fast Breeder Project
(PSB), then still called Project Group, was founded at the Center, and
Dr. Wolf Häfele, Head of INR's Theoretical Department, was made its leader.
The project was to be developed in two phases: In Phase 1, mainly the coolant was to
be chosen. Although sodium was about to be accepted internationally, the Project
Leader stated:
"We intend to verify each and every decision made earlier. "
This implied that also steam and helium were included as cooling options. Phase 1
was to take three years and require a budget of DM 25 million. In the ensuing
Phase 2, a prototype power plant with apower of 200 to 300 MWe was to be de-
signed and built. This was a strategy c1early different from those pursued in the com-
peting breeder development countries, USSR, USA, France, and the UK, which ven-
tured into the construction of large prototypes only by way of small experimental re-
actors (BOR-60, EBR 11, Rapsodie, DRF) with powers between 10 and 20 MWe, and 50
to 70 MWth, respectively.
The timing of plans for Phases 1 and 2 later was changed several times. After the as-
sociation with Euratom of the Karlsruhe project, the final choice of coolant was post-
poned until 1967. When a stronger commitment in the commercial breeder sector
became evident in the United States (at General Electric), adecision was taken to ad-
vance to 1965/66 the beginning of Phase 2 - the development of two prototypes
cooled with sodium and steam, respectively.3 3
The entry of Euratom greatly invigorated the project. On the one hand, the interna-
tional base was broadened by agreements on cooperation with the research centers
in Belgium (Mol) and the Netherlands (RCN Petten, TNO Apeldoorn), and with the
American SEFOR Project. In addition, Euratom also brought to the project consider-
able sums of money, namely 40% of the DM 185 million appropriated by the German
Federal Government between 1960 and 1967. A building construction boom arose at
the Center in scientific institutes (such as IMF), utiliti'9s (liquid decontamination), and
reactors (SNEAK). The number of personnel increased steadily; in October 1956,
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there were only 36 staff members who dared to move from Göttingen to Karlsruhe
with the Wirtz Reactor Group, while the headcount in 1959 already amounted to
725, in September 1966 even to 3005 men and women. The average age of technical
staff members was 34 years.34
The "Reactor" had grown up and become the Nuclear Research Center.
1.3.2 Interatom/GfK: a Delicate Balance of Interests
Around 1961/62, two power plant concepts were pursued independently in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany wh ich had one thing in common, despite all their technical
differences: They were cooled with sodium. Interatom in Bensberg had a contract for
the development, not yet construction, of a thermal 10 MWe nuclear power plant
with a U02 core, ZrH2 moderation, and Na cooling, which was to be built in JÜlich.
While talks about an association with Euratom were being started, GfK became in-
terested in a 200 - 300 MWe fast breeder power plant with a U02-PU02 core and, al-
so, sodium cooling. (The steam and helium variants pursued in parallel initially were
only back-up solutions.)
The different nature of the two concepts implied considerable risks of their ever be-
ing implemented because, in each case, the Federal Government was to be the main
source of funding. The Federal Ministry for Research had to be explained how - and
whether - the two projects matched. This implied the need to seek a compromise,
however, with neither Interatom nor GfK having any interest in abandoning "their
project" in favor of the others.
GfK took the first step by emphasizing the complementary nature of the two
projects. Although Karlsruhe had made internationally acknowledged progress in
neutron physics, safety research and (theoretical} fuel element development, it still
lagged behind in sodium technology and component development - for lack of ex-
perimental facilities. This opinion was expressed publicly, e. g., at a reactor confer-
ence at Argonne, USA, in 1963:
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"The German program is oriented primarily around physics and safety
considerations. The hardware aspeets of the German program are totally
lacking and it therefore will be quite difficult to meet an early 1970
schedule for a prototype fast reactor. It would appear to be advisable to
have projects in Germany where experience in fabricating and testing vital
sodium components and systems can begin. "35
Breeder session atthe
Nuclear Research Center
(trom leftto right):
Prof. Wirtz, Dr. Beckurts,
Prof. Seelmann-Eggebert,
Dr. Häfele (standing), Dr. Smidt,
Dr. Engelmann, Dr. Schnurr,
Mr. Ritz.
Project Leader Häfele exploited this open criticism by pleading in Bonn for a move of
the KNK site from Jülich to the Nuclear Research Center, especially emphasizing the
usefulness of KNK in the field of sodium technology,36 Interatom did not exactly op-
pose the argument, but demanded that the local electricity utility, Badenwerk, be in-
c1uded as a purchaser of the electricity to be produced and also as a source of funds
for the turbo-generator; in this way, there would be no excessive dependence on
GfK, and one would be able to demonstrate interest in the project by a utility.37
Another shortcoming of the Karlsruhe breeder development program was the ab-
sence of in-pile facilities for fuel element irradiation. True, the FR 2 was used, but its
thermal spectrum provided no information about phenomena of c1adding tube
embrittlement and, subsequently, material swelling. Indeed, it would have made
sense to equip KNK with an unmoderated core and use it primarily as a local irradia-
tion reactor,38
However, this change of KNK from a thermal to a fast reactor did not materialize,
because none of the partners were really interested. In 1963/64, Interatom had ad-
vanced the conceptual design phase of the thermal KNK power plant very far and
wanted to start construction. Replanning for a fast core would have meant a consid-
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erable loss of time and even greater dependence on the (partly competing) Fast
Breeder Project at the Nuclear Research Center.
GfK rather liked that approach, for it was realized that the priority plans for the 200 -
300 MWe prototypes would be shifted into a distant future if a KNK fast experimen-
tal reactor were interpolated. Wirtz, Chairman of the important Breeder A-Body,
c1early expressed this in a memo:
"It is my view that the KNK reactor should not have a fast core... That
would require very extensive preparatory activities. "39
The management of GfK finally concluded the internal debate by writing a letter to
Interatom with the following conclusion :
"In the timetable of the Breeder Project the KNK reactor is to help
primarily in acquiring experience with sodium components... We therefore
feel that all provisions should be made in the design to enable the future
installation of several unmoderated subassemblies, but would like to
reserve for a later point in time the decision as to when and whether this
will be done. "40
This decision seemed to meet the interests of Interatom and GfK. The lack of in-pile
facilities was to be taken care of by leasing half of the capacity of BR 2 in Mol, a reac-
tor with a relatively higher fast neutron flux than the FR 2. For complete fuel ele-
ment tests, the Enrico Fermi Reactor in Detroit had been envisaged, which was to go
critical in 1966.
However, the future was to show that the idea of KNK with a fast core remained
alive.
1.3.3 GfK/Experimental facilities as a Contracting Party
Interatom's liaison at the Nuclear Research Center in matters of KNK as a rule was
the Fast Breeder Project Management Staff, PSB (Dr. Häfele, Mr. Faude). Up until Oc-
tober 1964, it coordinated all questions about the site and the design, if necessary,
with the Technical Department and the Building Department. When KNK seemed to
be on the rails, a so-called KNK Head Office was set up in October 1964, which was
managed by Dr. Diederichs, formerly with the FR 2.41 Management intervened espe-
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cially in contractual matters. This happened, e. g., in September 1963 when Inter-
atom had submitted an estimated bid for KNK, and GfK had asked the Federal Min-
istry for Scientific Research (BMwF) to approve the conclusion of a corresponding
R&D contract.42 However, the Ministry for Research obviously had different ideas
about project management, for it commissioned GfK/Experimental Facilities in early
1965 to negotiate the delivery contract with Interatom.
Who, or what, was this GfK/Experimental Facilities?
It was a separate management division of the Nuclear Research Center, whose offi-
cial name had been Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbH, or GfK for short, since
1964. GfK/Experimental Facilities, or GfK/VA or simply VA for short, had been estab-
lished to manage the experimental facilities of the Federal Government laid down in
Atomic Power Programs 1- 3. Those were the Multi-purpose Research Reactor, MZFR,
in Karlsruhe; the Superheated Steam Reactor, HDR, in Kahl; the Niederaichbach Nu-
c1ear Power Station, KKN; the Karlsruhe Reprocessing Plant, WAK; and now, in addi-
tion, the Compact Sodium Cooled Reactor, KNK, in Karlsruhe. 43
This development had begun with the MZFR, for which an appropriation decision
had been sent to the administrative unit then still called Special Management Unit
(under Dr. Brandl and Dr. Schöller) in 1961. Experience with that administrative set-
up must have been good, because the management scheme over time developed as
foliows:
(1) The Federal Government, represented by the Federal Ministry for Research, ap-
propriated the funds for the experimental facility.
(2) GfK/VA acted as the organizer and owner, executed the projects as builder and
owner, and managed them after completion.
(3) Industry designed and built the facilities either as a general contractor or as a
general engineer (such as WAK).
(4) The electricity utilities agreed to purchase the electricity and founded subsid-
iaries for construction supervision and subsequent operation.
By 1973, the end of the 3rd Atomic Power Program, the VA unit had spent approxi-
mately DM 700 million in investments and DM 130 million in operating funds on the
five experimental facilities listed above, plus their peripheral units. This is an impres-
sive amount of money, and yet, it seems modest compared to the billions currently
estimated for the demolition of those very plants.44
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GfK/VA was a small
administrative unit
with approx. 40 staff
members, managed
by a Managing Direc-
tor (first Dr. Brandl,
from 1968 on, Dr.
August-Wilhelm Eitz),
and an officer in
charge of administra-
tive and legal matters GfK management (from the left):
Dr. Schnurr (Technology, GfK), Dr. Greifeid (Administration, GfK),(Dr. Hubert Tebbert). Dr. Eitz (GfKIVA).
The budget of GfK/VA was strictly separarate from the budget of the GfK/Research
Section. The independence of the Experimental Facilities Unit was preserved also
with respect to administration, spending of funds, and technical project manage-
ment.
Each experimental facility had a project leader on the technical side, who was sup-
ported by a project engineer. For KNK, this was first Dr. Gerhard Brudermüller and,
from 1969 on, the author of this report, together with Gregor Schnetgöke as engi-
neer. Because of the small size of GfK/VA, also administrative distances were quite
short; letters reaching the Mangaging Director, as a rule, landed on the desk of the
person who had to process and, mostly, also finish the matter, on the very same day.
Working at VA was fun.
1.3.4 The Delivery Contract Awarded to Interatom
With its signatures dated March 1 and May 31, 1966, respectively, GfK/Experimental
Facilities awarded the delivery contract for KNK to Interatom. In the almost three
years of discussion among Interatom, GfK, and GfK/VA, the following purpose of
KNK had been agreed upon:
(1) KNK was to be apreparatory stage of the sodium cooled 300 MWe prototype
plant.
(2) It was to be used to train operating personnei, especially with a view to the
large SNR 300 plant to follow.
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(3) It was to allow the Iicensing conditions applying to sodium cooled reactors in
the Federal Republic to be determined by way of example.
(4) Finally, it was to be an irradiation facility for tests of fast breeder fuel under re-
presentative operating conditions.
The delivery contract for KNK comprised the technical design and the delivery of the
20 MWe nuclear power plant plus engineering services for the building construction
part and the fuel element inventory. GfK/VA as the builder and owner was responsi-
ble for the building shell, the fuel rods including the enriched uranium (made at
AEG, Großwelzheim), the licensing procedure, and for operating the plant with in-
house personnel.
The total price of KNK amounted to DM 110.2 million; Interatom's share was
DM 87 million, the balance consisted of the contributions by the builder and owner.
It is remarkable to see that an absolute fixed price was negotiated which was not in-
fluenced by changes in materials prices and salaries and wages due to inflation and,
consequently, contained none of the price escalation c1auses which became custom-
ary later on. The period of delivery was estimated at 42 months, i. e. only 3 1/2 years.
The contract was 56 pages plus ten voluminous annexes long and contained a num-
ber of trickily worded c1auses causing the project managements of the contracting
parties to be on their toes all the time. One provision in the contract, the so-ca lied
completeness c1ause, implied that
Ilirrespective of the specifications, the deliveries and services provided by
Interatom must be so comp/ete as to allow proper operation. 1145
This made for innumerable difficulties in detail; nearly every day, events had to be
discussed which could be viewed controversially as to whether they contributed to
the completeness of the plant or not. Other c1auses referred to the state of the art at
the time the contract was signed and to additions or reductions in performance due
to technical modifications. Finally, there were the bulk of conditions imposed under
the Atomic Energy Act, for which a party paying the expense involved had to be
found in, mostly, lengthy discussions. At this point, special mention must be made of
Gregor Schnetgöke, the Project Engineer, who executed the difficult job of defining
the scope of deliveries in constant disputes with his colleagues on the side of
Interatom (Gubo, Gilles) in such an excellent way that the subsequent audit of the
KNK project by the Federal Auditing Court did not give rise to any criticism.
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For commissioning after completion of the construction phase, a cost reimbursement
price with an upper limit (DM 4.75 million) had been defined above which the extra
cost had to be paid half each by the contracting parties. Finally, there were a number
of warranty promises by the vendor, for instance, of the plant power, control rods,
fuel element reactivity, materials specifications; in case of failure to meet these,
either correction or substitute delivery was agreed upon. The construction period of
42 months was subject to a penalty; each additional month would have meant
DM 60,000 as payment in default.
In retrospect it was seen that this type of contract, with its focus on the project goal
and its definition of painful sanctions in case of failure to meet specific subgoals,
constituted the most effective instrument of control in the hands of GfK/VA. KNK
was built in the short time of 42 months at costs weil within the contractual range of
flexibility. Considering the general price escalation of nearly 10% in the construction
phase between 1966 and 1969, it is evident that this must have implied a consider-
able indirect contribution of Interatom to the KNK project.
Because of the good experience in contract management for KNK, the Federal Min-
istry for Research in Bonn for some time considered building the large SNR 300 plant
along the lines of the VA model. However, the idea was abandoned in the late sixties
because the SNR 300 was to be organized "c1oser to industry."
1.3.5 KBG/Badenwerk as Operators
As early as in August 1963, the local
electricity utility, Badenwerk, had re-
sponded to a query by KfK by expressing
its willingness to make available for KNK
a non-repayable grant of DM 4 -
5 million. This roughly met the expendi-
tu res for the turbine, generator, and
switchyard. In addition, the Badenwerk
was prepared to purchase the electricity
produced in KNK, as it did already with
the MZFR.46
While negotiations with Interatom
about deliveries were still going on, a
plant operations contract was signed in
October 1966. The Badenwerk founded
View ofthe KNK turbo-generator
in the turbine hall.
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a subsidiary as the operating company, Kernkraftwerk-Betriebsgesellschaft mbH, or
KBG for short, which was to be responsible for both KNK and MZFR. Dr. Helmut
Armbruster was the committed, practical Managing Director of KBG between 1966
and 1973, after having accumulated more than four years of experience in leading
positions with MZFR and GfK/VA. In the construction phase, KBG was to be responsi-
ble for technical building supervision, and after delivery, for operating the power
plants. Project control on the spot by KBG helped the staff to become thoroughly fa-
miliar with the plant even prior to commissioning. To some extent, this compen-
sated for the fact that the operator, and VA, had been commissioned to manage the
KNK project only after the end of the planning phase.
KBG, an independent legal entity, was required to manage its business in accordance
with the principles customary in the power industry. An annual financial plan and a
program of work had to be negotiated with GfK/VA as the owner. Within this frame-
work, KBG was refunded all expenditures less the income from electricity genera-
tion. KBG and VA were joint holders of the nuclear permit for KNK.47
In 1972, at a time when both MZFR and KNK were in full operation, KBG had a staff
of 242.
1.4 Designing and Building KNK
1.4.1 Plant Design
KNK was designed mainly between 1961 and 1964. The DM 30 million required were
raised by the Federal Government; Interatom contributed DM 5 million out of its
own resources. By 1964, the tendering documents and a preliminary safety report
had been completed, on the basis of which Interatom was able to submit a bid. The
main technical parameters of various power plant sections will be outlined be-
low.48,49
Reactor (ore
Among the most important components were the fuel and moderator elements.
Their geometry was cylindrical, which simplified handling by obviating the need for
azimuthai orientation of the elements. The elements were made up of a central cy-
lindrical moderator section surrounded by 44 fuel rods arranged in two rings, and an
outer moderator ring. The outside diameter (width across flats) of a fuel element
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was 126.1 mm; the fuel rods had an active length of approx. 1 m. The inner modera-
tor section coupled to the fuel rods constituted the fuel element; during refueling,
the outer moderator normally was to remain in the reactor. The fuel pellets made of
U02 had an enrichment of 6.75%, a diameter of 8.7 mm, and were to ensure a mean
burnup of 10,000 MWd/t of U.
In the normal design ver-
sion, the reactor vessel
contained 66 positions for
fuel elements; in a freshly
loaded core, there were
additional absorber rods
which could be with-
drawn after they had
reached a certain burnup.
The fuel elements were
kept down hydraulically.
Their coolant flow in op-
eration could be varied in-
dependently from the
outside by control orifices.
Actuation was by flexible
cables carried in tubes like
Bowden cables (orifice ad-
justment system).
ENTRANCE LOCK
STORAGE TANK
REACTOR VESSEL---
Cutaway view through the KNK containment.
The core was contained in a reactor vessel 10m high and 1.9 m in diameter. For safe-
ty reasons, it was surrounded by another steel vessel whose bottom centering pin
could not be checked after installation and, for that reason, again and again caused
speculations. Also the sodium inlet pipe as weil as the two outlet pipes, including the
reactor isolation valves, were double-walled. The reactor top shield consisted of two
rotable parts fitted into each other eccentrically, which were filled with basalt gran-
ulate and very high density concrete for shielding. Tightness between the vessel and
the top shield was achieved by two inflatable rubber seals similar in shape to the
tubes of bicycle tires. 50
There were seven control rods for power control and shutdown, all of which could be
operated as control rods, shim rods, or shutdown rods. They were made up of the
drive at the top, the coupling linkage, and the absorber part running in a c1adding
tube inside the core. The drive used a recirculating ball spindie; in a scram, the elec-
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tromagnetic coupling between the drive and the coupling linkage was disconnected.
A cylindrical zirconium hydride moderator part was contained inside the absorber
bundle to enhance the shutdown action. 51
The fuel elements and activated reactor components were handled by means of a
fuel handling machine which could be rotated as a semiportal system; a shuffling
unit shuffled fuel elements within the reactor vessel. The fuel handling machine
built by Demag had two separate gas circuits, which allowed a fuel element to be
cooled with argon after withdrawal. The fuel handling machine was able to move to
a sodium cooled fuel element storage pool and to an observation and disassembly
station for fuel elements. The system was greatly simplified by the bottom of the car-
riage of the handling machine being designed as a semiportal system. The cooling
gas was supplied through the base of the portal; in this way, all cooling and cover
gas systems were installed below the reactor floor. Fuel element shuffling within the
core was achieved by the shuffling system which could be put on top of the reactor
top shield. As the fuel elements were only moved within the sodium pool in this han-
dling step, no additional cooling was required.
In KNK, the fuel handling machine was a unit of special significance for technical
safety. The "maximum credible accident" (thus the terminology used at that time)
was defined to be the meltdown of a highly loaded fuel element because of cooling
failure in the handling machine. This was the basis also for designing the contain-
ment to be gastight up to 200 oe and to an overpressure of 2.5 atm. Finding the fuel
handling machine in good working order consequently was very important in in-
service inspections. In most cases, it was the traction belts which needed mainten-
ance.
Heat Transfer System
The heat transfer system consisted of two parallel circuits of 29 MWth each. The heat
generated in the reactor core was carried by the two primary sodium circuits to one
intermediate heat exchanger each and passed on there to the secondary circuits con-
taining non-radioactive sodium. They were prepressurized to the pressure of the gas
in order to prevent leakages of primary sodium into the secondary system. Except for
a few austenitic parts, the heat transfer system was made entirely of the low-alloy
ferritic steel mentioned above.
The four sodium pumps in
the two primary and secon-
dary systems were me-
chanieal, . vertical, single-
stage recirculation pumps
with radial impellers, so-
called open-surface pumps.
The pumps were mechani-
cally sealed at the top to-
wards the driving motor
and run in a hydrostatic so-
dium bearing at the bot-
tom. Throughput was var-
ied by changing the speed
of the DC drive.
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STEAM
WATER-STEAM SYSTEM
1 REACTOR
2 SODIUM RECIRCULATION PUMP
3 INTERMEDIATE HEAT EXCHANGER
L...j ..'7I-----------...... 1
4 STEAM GENERATOR
5 TURBINE
6 FEEDWATER PUMP
7 CONDENSER
The intermediate heat ex- Basic circuit diagram of KNK.
changers had vertical, cy-
lindrical plena along both
sides of the tube bundle.
The relatively thin-walled
large shell surface areas of these plena allowed the helieal tube coils to be connected
with a minimum of thermal stress. The heat exchangers were arranged so that all
flows followed the direction of natural convection. Moreover, they were displaced in
height relative to the core in such a way that reliable afterheat removal was
achieved by natural convection.
The steam generator consisted of parallel double tube coils, each of whieh trans-
ferred a thermal power of 1 MW. The inner tube carried water and steam, respec-
tively, while the gap between the inner and the outer tubes carried sodium in a
countercurrent flow. The diameters of 20 - 30 mm and wall thicknesses of 2 - 3 mm
made for dimensions of the steam tubes which corresponded roughly to those of
pipes in conventional boilers. The welds were inspected 100% for cracks, lamina-
tions, and slag inclusions. In a sodium-water interaction, automatie shutoff of the
steam generator was ensured. Depressurization was achieved by means of acyclone
in which the sodium and the solid reaction products were deposited, while the rest
was vented over the top.
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The valves for stopping the sodium flow in the heat transfer system were conven-
tional flat-body wedge gate valves. The spindie penetration was sealed by sodium
freeze seals. Nozzle control valves were used for flow control in the afterheat mode
of operation. Instead of the wedge gates, they had a permanently installed perfo-
rated plate whose openings were varied bya sliding plate.
The steam supply system of KNK corresponded to that of a conventional steam pow-
er plant of the same size. It was designed for a maximum generator terminal output
of 25 MWe. The main steam pressure at the turbine inlet was 80 atm.abs., while the
main steam temperature was 505 oe. The feedwater was preheated to 235°C in a
five-stage preheating system. The cooling water was cooled back in a three-tower
fan-operated cooling tower system.
The whole plant was controlled in such a way that load changes left the tempera-
tures in the systems as constant as possible in order to avoid thermal shock loads. This
required all flows to be changed in proportion to the power. To keep the tempera-
ture level constant, the reactor outlet temperature was controlled by way of the
neutron flux. The steam pressure was kept constant by way of the feedwater
throughput. The steam temperature upstream of the turbine was controlled by
changing the sodium inlet temperature of the steam generator. Also operation in
the load following mode was to be possible For startup and shutdown, the rate of
temperature change was limited to 2 degrees/minute in view of the thermal stress
imposed. For non-steady state events, such as pump failure and scrams, which could
not be influenced in operation, a limited number of cycles (approx. 200) beyond the
yield point of the material were permitted under the strength analyses.
New Plant Features
A summary of the design parameters listed above shows that KNK featured a num-
ber of new characteristics in 1964 which made it c1early different from earlier sodium
cooled reactors. Let me reite rate them briefly:
(1) The highest power per unit length in a fuel rod of the KNK fuel element was
510 W/cm, with the hot channel factor taken into account. At that time, this
was the highest thermal load of a rector with oxide fue!.
(2) As a c1adding tube for the fuel rods, austenitic steel with 16% chromium and
13% nickel was used for the first time. This steel grade was less susceptible to
embrittlement by sigma phase formation than the steel grades with 18% Cr
and 8 - 10% Ni normally used abroad.
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(3) With a maximum sodium temperature at the reactor outlet of 560°C, KNK was
among the reactors with the highest coolant temperatures.
(4) The carbon-stabilized ferritic 10 CrMoNiNb 9 10-type steel was used for the
thermal circuits. Compared to austenitic stainless steel grades, it was by far
cheaper and, because of its higher thermal conductivity and lower expansion
coefficient, was less susceptible to thermal shock, albeit at the expense of thick-
er walls. 52
(5) The reactor contained an orifice adjustment system which allowed the flow
through each cooling channel to be set and varied from the reactor operating
level. Flexible cables were run through the reactor vessel inlet to actuate orific-
es in the fuel element bottom sections; at the same time, the fuel element out-
let temperatures were monitored by thermocouples.
(6) Also the design of the intermediate heat exchanger and the steam generator
was new. As explained above, the helical tubes of the intermediate heat ex-
changer entered the relatively thin-walled, large shell surface areas of the
piena at a minimum of thermal stresses. The steam generators consisted of
double tube coils connected in parallel; each of them terminated in four par-
allel plena for the inlet and outlet of secondary sodium and for the inlet of
feedwater and the outlet of steam. One negative feature was their large space
requirement, which practically excluded this type of steam generator from use
in plants of more than 300 MWe.
(7) Finally, KNK also confirmed the suitability of zirconium hydride as a moderator
in thermal reactors. This indicated that ZrH2, with its hydrogen density compa-
rable with that of water, could become attractive also to shield against the
high fast neutron flux in future fast breeders.
(8) The afterheat, with the reactor shut down, was removed by natural convection
of the sodium coolant - an important safety criterion of the plant.
1.4.2 Speedy Construction
Construction of KNK began immediately after the delivery contract had been signed
in May 1966. The first measure was the caisson foundation for the reactor building,
which was necessary because of the relatively high ground water level on the prem-
ises of the Nuclear Research Center. The edge of the caisson was placed 13.6 m below
The dome ofthe KNK containment is swung
into place (1967).
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ground level. After the caisson had been sunk, construction of the containment was
started, and already in March of the following year the containment with its air locks
was successfully subjected to leak tests and pressure tests. In June 1967, the adminis-
tration building was delivered to the future operating crew. Chief Construction Su-
pervisor Adam had ensured speedy progress of construction.
In the reactor building, the
primary cells and the biologi-
cal shield within the contain-
ment were completed next.
After the cavities for the re-
actor vessel and the fuel ele-
ment store had been Iined,
the double walled reactor
vessel was put in place in Sep-
tember 1967. That same year,
the cylindrical outer concrete
shell around the containment
was completed and covered
with a second steel dome.
Erection of the building shells for the steam generator hall, turbine hall, control
room building, cellular coolers, workshop, emergency Diesel power plant, and water
treatment plant was begun in February 1967. Work was completed in late 1967, thus
allowing the installation of mechanical equipment to be started as early as in Janu-
ary 1968 - what breathtaking speed, compared to the SNR 300 project which was to
follow.
All major parts of the mechanical and electrical equipment had been ordered in the
course of 1966. The 10 CrMoNiNb 9 10 special ferritic steel (materials No. 1.6770) for
the heat transfer systems was purchased in accordance with a standardized program
for semifinished products; in this way, optimum timing of the manufacturing process
with various subcontractors was achieved. In October 1967, all major components,
except for the steam generator, were in the final stages of completion.
Installation of the piping began in December 1967 and culminated five months later,
when the primary sodium pumps were installed after first having been tested exten-
sively in the 5 MW Facility at Interatom. Around mid-1968, most of the mechanical
installations had been completed; next came the electrical equipment and the steam
supply system. The structural components for the fuel elements, moderator ele-
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ments, and for the control rods of the primary and secondary shutdown systems,
which Interatom had built in-house, were shipped to Karlsruhe in the course of 1969.
Occasionally, activities were five months ahead of schedule, but that lead was soon
consumed by technical problems and delays, which will be described in the next sec-
tion.
In October 1969, the operating volume of 89 tons of sodium was accepted in the
dump tanks; this event, which had been contractually agreed upon, completed the
construction phase. KNK had been built within the contractual time of 42 months in
an unparalleled all-out effort, albeit at some risks, as described in Section 1.5 be-
low. 53 This achievement is due to Interatom Managing Director Dr. Rudolf Harde
and, especially, his Project Leader, Karl-Walter Stöhr, who devoted all his energies to
the KNK project and willingly engaged in many a technical dispute with the cus-
tomer, KBG.
1.4.3 Operation with Interruptions
The commissioning period of KNK was subdivided into four phases: commissioning
without and with sodium (phases F1 and F2), zero power tests (F3), and power opera-
tion (F4).
Under the contract, the plant had to be accepted when
11operation, if possible without any interruptions, over aperiod of one
week allowed a steam generation to be achieved which permitted the
turbo-generator to be operated on the grid. 11
This required a reactor power of approximately 30% of the rated power. 54
Commissioning
While final assembly work was still going on, the F1 tests were started in the second
half of 1969; they were completed approximately by the end of the same year. Be-
tween October 1969 and May 1970, the systems were filled with sodium and tested,
and the sodium was purified. In the interim phase between May 1970 and May 1971,
a large number of systems were modified as a result of experience accumulated in
the commissioning phase (see Section 1.5).55
Loading the core, and the subsequent zero-power measurements, extended over the
period between July and October 1971.
41
After a partial operating permit under the Atomic Energy Act had been received, the
reactor was operated in the low power regime with the air coolers until May 1972.
The power rise was interrupted for four months (September to December 1972) be-
cause of a steam generator defect. The plant was accepted on February 5, 1973. On
February 21, 1974, KNK was raised to 100% power for the first time. Subsequently,
the plant was operated at its rated power up until September 1974, when conversion
activities for KNK 11 began. 56
Sodium Purification
The 89 tons of sodium required for KNK were delivered in two tank cars and filled in-
to the dump tanks at a temperature of 110 oe. This took one week. The oxygen con-
tent of the sodium corresponded to the saturation concentration at the filling tem-
perature. The length of the ensuing sodium purification phase was caused by the
high initial impurities in the ferritic system.
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Typical curves ofthe systems and plugging
temperatures during the c1eanup phase.
Purification was to achieve a
plugging temperature of less
than 150 oe, for which the sys-
tems temperature was raised in
steps to 500 oe. It was typical of
the purification campaigns that
another plugging point devel-
oped above 400 oe. This was dif-
ficult to influence, but did not
greatly impair plant operation.
The plugging meters served as
indicators showing sodium im-
purity; when the solubility limit
was underrun, temperature-
induced plugs were produced
downstream of a throttle.
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Due to the initial impurities in the systems also the carbon content rose considerably
above the level at delivery of the sodium (11.6 ppm). In the primary system, carbon
levels of 50 ppm were measured, in the secondary system later, even 300 ppm,
caused by an oil ingress from the pump bearings. After several purification runs,
these levels were reduced to 12 and 18 ppm, respectively. One important experience
gathered in this step was that the cold traps, originally designed to remove sodium
oxides, could quite weil be used also to reduce the carbon content.
Critical Experiment
Critical minimum loading was conducted with a concentric fuel element arrange-
ment around the central position and with the control rods all the way out. Loading
was completed in eight steps, and first criticality was reached with 38 fuel elements
on August 20, 1971. Earlier theoretical estimates had resulted in 37 + 1 elements, a
very accurate prediction. For the first time, reactor physicists ran their extrapolations
with one of those wonderful new pocket calculators equipped with microchips.57
The target core was loaded in ni ne additional steps. After the 13th loading step, the
installation of two solid absorbers was planned to compensate for the excess reactiv-
ity. For the excess reactivity of the final configuration, a value of 709 cents was
found; it was compensated to 419 cents by the introduction of the control rod bank.
The reactivity gain achieved by heating the sodium from 207 to 472°C amounted to
101 cents. In a sodium dumping test it was found that a reactivity gain of 120 cents
resulted from a total sodium loss from the active core region.
Power Operation
After completion of the air cooler mode of operation, which permitted reactor pow-
ers below 8%, the steam generator was commissioned, and power was raised in
steps up to 50% of the rated power. On August 9, 1972 the turboset was first syn-
chronized with the grid system, and electricity was produced at a reactor power of
25 MWth. Along with the subsequent power increases up to 55% of the rated load,
the coolant flows in the fuel elements were set by means of throttles. The criterion
used for setting the flow orifices were the outlet temperatures at the fuel elements.
In the phase of power rise, also the natural circulation characteristics of the plant
were verified. 4% reactor power simulated the maximum possible decay heat output
with the core fully burned up. After the full enthalpy rise had built up, a reactor
scram was simulated, and the sodium system was left alone with the coolant pumps
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shut off. The theoretical predictions of the reactor inlet and outlet temperatures
were matched in the measurements.
In February and March 1973, the uninterrupted one-week test and acceptance op-
eration was conducted, partly at a much higher power (59%) than was required un-
der the contract. In the light of that performance, acceptance of the whole plant by
GfK/VA was expressed on February 5, 1973. At the same time, KBG assumed respon-
sibility for plant operation. On the side of Interatom, Gerhard Hendl played a par-
ticularly important role in the commissioning of KNK I; he was assisted by his succes-
sor, Wilfried Albat, who was responsible for setting up the programs.
After the permit for 100% power (5th Partial Operating Permit) had been received in
February 1974, KNK reached its rated power two months later. The plant was in op-
eration, mostly at 100% power, without any trouble until the autumn of 1974. At
the same time, a small-scale experimental program was conducted in KNK with tests
of plant instrumentation and sodium technology. The interested parties running the
experiments were institutes at the Center, but also the Laboratory for Reactor Con-
trol and Plant Safety (LRA) at Garching (Prof. Birkhofer).
KNK ready and commissioned (1972).
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On September 2, 1974, KNK was shut down permanently as scheduled to be pre-
pared for the conversion into KNK 11. This was followed, among other steps, by un-
loading the fuel elements and taking them to the Marcoule, France, reprocessing
plant, disassembly of the fuel element store, and installation of the process com-
puter.
1.5 Experience Accumulated in Construction and Operation
When a first-of-its-kind plant, such as KNK, is being built with thousands of compo-
nents and switching elements, breakdowns and defects must be expected to occur.
And occur they did. In an attempt to c1assify them, one could list them under the
headings of lessons learnt in construction and commissioning, defects in quality and
insufficient experimental experience, and problems in the Iicensing procedure. 58
Especially the licensing procedure under the Atomic Energy Act reflected the fact
that almost ten years had passed since the design of KNK had begun. In addition, a
new breeder, the SNR 300, had been presented on December 31, 1969 wh ich, of
course, now had to be considered to reflect the state of the art. In the following
three years, the basic technical concept of the SNR 300 was revised rather thoroughly
by interventions made by expert consultants, Iicensing authorities, and the consor-
tium of customers, which caused many conditions to be applied to KNK as we11. 59,60
New Findings
In the early project phase, the expense necessary to develop the right methods of cal-
culation in some instances was underestimated quite considerably. Thus, for in-
stance, complicated components combined with the good heat transfer properties of
sodium gave rise to absolutely new design conditions. The c1assical computation ap-
proaches used in mechanical engineering often will no longer do in such cases. In
project design work for the SNR 300, specific recalculations with newly developed
codes therefore were conducted also for KNK. In some cases, this ultimately resulted
in the installation of new, quite different components in a plant already completed.
One case in point is the very sophisticated post-scram control system which, with the
installation of additional compensators and mixing sections, caused some three
months of delay in the commissioning phase.
It also necessitated a modification in the pump rotors, if the given rate of tempera-
ture change of 0.7 °Clmin was to be maintained. Moreover, the return feed pipe of
the primary c1eanup system had to be modified, and the secondary system had to be
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fitted new mixing sections to feed cold sodium into the hot leg. Also the neutronic
shielding calculations were found to be insufficient in several cases. Consequently,
after nuclear commissioning, the primary cells in various places had to be shielded
additionally against the secondary system.
Also the compact design of the plant, originally chosen for cost reasons and, mean-
while, part of the name of KNK, more and more turned out to be a drawback. It was
a hindrance in component assembly, and in many cases (such as in the primary so-
dium sampling case) also made access difficult for the plant personnel. Repair cam-
paigns in the primary cells (which, contrary to the original design objective, were by
no means maintenance-free) required complicated procedures to be developed, es-
pecially when work had to be conducted in radiation fields. Also in the ventilation
system, separate c10sing of each individual ventilation duct, and stronger fire resis-
tant barriers, would have been advantageous in case of sodium fires and the aerosol
production associated with them.
Quality Problems
In the course of commissioning activities, occasional overheating was found in the
sodium pipes. The cause were seen to be the circular-pipe heaters of the electric
trace heating system, some of which occasionally developed ground faults. A tiny set
screw, 1 mm long, but installed 9000 times in the connections of the heaters, had not
been secured properly and then caused a delay of several months because the con-
necting heads had to be replaced completely.
In March 1971, sodium discharged from the purifica-
tion system in the secondary circuit caused a fire. A
startup heater installed temporarily for isothermal
heating of the system to 500 oe contained a faulty
end cap weid in one heating rod, which had pro-
duced leaks already twice before. The third leak
caused a spill of approx. 500 kg of hot sodium, which
then started a fire. Although the damage was local-
ized, fire fighting was very difficult. Because of the
ongoing aerosol generation, the center of the fire
was hardly visible, and the sodium discharged had to
be covered again and again for several hours.
Hole in the KNK steam
generator pipe close to
a spacer weid.
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In September 1972, the first and only defect occurred in the otherwise very reliable
steam generator of KNK. It later turned out that a leak had arisen at the fin of a spac-
er in the double-tube system where there had been a porous inclusion difficult to de-
tect by inspection. Although depressurization under accident conditions worked,
several kilograms of sodium penetrating into the tertiary system as far as a short dis-
tance upstream of the turbine caused modifications to be made in instrumentation
and in the rupture disks.61 ,62
Other defects discovered in the course of commissioning were the break of a rupture
disk in the tertiary system, which had been caused bya pump speeding up, and the
simultaneous c10sure of two valves in the primary sodium system. When a solid ab-
sorber had to be reported floating, the angry supervisory authority responded by im-
posing a temporary shutdown.
If human error is considered part of quality, also the false bores in the rotating top
shield should be mentioned, which passed through all inspections and were discov-
ered finallyon the construction site. Also excessive lubrication of a pump bearing
must be noted, which allowed some ten liters of oil to spill into the secondary so-
dium system, which then had to be distilled off.
Reference should also be made to the insufficient sealing of the primary cells against
nitrogen leaks, which was due to a combination of faulty supervision on si te and un-
satisfactory sealing materials. Initially, operation under overpressure had been
planned, but his led to unacceptable leakages on the order of 50 m3/h and, there-
fore, had to be abandoned. Consequently, a mode of operation was chosen which in-
c1uded nitrogen feeding to lower the oxygen content in the primary cells to less than
2%, which was below the burning limit. This, too, resulted in major problems in
maintaining the necessary amounts of nitrogen, and in safety risks associated with
sodium leakages, because of the short escape times.
Lack of Experimental Experience
In some instances it became apparent that the preceding R&D program at Interatom
in Bensberg only insufficiently met the subsequent risks found in implementation.
The reason was either the experimental volume, which had been limited for financial
reasons, or the fact that certain phenomena cannot be simulated completely outside
the reactor.
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Curves showing the torque (D) over the
whole circle of the rotating top shield
(a): with sodium deposits,
(b): after mechanical removal ofthe
Na deposits,
(c): after meltdown ofthe sodium deposits.
Thus, it was found in KNK in the summer
of 1970 that both rotating top shields
sometimes were very difficult to move
after the sodium in the system had heated
up. The cause was found to be sodium
aerosols plated out in the narrow gaps of
the top shield system. As the geometry
could not be modified, a mode of opera-
tion was developed which allowed the
top shield to be thawed. For this purpose,
the top shield cooling system had to be
shut off briefly at a sodium temperature
above 350 0(, which raised the tempera-
ture in the gaps to more than 100 O( and
caused the aerosols to liquefy. Additional
bores in the top shields also allowed me-
chanical removal of the sodium and its
products. These procedures, though a bit
cumbersome, proved to work weil over
the entire operating life of KNK.
Similar problems with aerosols plating out in the rotating top shield had occurred
shortly before also in the French Rapsodie experimental reactor. Despite an official
visit to (adarache, it was not possible to acquire any information about that case; es-
pecially the repair measures, which obviously had been successful, remained a "trade
secret" of the (EA engineers. The Breeder Agreement signed by Germany and France
a couple of years later made an end to this blockage and initiated a very fruitful ex-
change of experience.
Lengthy Licensing Procedure
The timing of the KNK project was determined in a very special way by the licensing
procedure under the Atomic Energy Act. In what may have been a spirit of exagger-
ated optimism, it was feit initially that one construction permit and one operating
Conditions imposed, and times required, forthe
partial permits for KNK I under the Atomic Energy Act.
permit would do. In the end,
this had become ten partial
permits, five for construction,
and five for operation of the
plant. Half of these partial
permits took more than one
year, the first partial operat-
ing permit even a full
24 months, to come forth. All
permits were issued by the
Baden-Württemberg State
Ministry of Economics; the
State Ministry of Labor acted
as the supervisory authority.
Both ministries worked
through the Baden Technical
Inspectorate (TÜV) at Mann-
heim as the independent ex-
pert consultant.
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PARTIAL
CONSTRUCTION PERMITS
1 ,----'-'-"--------.-,-----C-li 15
21i 4
3 p""""",,,,,,d,,lll1'~5 ---e-
4 ,li 13
5 n 13
PARTIAL
OPERATING PERMITS
TIME SPENT [MONTHSj
CONDITIONS
75
19
2
26
88
TOTAL: 650
The ten partial permits referred to above were accompanied by 650 conditions im-
posed. These conditions covered a wide range, from the relatively simple installation
of additional locks up to the requirement of a second, redundant shutdown system
at an expense of several million DM. That condition came unexpectedly, for never
before had there been a sodium cooled reactor with such a component. The con-
struction and testing of that shutdown system, with flexible modular absorbers, de-
termined the critical path for quite some time. Other conditions referred to seismic
calculations for buildings and installations, and to the installation of an emergency
control center from which the reactor could be shut down, for instance, in case of a
cable fire. Again and again, inactive periods occurred in project development for
lack of apermit; ultimately, however, this was tolerable because one of the four
reasons for building KNK as a first-of-its-kind plant was to establish the nuclear li-
censing procedure for a sodium reactor.
The future was to show that these licensing problems were only the beginning.
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2 Converting KNK I into KNK 11
While Karlsruhe spent the period between 1964 and 1970 negotiating the KNK
project and building the plant, the nuclear scene in Germany changed profoundly.
Nuclear power plants cooled with light water began to win the day, starting with
KRB Grundremmingen (ordered in 1962) and soon followed by KWL Lingen (1964)
and KWO Obrigheim (1965). Evidently, thermal sodium reactors, such as KNK, could
have no economic chances in the near future. On the other hand, in the research sec-
tor, the Fast Breeder Project decided in favor of sodium as a coolant; after painful
debates, the steam and helium coolant variants had been dropped. This made it an
obvious choice to align KNK, and its future use, to the requirements of the Breeder
Project and, consequently, equip the facility with a fast core. This is what was done,
and the sections below will furnish a detailed account of this conversion of KNK with
all its technical difficulties and Iicensing problems. 63
The change in purpose of KNK was associated with a change in name. The original
KNK facility with the thermal reactor core, from now on, was referred to as KNK I,
while the facility with the unmoderated fast core was called KNK 11.
2.1 A Difficult Decision in Favor of KNK 11
2.1.1 A Reactor 15 Needed for Irradiation
The main reason for employing KNK no longer primarily as an electricity generating
plant, but as an experimental reactor and a neutron test bed, was the increasingly
more evident bottleneck, even emergency, in fuel element irradiation facilities.
The importance of the fuel element as the most highly loaded breeder component
had be recognized early on in the Fast Breeder Project. This is expressed in no uncer-
tain terms, for instance, in the technical documents of the Association Agreement
concluded with EURATOM in 1963:64
"The design of such a prototype offering promise for the future must be
based on the fact that the fuel element is the dominating component. The
reactor, in a way, must be designed and built around the fuel ele-
ment. "
Testing the prototype fuel rods made by Alkem and GfK, respectively, with all their
fuel and c1adding materials variants, required experimental reactors with in-pile
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space for irradiation. Initially, the FR 2 reactor built at the Center had been equipped
with so-called capsule test rigs as early as in 1965.65,66 However, when the phenom-
enon of materials swelling was discovered, reactors with a fast neutron flux were in
particular demand.67 A makeshift solution was alease of 50% of the capacity of the
Belgian BR 2 reactor, which had a higher fraction of fast neutrons than the FR 2.68
At PSB, great hopes were pinned on the Enrico Fermi Fast Breeder Reactor (EFFBR) in
the USA, which was to be used for irradiation of prototype bundles. 69 The accident
caused in that reactor in October 1966 by a piece of sheet metal erroneously intro-
duced during construction and now blocking a fuel element made an end to those
plans and, at the same time, revealed a major bottleneck in the irradiation sector.
After all, within the division of labor agreed upon in the Breeder Project, GfK was ex-
pected to irradiate at least 30 prototype fuel rods in sodium and in a fast flux - and
that before the large SNR 300 plant would be tackled. Almost at the very last minute,
a solution was found in the irradiation of small bundles in the Dounreay Fast Reac-
tor. Agreement was reached with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency
(UKAEA) to irradiate 39 rods in the DFR (another 38 were made available by CEA);
that irradiation was performed between January 1969 and April 1970 under the
name of DFR 350,70 Further irradiations in the amount of DM 43 million were to fol-
low, but did not materialize because the underlying industrial agreements between
Kraftwerk Union (KWU) and the Nuclear Power Group (TNPG) had not been
signed,71
In view of all those problems with reactors abroad, the domestic KNK facility came
back to peoples' minds. KNK was a sodium cooled plant, and the inlet and outlet
temperatures of the fuel elements corresponded to those of modern breeder power
plants; in addition, its core was compact in design and, thanks to the use of zirco-
nium hydride instead of graphite as a moderator, also resembled that of a breeder.
In a small-scale research study for GfK (costing DM 100,000 and 30 engineer-months)
the fundamental usability of KNK as an irradiation reactor had been ascertained as
far back as in 1964.
Following arequest by the Fast Breeder Project, GfK/VA now commissioned another
study with Interatom in which the suitability of KNK for accepting an unmoderated
core of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide was to be examined in detail. This so-
called feasibility study with an order volume of DM 2.5 million was conducted while
KNK was still under construction, and was presented in 1968. It arrived at the sum-
mary conclusion that KNK's core center could be equipped with a fast core consisting
of seven mixed oxide fuel elements. They would correspond to the elements of the
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SNR 300 in their main specifications. In particular, the rod diameter, lattice pitch, U-
Pu ratio, temperatures, power densities and, of course, fabrication specifications
could be largely identical. As c1adding materials, the steel varieties examined for the
large breeder at that time, namely 1.4988 and 1.4981, were to be taken into account.
Other important existing KNK components, such as the diagrid, the tank internals,
and the rotating top shield, could be employed practically without any modification.
KNK also seemed to lend itself weil to serving as a test bed for safety instrumenta-
tions. It had been instrumented lavishly from the outset, and its central position of-
fered a possibility for testing, under in-pile conditions, a variety of detectors planned
for use in the SNR 300 before installing them. Moreover, the installation of a sophis-
ticated process computer had been envisaged which would have facilitated the eval-
uation of all these experimental objects.
The results of the KNK 11 feasibility study presented by Interatom were submitted for
independent evaluation to the U.S. consultant, Nuclear Utility Service (NUS), by
GfK/VA in 1969. NUS more or less confirmed the plans of Interatom and, in addition,
made about two dozen suggestions, some of which will be mentioned here.72 Thus,
the spacers of the fuel rods were to be checked for homogenization of the sodium
temperature, and the excess reactivity of the secondary shutdown system was to be
raised from 2.3 to 3.3%. Because of the small core and the relatively large fuel ele-
ment bundles, the reactivity increment produced by the introduction of fuel ele-
ments into the core was bound to be very large (around 7%); NUS therefore asked
for additional technical safety measures in the fuel handling machine to avoid load-
ing accidents. The time required to convert KNK I to KNK 11 was estimated by NUS to
run up to ten months, which was similar to the figure quoted by Interatom (nine
months). Unfortunately, both authors were far off the mark, as was to be seen later.
The Fast Breeder Project Management was highly pleased with the results of the
KNK 11 feasibility study and expressed this feeling in a memorandum to the two man-
agements of GfK and GfK/VA as folIows:
"The use of a fast core in KNK (KNK 11) is considered by the Fast Breeder
Project a major constituent part of the development of fast breeder reactors.
An aspect of major importance is the possibiJity to conduct in the central
zone of KNK 11 instrumented in-pile experiments under real breeder condi-
tions. The financial expenditures for the KNK 11 core seem to be adequate. "73
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Now GfK/VA was faced with the problem of purchasing the plutonium plus enriched
uranium needed for KNK 11. This was no easy job, for in the late sixties there were on-
Iy tentative beginnings of a plutonium market. In the United States, that market was
controlled by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), which also had fixed the
price of plutonium within its domain to a level of $43 per gram. Thanks to fortunate
coincidences, and thanks also to the assistance by Nukem, Hanau, some sublots of
plutonium could be acquired cheaply from American electricity utilities (such as Yan-
kee Atomics), which finally resulted in an average price of $23.75/g for the 100 kg of
plutonium purchased. Alkem was commissioned immediately to convert the nitrate
into an oxide, separate the americium, and manufacture the first trial rods.
KNK 11 was now weil on its way, but this had not made KNK I any less important.
Quite on the contrary, as will be shown in the next section.
2.1.2 Coming to Terms with Sodium Technology
On the last day of 1969, the planning consortium for the SNR 300 under the leader-
ship of Interatom mailed the technical documents for that breeder power plant. In
the bid submitted soon, April 1, 1971 was mentioned as the date construction of the
SNR 300 was to be started.
The Fast Breeder Project Committee, an agen-
cy for steering breeder matters established by
the Federal Ministry for Education and Sci-
ence, then called a meeting. In March 1970,
the Project Committee established an ad hoc
committee assessing the technical maturity of
the SNR 300, which was chaired by Dr. Eitz,
Managing Director of GfK/Experimental Fa-
cilities. Other members were Dr. Däunert,
BMBW; Dr. Keßler, GfK; Mr. Koop, RWE, and
the author of this report. After six meetings,
the Committee surprisingly found in
June 1970 that the SNR 300 was not yet ready
for construction, as a number of technical
preconditions would not be met by the envis-
Artist's impression ofthe Kalkar
Nuclear Power Station (state as
of 1971, still without the cooling
tower).
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aged construction date. Those were conditions spelled out in the appropriation de-
cision of 1966, five of which had to be handled by Interatom (A1 - A5), three by GfK
(B 1 - B3), before construction of the SNR 300 could be started.74
The so-called "Essential A3" was considered particularly important; it was associated
with KNK and, in part, with the Hengelo component test facility. This is what it said:
"Management of sodium technology by making use of the experience ac-
cumulated by that date in the 5 MW Experimental Facility at Interatom
and in KNK. This includes, in particular, the successful commissioning of
KNK... "75
In view of the technical problems in commissioning KNK as described in Section 1.5
above it was easy to see that essential A3 would not be met before the autumn of
1971. Although the planners tried to interpret this appropriation condition as a dem-
onstration of the feasibility of KNK, thus weakening its impact, Dr. Schuster as Chair-
man ofthe Project Committee insisted that Interatom conduct a kind of "trial run" in
the form of KNK before being awarded the SNR 300 contract.76 Finally, agreement
was reached on considering essential A3 to have been met as soon as KNK was oper-
ated at 50% of its rated power. Should that be unattainable by late 1971, another
committee would be set up to look into the causes. All of a sudden, commissioning
KNK had become very important. KNK I c1early enjoyed a higher priority than KNK 11,
as was underlined every day by the efforts made on site by the Interatom team.
Yet, the KNK essential was not fulfi·lled in time. Especially the aerosol problem asso-
ciated with the rotating top shield was very time consuming. The timetable was
strained also by the sodium fire in the secondary system in March 1971, because of
the lengthy c1eanup phase following the incident. As announced, the Project Com-
mittee therefore set up another committee that was to look into the "causes of the
delays in the schedule of KNK," and assess their relevance to the SNR 300. The mem-
bers of that subcommittee included Dr. Däunert, BMBW; Mr. Koop, RWE;
Messrs. Stöhr, Guthmann, Dr. Herberg, all of Interatom; Dr. Brudermüller, KBG; and
the author as chairman. The final report presented by that committee77 listed some
25 minor and major events in KNK which had prevented the commissioning deadline
from being met; in addition, a "Iist of risks" was presented with areas in which in-
sufficient knowledge could be assumed to exist with respect to the SNR 300 breeder.
In the opinion of the committee, operation of KNK at 50% of its rated power was not
possible before 1972.78
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That prediction turned out to be correct. On August 9, 1972 KNK, running at 55%
power, for the first time supplied electricity into the Badenwerk utility grid. How-
ever, despite its commissioning problems, KNK had not delayed the SNR 300 project.
Additional requirements imposed by the licensing authorities and by the customer
consortium in the meantime had delayed the start of construction of the SNR 300 by
two years, from April 1971 to April 1973. Moving the site from Weisweiler to Kalkar,
and changing plans from a cylindrical to a rectangular containment, had been par-
ticularly time consuming in this respect.
2.1.3 A Bad Surprise
Let us return to KNK 11.
After the positive outcome of the feasibility study and the evaluation by NUS,
GfK/VA in June 1970 had filed with the Stuttgart licensing authority an application
for conversion of KNK I and operation of KNK 11 with an unmoderated core. The ap-
plication had been accompanied by a three-volume report with technical descrip-
tions and documents containing the details of the modifications of KNK I to KNK 11.
The applicants expected a nuclear license based on the old KNK I facility, which had
already been examined by expert consultants and licensed; expressed in the jargon
of that time: a so-called modification permit was applied for.
At long last, in the autumn of 1971, the licensing authority responded to the applica-
tion filed, creating a profound surprise: The conversion of KNK I to KNK 11 was con-
sidered a material alteration in the sense of Section 7 of the German Atomic Energy
Act:
Any person who constructs... a stationary installation... or who materially
alters such installation, or its operation, shall require a /icense. "... "A /i-
cense may be granted only if every necessary precaution has been taken
in the light of the state of the art... 11
At the same time, the authority announced its intention to impose extensive condi-
tions in the fields of emergency core cooling, earthquake protection, and power ex-
cursions. In addition, the entire plant, including the existing old KNK I plant, would
have to be made the subject of new expert examination and new permits in which
the advanced state of the art would have to be taken into account. Express mention
was made of the need to reassess the site of the plant on the premises of the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center. No doubt, the intense SNR 300 debate between
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1970 and 1972 had contributed to that official decision. This was true in particular of
the site, as the rejection of Weisweiler was still very much in everybody's mind.
The author of this report will forever remember the moment when, on his trip back
from the Stuttgart licensing authority in October 1971, he realized that KNK 11 had
become incalculable because of the backfitting measures now to be expected and
the unfathomable influences of the SNR. A project analysis conducted right away to-
gether with the VA Management at that time (Dr. Eitz, Dr. Tebbert) culminated in a
nocturnal dispatch of a huge number of cables canceling and suspending, respec-
tively, all contracts for KNK 11.79
The fate of the KNK 11 project was wide open again.
2.1.4 Will the SNR 300 Outpace KNK 111
Concern was feit even in distant Bonn.
Expecting a speedy development of KNK 11, the Federal Ministry for Research had ap-
propriated funds amounting to DM 69.3 million already in 1971.80 Of that amount,
some DM 40 million had been spent on purchasing the fuel (approx. DM 30 million)
and on preplanning activities and experiments at Interatom (approx. DM 10 million).
Part of those funds would have been lost forever, had the KNK 11 project been termi-
nated now.
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Time schedule for KNK I, KNK 11, and SNR 300 (state as of 1972).
There was another horror scenario haunting the persons responsible at the Federal
Ministry for Education and Science even more: If both KNK 11 and the SNR 300 were
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built, it was no longer impossible for the SNR 300 to be commissioned before KNK 11.
For, at the 1971 Status Report of the Fast Breeder Project, it had been announced:
"The actual start of construction is to be in April 1972. Assuming a con-
struction period of five years, this means that the SNR 300 could start its tri-
al power operation in the first six months of 1977. "81
If the hit-and-miss mode experienced in commissioning KNK I continued, and if fur-
ther time consuming conditions had to be fulfilled in converting and commissioning
KNK 11, there was hardly anybody who would guarantee regular KNK 11 operation be-
fore 1977.
As always when in need of good (inexpensive) advice, the Federal Ministry for Educa-
tion and Science appointed a committee. It was the third committee within eighteen
months discussing aspects of the KNK project. It was called "ad hoc Committee Veri-
fying the KNK 11 Project." This time, a neutral member was appointed chairman,
namely Mr. Kallenbach, Executive Board Member of the EVS electricity utility in
Stuttgart, a company involved neither in KNK 11 nor in the SNR 300. The staffing of
the committee was calibrated very nicely: Dr. Mausbeck (Interatom), Dr. Engelmann,
Dr. Eitz, and the author (all KfK) probably were supposed to inject the expert knowl-
edge about the project, but were considered proponents of KNK 11; they were ac-
companied by the high temperature expert of the Jülich Nuclear Research Center
(Dr. Bergmann), the officer at BMBW responsible for the German Advisory Commit-
tee on Reactor Safeguards (Dr. Schnurer), and the future head of SNR 300 operations
(Mr. Koop).82 The most intricate questions were asked bya non-member of the com-
mittee, BMBW unit head Dr. Lorenzen, and his assistant, Dr. Däunert. Probably an-
ticipating the questions he would be asked by his superiors, he played the devil's ad-
vocate by asking for all the important information about the status and develop-
ment of the project.
For four meetings, the committee delved into the technical risks of the modification
of KNK 11, its benefits to the irradiation program83 and to breeder development84,
and the potential schedule of KNK 11 and the SNR 300. The committee jointly arrived
at the conclusion that the benefit of KNK 11 continued to exist, and that it would help
to reduce greatly the technical risks of the large SNR 300 facility.85 For that reason it
was recommended to continue to pursue the KNK 11 project. However, this was tied
to two major conditions: The technical expert examination by the German Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (RSK), which was about to be started, had to pro-
duce a positive finding, and the lead of KNK 11 over the SNR 300 - with respect to the
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commissioning dates of the two power plants - should not underrun three or four
years.
At that point in time, nobody could have guessed that especially this last condition
would be so easy to meet.
2.1.5 RSK Vote and KNK 11 Delivery Contract
The documents for the various technical subcommittees of the German Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards were prepared speedily throughout 1972. The
RSK vote was expressed in January 1973, and quite positive it was:
"Within its discussions of a recommendation about the site and the safety
concept the RSK examined the major safety issues associated with the in-
stallation of a fast core in KNK. .. It recommends to BMBW to approve the
granting of apermit for the site and for the safety concept. "86
The most important factor was the RSK approval of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
Center as a site, for a change in location, the way Weisweiler had been replaced by
Kalkar, would have been impossible in an existing plant, such as KNK. Yet, the expert
consultants formulated some technical conditions with far reaching implications.
There was, for instance, the requirement of an emergency core cooling system to be
designed as a third heat sink, in addition to the air cooler and the condenser. For this
purpose, the gap between the vessel and the double tank could be used for gas cool-
ing. Complete redundancy in plant supplies and electricity later was achieved byan
emergency weil specially drilled for this purpose, and an emergency Diesel power
plant installed in a vault.
As with the SNR 300, increased attention was to bedevoted to the Bethe-Tait acci-
dent, which could cause core meltdown. In addition to an analysis of the negative
coolant coefficient, upgrading the instrumentation by installing reactimeters, etc.,
was demanded. Moreover, a weighty top shield c1amping system was to be installed.
All predictive estimates were exceeded by far by the expense required to upgrade
the old KNK I system against seismic impacts. The piping of a sodium system is re-
strained in soft suspensions because of the thermal expansion it undergoes and, as a
consequence, by its very nature it is susceptible to the excitation of vibrations; at-
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taching it with shock absorbers at precalculated points was a very time consuming
and costly affair in ~he ensuing conversion phase to follow.
Also physical security, i. e. protection of
the plant against sabotage and terror-
ism, was not easy to achieve. It is almost
impossible to harmonize the require-
ments of traditional accident protection
(as many open escape doors as possible)
with those of physical security (only very
few doors, and those should be locked,
too).
The positive vote by RSK was the
necessary prerequisite for concluding
the KNK 11 delivery contract with
Interatom. It was signed in June 1974 Physical security at KNK.
after three days of almost continuous negotiations among Dr. Traube,
Mr. Brakelmann, Dr. Tebbert, and the author. All services and deliveries to be made
by Interatom were laid down: complete detailed planning of KNK 11; manufacturing
the reactor components; assembling the fuel elements; installing the components in
the plant, including the process computer. In addition, the engineering impact of
those legal conditions which had already been imposed had to be covered.87
Among the most important components to be provided by Interatom were the fuel
element store with its handling facilities, the reactor top shield c1amping system, the
structural parts of the core, and the primary and secondary shutdown systems. The
fuel rods for the core were manufactured by Alkem and RBU, both at Hanau; for the
central zone and the outer ring zone of the inner core section, nearly 2000 U02-PU02
fuel rods had to be manufactured.
The KNK 11 delivery contract was relatively complicated in structure, in principle, be-
cause it covered the conversion of an existing plant long since accepted under a pre-
vious contract. New components, such as the fuel elements or the shutdown systems,
were intimately connected with existing components, which made for difficult defi-
nitions in liability, warranty and guarantees. Also when it came to personnel, Inter-
atom had to use the assistance of the operator, KBG, without this being allowed to
mix up responsibilities for each and every step. Moreover, the conditions which
would be contained in the expert opinions in the partial permits to be issued at a lat-
er date were not yet known, or could be only "guessed at." As a price model for the
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delivery contract concluded between GfK/VA and Interatom, therefore, a cost price
with an upper limit was agreed upon.
Project Management wanted to keep the total cost of KNK 11 for all these deliveries
and services by Interatom, fuel purchase, fuel element fabrication, and experiments
during the construction phase, below DM 100 million.88 They ultimately succeeded
in achieving this goal thanks to the provision, free of charge, of two MOX fuel ele-
ments by Belgonucleaire in compensation for the irradiation, also free of charge, of
those elements in KNK 11. The accounts on the entire KNK 11 project were settled four
years later at a total of DM 140 million. The extra cost resulted from a much longer
conversion phase and from many unexpected demands by the licensing authority in
the wake of the conditions imposed upon the SNR 300. Considering that cost over-
runs of the SNR 300 and the THTR amounted to approximately 400%, the 40% over-
run in KNK 11 appears quite tolerable.
2.2 KNK 11 Design
2.2.1 Reactor Core and Fuel Elements
Designing the reactor core of KNK 11 was ademanding task. Under the boundary con-
ditions established by the KNK I plant, primarily these goals were to be achieved:
(1) Irradiation of a statistically sufficient number of breeder fuel rods in fuel ele-
ments of the type planned for use in the SNR 300.
(2) Use of fuels typical of breeder reactors in the inner test elements, and establish-
ment of a breeder-Iike neutron spectrum.
(3) Achieving representative powers per rod unit length of up to 435 W/cm.
(4) Achieving sufficient excess reactivity and in-pile times; for the first core, a burn-
up of 80,000 MWd/t had been envisaged.89.90
The existing KNK I plant established narrow limits for KNK 11 in respect of its thermal
power, coolant flow, and permissible pressure loss.91 Also the fundamentallattice of
the core elements and the positions of the absorbers were to be adopted from KNK I;
merely the central secondary shutdown position was c1eared for one test element.92
Moreover, the neutron physics core design was to ensure a negative Doppler coeffi-
cient of sufficient magnitude.93.94.95
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The result of all these considerations was a two-zone core with 29 fuel elements. The
inner test zone with seven fuel elements was to ensure the test conditions, while the
outer driver zone had to provide criticality. As the KNK 11 core was smaller than the
thermal KNK I core, an additional five blanket elements could be accommodated on
externallattice positions.96,97
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In contrast to conditions in KNK I, the power coefficient of the core was always nega-
tive. To ensure a sufficient Doppler coefficient, the spectrum in the U-238 resonance
range was additionally raised by zirconium hydride rod moderators in the second
row of driver elements. This made the neutron spectrum of the driver zone slightly
softer, and that of the test zone slightly harder, than in the SNR 300. For energies
above 0.1 MeV, the neutron flux in the KNK 11 core attained roughly half the level it
had in the SNR 300. As precisely that energy range is responsible for radiation effects
in the c1adding tube, KNK 11 was excellently suited for in-pile tests. 98,99
The fuel elements of the test zone were to incorporate 211 fuel rods each; merely
the central element was equipped with 169 fuel rods. The diameter of the cylindrical
fuel rods was 6 mm, which was identical to the design chosen for the first core of the
SNR 300. For the c1adding tube, three austenitic materials with numbers 1.4970,
1.4981, 1.4988 were planned in various metallurgical conditions. The fuel consisted
of mixed PU02 and U02 in a mixing ratio of 30 : 70% sintered into pellets. 100
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The fuel smear density was 80% of the theoretical density, which offered sufficient
porosity in the fuel to accommodate the fission products. The fuel density had been
defined at 86.5% of the theoretical density, and the as-fabricated c1earance between
the pellet and c1adding tube had been fixed at 155 pm. Specifying
hypostoichiometric fuel was to achieve better chemical compatibility of the c1adding
tube with the fue!.
Above and below the fuel stack there was one stack each of pellets of fertile material
integrated into the fuel rod. Below the active fuel rod region, the fission product gas
plenum had been designed to 40 bar. Engineered safeguards design was made with
the IAMBUS fuel rod computer program. The neutron physics methods and calcula-
tions were backed by a critical experiment which had been performed in SNEAK in
Karlsruhe in 1968.101
The fuel rods were held in place by axially staggered grid-type spacers, which were
said to offer thermohydraulic advantages over competing concepts. Most of them
were spark eroded spacers; one innermost ring element of the test zone was
equipped with a honeycomb spacer. A special mixing head was to facilitate tempera-
ture monitoring of the fuel elements.
The rods of the absorbers had a diameter of 10.3 mm and were filled with B4C pellets
and granulate, respectively. The helical fins ensuring the spacer function were inte-
grated into the c1adding tube. Below the absorber stack there was a gas plenum ac-
commodating the helium gas generated in B 10 by neutron absorption. The absorber
concept was backed experimentally by earlier in-pile experiments conducted in the
Rapsodie reactor at Cadarache.
2.2.2 Safety and Instrumentation
In the design of KNK I1 much importance was attached to preventive safety. The con-
cept implied, above all, the timely detection of losses of coolant flow in the fuel ele-
ments, and a reliable decay heat removal capacity with the reactor shut down. Un-
like prototype-size fast breeders (such as Kalkar), KNK 11 was favored by its low fuel
mass and by the void coefficient being negative throughout. In addition, the plant
had a highly heterogeneous core structure ensuring incoherent accident develop-
ment. 102
There were three instrumented safety barriers for the detection of local losses of
coolant flow in the core, namely the DND system for the detection of delayed neu-
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trons, the thermocouples at the fuel element outlets, and the reactimeter. The DND
system indicated the existence of emitters of delayed neutrons in the coolant and, in
this way, the presence of free fuel surfaces in the core. The response time of the DND
monitors was on the order of minutes; their sensitivity was deemed to be sufficient
to detect blockages with a free fuel surface of approx. 5 cm 2, i. e., before the onset
of local boiling.
Integral flow reductions in elements of the test and the driver zones to less than 90%
of the rated flow were to be detected by individual monitoring of the outlet tem-
peratures of all test and driver elements. Impurities of various dimensions not re-
moved by the plant c1eanup system were to be retained at the sieve-like inlet struc-
ture of the fuel elements or at the lowest spacer level in the region of the fission
product gas plenum.
Slowly growing blockages of this type were detected by the system long before the
onset of integral boiling. Even the very unlikely case of fast, almost complete plug-
ging of the flow area was detected in time before, or shortly after, the onset of in-
tegral boiling. Sudden total blockages were excluded by the special design of the
coolant inlet zone.
The reactimeter was a boiling detection system able to monitor the decrease of reac-
tivity in the course of boiling. The shutdown limit was at -8 cents. In the driver ele-
ments, stable boiling without interrupting rod cooling was most likely to occur be-
cause of the low bundle pressure loss, while unstable boiling followed by "burn-out"
was more likely to occur in the test zone. The reactimeter was a device for reactivity
measurement. It had a variable source term and nine variable measurement ranges
between 2.5 cents and 10 dollars. The unit was able to indicate promptly both nega-
tive and positive reactivity changes. 103,104,105
The RSK demanded that the installations for decay heat removal be supplemented
bya diverse, physically separate emergency core cooling system in the conversion to
KNK 11. This was achieved by direct gas cooling of the wall of the reactor vessel. For
this purpose, an existing nitrogen system was upgraded so that nitrogen coolant
permeated the gap between the wall of the reactor vessel and the wall of the guard
vessel from top to bottom as soon as redundant change-over valves had been actu-
ated. The nitrogen circuit was recooled by the emergency cooling water supply sys-
tem. The water was extracted from the fresh water system of the Nuclear Research
Center or from an emergency weil specially drilled for that purpose.
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An additional Diesel power
plant was installed to gen-
erate electricity for the
emergency core cooling
components. It was located
in aseparate building pro-
tected against seismic im-
pacts and sabotage which
contained also the neces-
sary switching and moni-
toring installations. The
emergency Diesel power
plant building was de-
signed so that an assumed
airplane crash would not
cause the plant electricity
supply and the Diesel sys-
tem to fail simultaneously.
The thermal design of the emergency core cooling system was based on an accident
defined by the expert consultants in which, after a leakage in the unprotected sec-
tion of a primary system, the isolation valves of both systems would dose at the same
time. A delay of thirty minutes was assumed for actuation of the emergency core
cooling system. Thermal calculations performed by means of the NOTUNG computer
code demonstrated that meltdown of the reactor core was avoided even in this hy-
pothetical case. 106,107
2.2.3 Protection against Seismic Events
In 1971, when the conceptual design of the conversion of KNK I to KNK 11 was being
discussed, the design philosophy for seismic loads affecting nuclear power plants was
tightened up considerably on the occasion of the 1st SMIRT conference in Germany.
Instead of only steady state accelerations, dynamic effects now were to be taken in-
to account as weil. KTA Rule 2201 set forth the seismic design of nudear power
plants; accordingly, all those structural parts and plant components had to be de-
signed earthquake-proof which were required to shut the reactor down, remove the
decay heat, and prevent releases of radioactive substances. 10S
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For KNK 11, this requirement initially was to be met by the proper demonstrations
and by upgrading the primary system as weil as the newly added emergency core
cooling system. However, anticipating the tighter criteria imposed by the German
Federal Ministry of the Interior, the expert consultants demanded the same proof for
the whole secondary system. This increased the amount of work bya factor of 5 over
earlier concepts. 109
It had to be demonstrated that the components of the heat transfer system, such as
pipes, sustained seismic loads; in case of doubt, they had to be upgraded. This was
possible either by reinforcing structures or by increasing the vibrational mode of that
component in order to achieve lower acceleration levels and, consequently, lower
load forces. It primarily meant that the component under discussion had to be tied to
parts of the building or to platforms which, of course, had to be stiff enough to sus-
tain such loads.110
KNK steam generator before it was upgraded.
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As no additional forces caused by seismic protection measures must act upon plant
components during normal reactor operation, thermal movement of compon-
ents had to be taken into account as weil. For this reason, shock absorbers were used
which followed changes in length
during slow movements, but
locked almost entirely in fast
movements. In this way, "dynamic
benchmarks" were obtained. The
all-metal shock absorbers used in
KNK 11, which contained no fluid,
were guaranteed to be resistant
to radiation; various different siz-
es were provided in accordance
with the loads encountered. How-
ever, because of the compact de-
sign of KNK it was frequently im-
possible to install as many seismic
shock absorbers as would have
been desirable. 111
A group of approximately twenty people had to be recruited at short notice at
Interatom to perform the dynamic calculations; for almost two years, they were
occupied with vibration and stability calculations and the associated experiments.
STEAM GENERATOR
HOUSlHG
KNK generator after being upgraded
by reinforcement beams.
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They also developed new methods of
computation as weil as computer codes
which, later on, were used also for the
Kalkar SNR 300 prototype. Dynamic
benchmarks found suitable in systems
analyses often turned out to be unfeasi-
ble technically. In most cases, therefore,
numerous iterations in the computer
analyses and design drafts were neces-
sary to arrive at the final solution. Solv-
ing the finite element calculations of
the pipe systems took roughly 350 hours
on the CDC 6200 and CDC 172 host com-
puters at that time. Other design prob-
lems arose because the usability of the
American shock absorbers, which were
supposed to be resistant to temperature
and radiation, had to be demonstrated in lengthy functional tests and quality in-
spections which were run at the manufacturer's site in the United States in the pres-
ence of the expert consultant.
The large components of the heat transfer system, such as the reactor vessel, pumps,
intermediate heat exchanger, air cooler, and steam generator, were the benchmarks
with respect to thermal expansion for the piping. They had to be demonstrated to
have sufficiently high vibrational modes, as a rule, above 10Hz. Where they were
too low, subsequent upgrading was required. For each of these components, obser-
vance of the permissible stress levels for the safe shutdown earthquake load case had
to be demonstrated.
For the reactor vessel and the guard vessel, stresses were demonstrated to be within
the permissible boundaries in an earthquake; no upgrading measures were there-
fore required. This also applied to the main sodium pumps.112
The sodium intermediate heat exchanger constituted the containment boundary,
which meant that particular requirements had to be met in demonstrating its seismic
stability. Because of mass distributions and the physical arrangement, no shock ab-
sorbers could be used in upgrading the sodium intermediate heat exchanger. In-
stead, the existing support structures and their couplings had to be improved. Be-
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cause of cramped space conditions, the components had to be dismantled into small
units for backfitting and assembly. These measures finally resulted in vibrational
modes above 13 Hz in the sodium intermediate heat exchanger.
The seismic design of the steam generator was extremely difficult to achieve because
of the special design features of this component. The meandering bent double tubes
of the two steam generators were supported on the double bottom of the housing;
the headers proper were elastically supported for thermal movement. The steam
generator housing, in turn, rested on struts to ensure heat removal by natural circu-
lation. The seismic qualities of the steam generator coils were demonstrated in the
United States with the assistance of a specialist team from the Hanford Engineering
Development Laboratory (HEDL). In principle, it boiled down to a clever attachment
of the topmost pipes.
A sophisticated finite element model had to be established for dynamic analysis of
the steam generator housing with the depressurization systems. The required rigid
building structure necessitated extensive backfitting measures. Among other things,
a rigid three-dimensional framework structure had to be installed to transmit forces
only to the corners of the building. However, these measures, and others, finally
raised the vibration mode of the building to a level above 9 Hz.
2.2.4 fuel Handling and Spent fuel Management
Handling the hexagonal fuel elements of KNK 11 required modifications to be made
to the transport facilities of KNK I, as KNK I fuel elements had had round contours.
The conveyor-type lifting systems used, in which flat steel conveyors had acted as lift-
ing elements, did not reliably provide the necessary angular positioning capability
for the elements. In addition, swelling of the wrapper tubes in KNK 11 required high-
er tensile and compression forces to be exerted in handling. 113
In the light ·of these considerations, the conveyor-type lifting systems so far used
were abandoned in favor of a new shuffling unit, a machine with a rod-actuated lift-
ing system able to push and pull the fuel elements. It moved elements in the reactor
vessel between a fixed orientating position and the core position to be approached.
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Also storage of the fuel elements had to be modified. The so-called wet store, i. e.
the fuel element store under sodium, was designed so as to accommodate a com-
plete core load of fuel elements and absorber elements. This required a new storage
drum to be designed, which had to be adapted to the dimensions of the fuel ele-
ments. Permanently installed absorbers ensured subcriticality under allioading con-
ditions.
A dry store was planned for the fuel elements not yet irradiated, in which these ele-
ments could be stored under criticality-safe conditions. To make the fuel zone acces-
sible for nuclear safeguards inspections, the sidewalls of the so-called fuel element
wardrobes had to be designed as fold-down walkways.
In the area of disposal, the Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1976 included obliga-
tions for waste management provisions. An excerpt from Sec. 9a reads as folIows:
"Any person who constructs, operates, otherwise holds, materially alters,
closes or disposes of installations within which nuclear fuels are handled, ...
shall ensure that resulting radioactive by-products... are used in a safe
way. .. or, to the extent that this is not possible at the current state of the
art, is not meaningful economically, ... are properly disposed of as radioac-
tive waste... "
A number of aspects had to be taken into account in the disposal of KNK 11 in which
KNK 11 fuel elements differed from typicallight water reactor fuel elements:
(1) The elements contained highly enriched uranium, and those of the test zone in
addition contained 30 per cent by weight of plutonium.
(2) The target burnup of the elements was between 30,000 and 80,000 MWd/t,
which was considerably higher than the LWR burnups at that time (approx. 30 -
40,000 MWd/t).
(3) After the elements had been unloaded from the reactor, sodium adhered to
them, and they had to be taken through special washing and drying steps.
(4) Before they were delivered to the reprocessing plant, fuel element bundles had
to be dismantled, as the reprocessing companies accepted only fuel rods. This
"singulization" could only be carried out in hot cells. 114
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Under the spent fuel management plans,
the fuel elements unloaded from the re-
actor were to be transferred into a
sodium-cooled fuel element store inside
the containment. After a cooling phase of
several months, the length of which de-
pended on burnup, they were to be
stripped of any adherent sodium in a so-
dium washing plant. Then they were to
be encapsulated and transported into the
existing storage pool of the MZFR Multi-
purpose Research Reactor on the KfK
premises and stored there for aperiod of
6 - 12 months. The final stage was to be
the Hot Cells, where the elements were to
be singulized and prepared for shipment
to the French reprocessing plant at
Marcoule.
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Management and disposal of KNK 11
fuel elements (state as of 1975).
The sodium washing plant for spent fuel elements was a new system on the spent
fuel management pathway. The fuel element to be washed was to be inerted in a
container and c1eaned of any adherent sodium by means of slightly superheated
steam. The hydrogen thus produced in the offgas had to be monitored carefully. Fi-
nally, the fuel element was to be dipped into fully demineralized water and dried
with nitrogen.
2.3 The licensing Procedure
2.3.1 The Public Inquiry under the Atomic Energy Act
As a consequence of the decision by the Iicensing authority in Stuttgart to treat the
conversion of KNK I to KNK 11 like the construction of a new plant, a public inquiry
had to be held. The licensing application together with the usual documents, such as
the safety report and expert opinions, therefore was laid open for public inspection
at the office of the mayor at Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen and with the licensing au-
thority in Stuttgart in the summer of 1973. Within the official period for registering
objections, 22 persons and three associations filed objections. Remarkably enough,
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all opponents - in some cases, several members of the same family - came from
Karlsruhe and the immediate vicinity; the phenomenon of "Iong-distance oppo-
nents" or professional traveling "NPP opponents" did not exist at that time. The
most prominent of the three associations was the so-called Rheintal-Aktion (Rhine
Valley Campaign) led by Helmut Wüstenhagen, one of the earliest nuclear power op-
ponents, who disappeared from the nuclear scene rather abruptly in the late seven-
ties.
The hearing was organized at the Nuclear Engineering School of the Karlsruhe Nu-
c1ear Research Center on September 4, 1973. Very few of the opponents, and quite a
large number of visitors and discussants, turned up. Contrary to later practice, almost
all of them were admitted and allowed to ask questions ad hoc. Most of the ques-
tions were about the "hazardous nature" of sodium and the proximity of the nearest
village, Leopoldshafen, to the site of the power plant. Fortunately, the Nuclear En-
gineering School had a scale model which allowed everybody to handle liquid so-
dium and, in this way, obtain a visual impression of this substance whose surface
gleamed like water.
The written objections were dealt with separately and emphasized again in the per-
mit issued later. They concentrated on four points: the hazards associated with plu-
tonium; the accident in the U.S. Enrico Fermi reactor; the fire in the U.S. Rocky Flats
plant; and the recent ruling on fast breeders by a U.S. court of appeals. Remarkably
enough, all these objections were based on foreign critics; at that time, there were
no German eco-institutes formulating objections of their own.
Also in the objection concentrating on the hazards inherent in plutonium, an exter-
nal expert was quoted, the Frenchman, G. L. Verot, who had estimated in the
"Energie Nucleaire" journal that an annual 20 - 100 kg of plutonium would escape
into the environment annually by the turn of the millennium. However, his assess-
ment had been based on outdated process techniques; it was easy to show that the
improved methods of chemical precipitation, ion exchange, and evaporation avail-
able now and in the immediate future would achieve much higher decontamination
factors.
The accident in the Enrico Fermi reactor on October 5, 1966 was caused by a zirco-
nium baffle below the core coming off and subsequently blocking part of the cool-
ant flow. This caused incipient melting in two fuel elements without giving rise to
any major radioactive pollution of the environment. However, the plant was decom-
missioned later, mainly for economic reasons, and has since served as one of the pet
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examples quoted by nuclear opponents to prove their point against breeder technol-
ogy.
At the Rocky Flats plant of the USAEC, self-ignition of plutonium waste occurred in
May 1969; it contaminated various buildings by way of the ventilation system. The
cause of the defect was never disclosed in any detail, as Rocky Flats was a c1assified
nuclear weapon plant.
The decision by the U.S. court of appeals, finally, for the first time required that the
USAEC present an environmental protection report on the American fast breeder
program; this was a far cry from the rejection of breeder reactors by a court of law,
which opponents had cited.
By and large, the public inquiry proceeded very smoothly. After arguments had been
exchanged for a few hours, the Chairman, Mr. Blickle of the State Ministry of Eco-
nomics in Stuttgart, was able to close the proceedings.
2.3.2 Expert Opinions and Permits
The feasibility study in 1968 and the subsequent positive recommendations ex-
pressed by the American NUS company and a few KfK institutes were the precondi-
tions under which planning work on KNK 11 could be continued. All these efforts con-
verged in a three-volume preliminary safety report submitted to the State Ministry
of Economics in Stuttgart as the leading licensing authority in June 1970, together
with the application for apermit under the Atomic Energy Act. Following the deci-
sion by that authority to the effect that the conversion of KNK I to KNK 11 constituted
a major change, a second, revised, safety report was submitted in 1972. In Novem-
ber 1972, the Baden Technical Inspectorate submitted its expert opinion on the site
and the plant concept; it contained the respectable number of 230 conditions im-
posed, comprising conditions in the expert opinion and the documents called for.
After five subcommittee and three full-committee meetings, also the German Advi-
sory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) in January 1973 expressed its positive
vote on the conversion of KNK.
However, the first partial construction permit did not materialize for a long time yet.
First, a considerable part of the conditions expressed in the expert opinions on the
site and the design concept had to be worked on, the documents had to be disclosed
for public inspection, the public inquiry had to be conducted and, above all, the ex-
pert opinion on construction had to be obtained from the Baden Technicallnspec-
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torate. It arrived in the spring of 1975,
again containing more than 200 con-
ditions, but otherwise was very posi-
tive. On May 2, 1975, the 1st Partial
Construction Permit was issued. 115
Escalating licensing requirements under the
Atomic Energy Act in the period 1960-75.
Michael M., 3, holds the tiling documents tor
the FR 2 under his right arm; the stack on the
left are the corresponding documents tor
KNK 1/11.
Conversion proper of KNK, i. e. instal-
lation of the new systems and compo-
nents, proceeded on the basis of other
partial permits. The entire KNK 11 con-
version volume required two partial
construction permits with seven
amendments, which were obtained
between May 1975 and June 1977. The
3rd Partial Construction Permit, under
which the old KNK 1plant was to be in-
corporated in KNK 11 and the combina-
tion of old and new plant components
had to be Iicensed, created particularly
difficult formal problems. This was due
to the different documentation stan-
dards of the two plants as a conse-
quence of the different times at which
they had been built.
The 1st Partial Operating Permit for KNK 11 operation was filed for already in the
spring of 1976; it covered the storage and handling concept. The permit was issued
in May 1977 and included a number of very sophisticated physical protection mea-
sures for the Pu elements. The 2nd Partial Operating Permit, which related to zero-
power operation, bore the date of September 30, 1977. On the basis of a third, re-
vised, safety report, KNK 11 operation at the rated power was finally permitted under
the Atomic Energy Act in March 1978.
The KNK IIlicensing procedure was quite expensive. The three applicants, KfK, KBG,
and Interatom, remained in continuous contact with the State Ministry of Economics
in Stuttgart as the licensing authority proper, and with the State Ministry for Labor,
Health, and Sodal Order (supervisory authority), the State Ministry of the Interior,
and the Federal Ministry of the Interior in matters pertaining to the Advisory Com-
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mittee on Reactor Safeguards (RSK). The leading expert consultant was the Baden
Technical Inspectorate assisted by its sister organizations, the Rhineland Technical
Inspectorate, the Stuttgart and the Palatine Technicallnspectorates, and GRS for spe-
cial matters. Occasionally, sixty specialists were involved in passing expert opinions
on KNK 11. In the line of "conventional" authorities and offices, the Karlsruhe Testing
Agency for Structural Building Stability must be mentioned here as one of the insti-
tutions required to examine most of the seismic measures taken. The State Criminal
Investigation Department in Stuttgart checked the measures of protection against
sabotage and terrorism, thus introducing a slightly unusual touch into the project
management activities.
A few statistical figures perhaps can convey an impression of the expenditures in-
volved in the KNK 11 licensing procedure. The KNK 11 plant was described in three
safety reports to different degrees of detail, each report consisting of three volumes.
The three bulky expert opinions by the Technicallnpectorates based on those reports
contained nearly 600 conditions, which had to be met by the commissioning date of
1977. For this purpose, the applicants submitted additional documents, which accu-
mulated to a stack approximately 7 m high. The documentation of the whole plant
ran into approximately 100 meters of file cases. Between 1972 and 1977, some 1500
safety-related meetings were held, roughly 200 of these at project management lev-
el.
2.3.3 Specification and Documentation
In the licensing procedure under the Atomic Energy Act, all components and systems
must be described as planned and laid down in specifications. Subsequently, the doc-
umentation must prove how the plant was built in actual fact. Consequently, the
specifications indicate what the plant is to be like, while the documentation records
what it really is.116
Also in this area, the state of the art had progressed so much between 1965 and 1975
that it was impossible to simply transfer to KNK 11 the specifications and
documentations of the old KNK I plant without modification. Instead, the licensing
authority requested the expert consultant to examine in detail all KNK I specifica-
tions as to their usability for KNK 11. In a time consuming, costly procedure running
into several million DM, all specifications of the old plant were checked for consis-
tency with the conditions imposed upon the new plant by the Technical Inspectorate
and "upgraded" in a so-called "Index 10 Procedure." Changes of specifications in the
middle of an ongoing, sometimes even completed, manufacturing process were par-
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ticularly expensive and frequently resulted in delays. Many existing systems and com-
ponents achieved a higher safety-related importance in KNK 11; for this reason, the
new "supplementary specification" category came into being.117, 118
In order to find even a relatively c1ear c1assification of the large number of specifica-
tions, the "specification family" category was agreed upon with the supervisory au-
thority. The term meant the summary of all detailed specifications drafted at various
points in time (KNK I, KNK 11) to describe the plans for the same plant component. For
KNK 11, there were 163 specification families for the mechanical sector, 50 for the
electrical engineering sector, and some of these had ten family members.
A similar amount of red tape prevailed in documentation. In this sector, a distinction
was made between old and new documentations, depending on whether docu-
ments referred to KNK I or KNK 11. For all components in KNK 11, there was a supple-
mentary documentation which the respective part carried through all manufacturing
stages. In principle, manufacturing a component was allowed to be started only
after all documents examined by the Technicallnspectorate had become available. In
the acceptance procedure, the manufacturer, operator, and the expert consultant
had to indicate their c1earance on the same sheet of paper. For valid reasons,
Karlsruhe did not accept any component for storage on site which did not bear these
three signatures. 119
2.4 Experience in the Conversion of KNK I into KNK 11
2.4.1 Problems in Sourdng and Manufacture
Purchasing the components and systems for KNK 11 frequently suffered from difficul-
ties in finding suitable sources. This problem was caused by the extremely stringent
quality and acceptance requirements under the Atomic Energy Act. As a conse-
quence, prices often were several factors higher than those of comparable conven-
tional components, merely because of the extreme requirements imposed by the
Technical Inspectorates. However, as numerous companies which had been asked
were unable, or unwilling, to meet the stringent quality requirements - also against
the background of a booming economy - many of them simply submitted no tenders
or quoted prices so high that it would have been impossible to award them a con-
tract. 120
In order to be able to buy some important KNK 11 components at all at reasonable
prices and deadlines, collective orders occasionally were placed together with com-
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ponents for the larger SNR 300 reactor. But in the case of some components even this
junctim - either deliveries for SNR and KNK 11 or no contract for SNR - failed, thus re-
quiring top management level discussions to be initiated in order to motivate poten-
tial suppliers to quote at acceptable conditions.
In some instances, vendors overestimated their technical capability and then had to
be supported by Interatom to such an extent that they were finally able to produce
components ready for installation. The first contracts placed for KNK thus had a cer-
tain teaching function for subsequent contracts placed by the SNR 300 consortium.
One example to be mentioned here is the complicated manufacture of the structural
parts for the fuel elements. (No mention shall be made of those companies which ini-
tially had tried in vain to manufacture them.)
Flowsheet of KNK 11 fuel rod fabrication.
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Problems in many areas were ereated
also by the fabrication of the mixed ox-
ide fuel rods for the test zone. The con-
tract awarded to Alkem in Hanau com-
prised some 2000 PU02-U02 rads.
Alkem so far had manufactured only
200 rods of that type for irradiation
purposes. The mere step of scaling up
to a much bigger lot seemed to invite
difficulties. (Incidentally, 20,000 rods
had to be produced for the SNR 300.)
The first bad surprise encountered was
the susceptibility to cracks of the high-
temperature austenitic c1adding tubes,
when the end eaps were welded in
plaee. Welding to specifications suc-
eeeded only after initiation and extinc-
tion of the are had been moved into
the solid material of the end plug. De-
veloping the new welding teehnique
took almost six months. 121 ,122
Problems were created also by the plutonium delivered, which came from highly
burnt-up light water reactor elements. As a consequence of the unexpectedly long
manufacturing campaign it became highly enriched in americium 141, thus causing a
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radiation protection problem when handled in the gloveboxes. Additional shielding
and more frequent switches of personnel had to be planned for. In addition, the rel-
atively high plutonium content of 30% affected the strictly specified oxygen/metal
ratio and hydrogen adsorption in such a negative way that a number of lots had to
be discarded.123
This playing around with small fabrication lots led to a situation in early 1976 in
which all the enriched uranium had been used up. Until that time, ordering uranium
in the U.S. had been easy, something to be settled almost by postcard. This changed
with the anti-proliferation policy adopted by the new U.S. President Jimmy Carter. It
had an impact even on KNK 11, for 8.8 kg of highly enriched uranium, which had been
ordered and were needed urgently, were not c1eared for export. Only after the Ger-
man Ministry for Foreign Affairs had intervened, the competent U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission was willing to organize a hearing. That hearing was held at the Argonne
National Laboratory (ANL) in the summer of 1977; for several hours, the German cus-
tomers were interrogated in great detail about the causes of the increased quanti-
ties in fuel rod manufacturing. More than one question touched upon trade secrets,
but the German representatives (Dr. Tebbert, the author) could not afford to "skirt"
such questions, for the consequence would have been non-delivery of the material.
That experience with a monopoly holder makes the c1iche of "self sufficiency" ap-
pear in a much more understandable light. 124
The lack of source material for the fuel rods seriously jeopardized the KNK 11 project.
After many futile attempts to purchase the material elsewhere, the number of stand-
by elements had to be reduced in the end. In addition, Alkem, in intense efforts, suc-
cessfully developed a technique of dry reprocessing and reuse of the uranium scrap
which had arisen in the production process. After that process had become ready for
use, the Americans granted c1earance to export the uranium ordered. Whether this
was just a coincidence, we will never know.
2.4.2 Assembly under Difficult Circumstances
The KNK 1 plant was shut down in September 1974 for preparation for conversion.
Assembly work for conversion could not yet be started, as the required permit was
expected to come forth not before the next year.
The main activities in the preparatory phase were concerned with the removal of the
KNK 1 core. The fuel elements were taken to the French SAP facility at Marcoule for
reprocessing. 125 Surprisingly, to the French experts, disassembling the bundles in
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the hot cells at Marcoule turned out to be more difficult than assumed. (The extra
cost charged had to be refused nonetheless, as a fixed price had been agreed upon.)
Also the other core internals, such as absorbers, moderators, and reflector elements,
were washed to remove all traces of sodium, and passed to the KfK collection point
for scrapping. Some of the major steps included the removal of the KNK I drum for
the fuel element wet store under argon as a cover gas. It had become necessary be-
cause of the hexagonal contour of the KNK 11 fuel elements. Finally, mention should
also be made of the replacement of the tops of the sodium main isolating valves; this
step was carried out by the KBG operating crew, incidentally under extremely
cramped space conditions in the primary cel1. 126
The 1st Partial Construction Permit for the conversion into KNK 11 arrived on May 2,
1975. As customarily happens with first permits, it was of the more conceptual type
(" blank permit"). The actual conversion volume was determined in two amend-
ments, which came in July and October of the same year. Now, conversion of the
KNK plant could be started for good.
Under the permits referred to above, also the stores for fresh and spent fuel ele-
ments and the moderator store were installed. Moreover, the emergency cooling sys-
tem with the component loop and the penetration through the containment had
been licensed together with most of the instrumentation and reactor protection sys-
tems. Also the large area of handling, with the fuel handling machine and the shuf-
fling device, could now be addressed.
These conversion activities going on side by side, and the continued operating steps,
such as in-service inspections, handling, repair, and maintenance, necessitated close
harmonization between the responsible KNK operator, KBG, and the responsible
KNK 11 vendor, Interatom. In order to ensure the safety both of the plant and of the
work conducted, some conditions specific to KNK had to be observed:
(1) A reactor plant which had been in operation and accumulated a correspond-
ingly high activity inventory was to be converted; radiological monitoring of
the personnel had to be ensured, and personnel exposure had to be minimized.
(2) Given the large number of simultaneous conversion and examination activities,
there was a possibility of mutual interference; not all systems converted could
be shut down at the same time.
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(3) Many activities, especially those in the primary cells, had to be carried out un-
der extreme conditions, both with respect to cramped space and the tempera-
tures prevailing (40 - 50°C).
Günter Finke, for many years KNK Plant Operations Manager, introduced a job c1ear-
ance procedure which allowed the KNK 11 conversion to be conducted efficiently and
without any accident. A draft directive for maintenance and backfitting activities in
nuclear power plants later issued by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior
(BM!} incorporated major parts of the KNK I job c1earance procedure. 127
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However, the most difficult con-
version measures had yet to be
taken: upgrading the plant
against seismic effects. These
measures were not to be c1eared
until the 2nd Partial Construction
Permit in February 1976 and one
of its amendments of June 1976,
respectively. The immense scope
of this step could not have been
foreseen. Merely detuning the
frequency of the steam gener-
ator casing, together with the
penetrations through the floor
bottom troughs, the roof cover,
and electrical assembly work, im-
plied an expenditure of approx.
10 man-years and the use of
30,000 kg of steel. The heat
transfer system required not only
bracing of a large number of
components, but also 34 seismic
energy absorbers to be installed. Planning and execution of the
In quite a number of places, the conversion of KNK I to KNK 11.
compact design of the plant did
not allow these absorbers to be installed easily. Specific dynamic points derived in a
theoretical systems analysis frequently were impossible to comply with in reality, or
only after extensive dismantling of existing components.
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Solutions required numerous iterations to be made in analysis, design, and feasibility
checks. This necessitated dose cooperation among the designers at Bensberg and the
crew on site in Karlsruhe. Even placing dowels for the installation of seismic energy
absorbers and struts caused problems, for the official rules applied only to concrete
with undamaged reinforcement. Very frequently, the drills hit reinforcing bars,
which meant that the standardized distances between dowels could not be main-
tained; consequently, special permits had to be applied for on the basis of an ap-
proved change in specification, or a brand new design had to be developed.
Also installing the shutdown systems was permitted at a relatively late point in time,
namely in the 5th amendment of May 1977. The functional reliability of these sys-
tems first had to be demonstrated in an extensive experimental program. A proto-
type had to undergo lengthy tests both in water and in sodium. The sodium tests had
to be conducted under conditions very much like those prevailing in a reactor. The
prototype of the primary shutdown system was to survive 2000 scrams, 2800 com-
plete double strokes, and 1,400,000 standard strokes, which had to be demonstrated
in subsequent wear studies. 128
Because of the increasing demands made on specification and documentation, in up-
grading against seismic effects, and the measures of physical security, which will not
be discussed in this paper, both the timetable and personnel planning had to be re-
vised thoroughly several times between 1975 and 1977. In all these areas, the num-
ber of personnel should have been increased as soon as possible, but this was not
easy to achieve, as this requirement conflicted with the long-term personnel plan-
ning of the vendor, Interatom, for the SNR 300. This created special problems for the
KNK 11 project management at Interatom; the responsible Chief Project Manager,
Elmar Guthmann, and his committed Project Leaders, Hubert Andrae and Pe-
ter Romeike, finally produced a workable solution, also thanks to the competent
work of Gerhard Hendl, who returned to KNK as Chief Construction Supervisor.
Short-term delegations from the SNR sector allowed up to 200 persons to be en-
gaged in conversion and operations jobs at KfK for brief periods of time. It fre-
quently happened that the Interatom project managements for KNK and the
Kalkar SNR 300 fought violently for the best breeder engineers within the company.
As the success of these efforts mostly became visible first in KNK, a KNK team devel-
oped at Interatom which was characterized by its special team spirit and devotion to
the Karlsruhe project, led by its mentor, Dr. Mausbeck.129, 130
In retrospect, it is safe to say that the phase of converting KNK I to KNK 11, which had
been planned for only nine months, was absolutely too short. It finally extended
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over two years, from the autumn of 1975 to the autumn of 1977. Within that period
of just two years, enormous achievements were made. Against the background of in-
creasingly tighter criteria in the nuclear field, and in view of the standard put up by
the large SNR 300 plant, an existing thermal plant no longer fully accessible in all its
parts was converted into a fast experimental breeder.
The team who made it possible must be commended on their performance.
2.4.3 The Project Meetings
The three contracting partners, KfK (initially, GfK/VA), Interatom, and KBG, together
worked on the KNK project for 26 years, between 1965 and 1991. Frequently, they
were the joint holders of the permit under the Atomic Energy Act; they always had
to play their roles as builders and owners, designers and vendors, and as operators of
the plant. Frequent discussions were held over these many years, but none of them
so influenced project management as the so-called project meetings. They consti-
tuted the common table around which KfK, Interatom, and KBG met every two or
three weeks in order to analyze the project status and determine the next steps to be
taken. As the author was chairman of that body for twenty years and, in those years,
saw many participants come and go, he would Iike to address also some human as-
pects.
The project meeting was always held in the same room, the so-called OBL Hut, which
was situated in the KNK area on the premises of the Nuclear Research Center. Prep-
arations for the meeting could be sensed roughly one week in advance especially by
a drastic increase in telephone calls, from which conclusions could be drawn about
persons commissioned by KfK or KBG, preferably Interatom, who were deeply in-
volved in this, that or the other "action items" of the previous meeting they had
been assigned as their homework. At the same time, the agenda of the coming
meeting was prepared, for which Interatom had to collect proposals. At this point, at
the latest, the trend for the meeting to come was evident. In addition to the un-
avoidable project topics, it was always attempted to also put items on the agenda
which allowed certain parties to make effective sales pitches, or which allowed the
buck to be passed to some other party, not too obviously, of course. A tempestuous
meeting was to be expected when one of the parties, often KBG, did not even try to
word its agenda item in a neutral way. In such cases, the item did not read "problems
with valve tops," but quite bluntly "maldesign of the valve tops by Interatom. "
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The project meetings began at 9 a.m.; participants from Interatom mostly arrived
thirty minutes earlier in order to hear from their Chief Construction Supervisor dele-
gated to KfK about the most recent events in the plant and, in particular, to sense
the "mood." The seating arrangements in the meeting room were defined precisely;
nobody would have dared to usurp somebody else's accustomed seato On the left, as
seen from the door, were the seats of KBG, on the right those of Interatom; at the
top sat Dr. Brudermüller and the author. One always faced the same person (adver-
sary). Invited experts had to move to the bottom end of the table in the relatively
crammed space; in those years, smokers of any kind were not yet suppressed. Offi-
cers, such as heads of operation or project managers, were required to attend ex of-
fido, otherwise, the three parties were free in selecting their participants. Those in
the know about these events immediately concluded from vacancies or from new ar-
rivals who had fallen in disgrace or who was about to rise. Especially for the plant
crew of KBG it was an honor to be invited to a project meeting.
After the preliminary remarks at the beginning of the meeting, traditionally the Op-
erations Manager of KBG, Mr. Finke, had to deliver the operations report. He often
went into great detail, relying on memoranda by his staff whose handwriting he oc-
casionally had reason to complain about. This was followed by the discussion of topi-
cal points for which a presenter, frequently a guest from Bensberg, mostly had been
nominated in advance. The ensuing debate, as a rule, was held only by the "old cam-
paigners," in the case of KBG, Dr. Brudermüller and Mr. Finke, in addition to the
group leaders (Messrs. Reuter, Zimmermann, Dr. Richard); on the side of Interatom,
it was the project leaders (Dr. Höchel, Messrs. Guthmann, Andrae, Romeike), and
Dr. Mausbeck, who had an immense knowledge of sodium technology and was held
in high esteem as "Mr. Interatom." On the side of KfK, it was particularly
Mr. Schnetgöke, who was competent in many subjects of contract management,
and, ex officio, it was the author as chairman of the discussion. Occasionally also
Mr. Griesenbach, the commercial expert, asked for the floor from the side of the
Interatom section. He must have memorized the complete list of all contractual de-
liveries and performances to be made by his company, for whenever he seemed to
feel that some additional item or service was being asked for, he mentioned extra
costs, just for the record and to be on the safe side. Also as a matter of principle, the
customer immediately and expressly contradicted such claims, also for the record.
It is safe to say that every technical subject of any importance appeared on the agen-
da of the (300) KNK project meetings at least once, if not more often. Some of these
topics stayed there for years, such as the problem items, gas bubbles and control rod
actuating equipment. The participants fully weil realized that they bore responsibil-
Expert and connoisseur alike:
Project Manager Gregor Schnetgöke, KfK.
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ity for the project, each in his area, and had to come to grips with the problems
themselves. This probably caused a kind of group dynamics process to be initiated of
full commitment and active participation, which also fostered active enthusiasm for
the job.
Some entertainment value, especially for the silent participants in the project meet-
ings, was provided by occasional disputes, even arguments. They followed a c1ear
ranking order. Minor skirmishes with Interatom were nothing extraordinary; the re-
presentatives of industry were accustomed to being attacked a bit more forcefully;
probably, it was all included in the price. The discussions within KBG were Iistened to
with slightly more amusement. However, some participants seemed to reach the
peak of enjoyment when the two top ranking representatives of the customer
(Dr. Brudermüller and the author) got into arguments. True, it did not happen too
frequently, but happen it did. For the rest, the healthy regional mix around the ta-
ble, which included Berliners (Finke), people from the Rhine region and Franconia
(Dr. Mausbeck), Swabians (Dr. Brudermüller), and Bavarians (author), ensured that
no bad mood persisted for a very long time.
In most cases, the partici-
pants in the project meet-
ing had had their say by
1 p.m.; all criticism and
frustration had been ex-
pressed, and homework
for the next few weeks
had been assigned. The
unanimous decision then
taken was to have lunch.
As it was a bit late for the
canteen of KfK, whose
qualities were known and
esteemed, the group
mostly opted for the
Kärcherhalle restaurant
in Weingarten. A drink
helped to release the tensions which had accumulated over the previous hours; the
most important project agreements were reconfirmed over steak, and desserts
smoothed the discussions of some easier topics, such as the best organization to be
found for the Siemens group, or whom the Federal Chancellor should appoint the
82
next Minister for Research. After characteristic follow-ups to dessert (Mausbeck: a
Brazil cigar; Höchel: brandy; Romeike: an extra large helping of vanilla ice with
cream) the group members went their respective ways.
They met again for the next project meeting three weeks later.
This procedure took place exactly three hundred times. 131
3. Operation with the KNK 11 First Core
The conversion of KfK was a turbulent phase straining participants to the limits of
their ability. The large number of conditions imposed in the licensing procedure
could not have been foreseen, and it was sometimes very difficult, and took a lot of
engineering skills, to implement them in an existing plant. Quite a number of these
requirements were "duplicates" of conditions imposed on the SNR 300, whose con-
struction at Kalkar had begun in the spring of 1973. Karlsruhe feit Iike being in a
competition with the "big brother," for the Federal Ministry for Research had or-
dered that KNK 11 was to be commissioned at least three or four years prior to the
SNR 300. As the contracts provided for a commissioning date of the SNR 300 in 1979,
KNK 11 should have been started up by 1976 at the latest. However, that was beside
the point, as seismic protection measures were still in full swing in that year, and
commissioning the plant was absolutely out of the question before the end of 1977.
But soon things began to go wrong also in Kalkar. After a speedy start, the project
began to slow down in 1975/76 because the demonstrations of the vessel support
beams demanded by the licensing authority were not produced in time. The reason
for the requirement was the famous, or rather infamous, Bethe-Tait accident, which
was to make life difficult for the SNR 300 also in subsequent years. After 1978, the
Kalkar project almost came to a complete standstill because it was the subject of in-
vestigation by a Committee of Inquiry of the German Federal Parliament for nearly
four years, during which period the authorities no longer issued any substantial con-
struction permits. 132
Thanks to these massive project delays in Kalkar which, as is weil known, were never
recouped, KNK 11 never again ran the risk of being overtaken by the SNR 300 in terms
oftime.
Perhaps it should be added that this was a pity.
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3.1 Operation up to Peak Burnup
3.1.1 Commissioning the Fast Core
As far as was possible under the conditions of conversion, the primary sodium sys-
tems in KNK 11 were continuously maintained in the recirculation mode to keep up
the desired purity of the sodium. The secondary systems had largely been drained for
the attachment of seismic energy absorbers, and were kept under the pressure of an
inert gas. Despite the many activities in the reactor area, the radiation protection
record for the plant crew was very positive. The average exposure dose per person in
1977 amounted only to 41 mrem, which was roughly 10% of the levels normally sus-
tained in spas in the Black Forest and Fichtelgebirge mountains as a natural back-
ground.
Commissioning KNK 11 was begun with trial handling of fuel element dummies and
extensive functional testing of the refueling machine and the reshuffling system.
After these preparatory jobs had been completed, the external round and hexagonal
reflector elements were loaded into the core. In May 1977, the authority issued the
1st Partial Operating Permit for putting the nuclear fuel into the interim store of
KNK 11.133
Zero Power Operation
The 2nd Partial Operating Permit, so eagerly waited for, was issued on Septem-
ber 30, 1977. It finally allowed nuclear commissioning of the plant at a very low pow-
er level, the so-called zero power operation. All necessary preparations had been
made, and it came as no surprise that this measuring campaign, which comprised the
buildup of the critical minimum loading, loading up to the target, calibration of the
shutdown systems, and assessment of the reactivity coefficients, took only six
weeks.134
To reach the critical minimum load, the blanket and the seven U02/Pu02 fuel ele-
ments were loaded in the first step. In an additional four steps, unmoderated as weil
as moderated U02 elements were added. Extrapolation of the final loading step in-
dicated a critical minimum load of 20.6 fuel elements. A compliment should be paid
to the reactor physicists of Interatom, who had estimated 20 + 1 elements in their
advance calculations. KNK 11 went critical for the first time on October 10, 1977; one
week later, also the target core with 29 fuel elements had been built up.
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The following program of measurements for rod calibration served to demonstrate
the availability of sufficient shutdown reactivity in the two shutdown systems. Dif-
ferent measuring techniques were employed to determine this reactivity, e.g., the
compensation method and the fast rod insertion method. Of course, corrections had
to be applied because of the flux deformations caused by movements of the ab-
sorber rads and their interactions. Again, the measured data were in good agree-
ment with the nominal design levels.
Determining the reactivity coefficients completed the program of measurements for
the zero power campaign. For the isothermal temperature coefficient, the sodium
temperature was increased in steps, and the reactivity loss created in this way was
measured by the reactimeter. For measurement of the negative void coefficients, the
sodium had to be drained into the dump tank step by step from the operating level
onward. The results for these coefficients also were in good agreement with precal-
culated values; only one flow coefficient initially was an outlier. 135
Power Operation
After several weeks of high-temperature c1eanup at 400°C the plant was ready for
power operation in early 1978. However, it took untillate March for the permit cov-
ering operation at a maximum of 40% of the design power to come forth. The reac-
tor power was increased in small preset steps, the full enthalpy rise of 160°C was built
up across the reactor core, and only one month later KNK 11 generated electricity and
was connected to the Badenwerk power grid for several weeks without any prob-
lem. 136,137
In August 1978, the 3rd Partial Operating Permit was achieved, which covered opera-
tion up to 100% of the rated power. Increasing the power had become almost a rou-
tine event, but at 60% of the rated power an unforeseen event occurred: the plant
was shut down automatically by an unscheduled scram activated by the "negative re-
activity high" limit. That limit had been set to -7.3 cents and was monitored by three
reactimeters each in the primary and secondary shutdown systems. In KNK 11 safety
philosophy, the underlying idea was protection against losses of coolant flow and
the detection of boiling events.
These scrams occurred repeatedly and caused extensive thinking and actions by the
three contracting parties. A more detailed description will be given in the next sec-
tion.
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Very soon it was possible to exclude the occurrence of boiling processes with bubble
formation in the core. Instead, the experts rightly thought of entrained bubbles of
the argon cover gas, which caused negative step changes in reactivity when passing
through the core. After a degassing line had been found to be the main cause, and
corrections had been made, KNK 11 was restarted and kept in operation at more than
60% power. In this way, full power was reached for the first time on March 3,1979;
on November 6, 1980, after the gas bubble problem had been solved, the plant was
delivered by Interatom to KfK, and KfK charged KBG with the responsibility for plant
operation.
The first fast breeder reactor in the Federal Republic of Germany had been commis-
sioned.
KNK is delivered in
the control room
(trom lett):
Dr. Mausbeck (Interatom),
the author (KfK).
3.1.2 Problems with Gas Bubbles
The gas bubbles passing through KNK 11 created quite a stir in the media. The daily
newscast on the first TV channel (ARD) on January 16, 1979 reported that KNK 1I
"had failed temporarily in December." FDP Member of Parliament Hölscher even ad-
dressed a widely disseminated query to the Federal Government "about severe de-
fects in the KNK experimental reactor and uncontrollable changes in criticality," and
the untiring breeder critic Kurt Rudzinski, finally, devoted a long article to this event
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in the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" under the headline, "The Accident at the
Karlsruhe Experimental Breeder Reactor."138
The reason for the sudden interest of nuclear critics and the journalists associated
with them was evident. In faraway Bonn, the Committee of Inquiry mentioned above
was looking into the events initiating a potential core meltdown in a breeder reac-
tor, and the gas bubbles in KNK II fitted this scenario very nicely. Extrapolated to the
larger SNR 300, they would have caused positive reactivity step increases in that
plant and, consequently, not initiated harmless scrams, as in KNK 11, but power in-
creases and, potentially, meltdown of the fuel elements. Although Dr. Helmut
Hübe!, the renowned safety expert of Interatom, called these conjectures absurd, al-
so by referring to the relatively small amount of gas, and to the gas bubble separator
installed in the SNR 300, among other things, "semper aliquid haeret."139
Cross section through the KNK 11 primary system.
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There were ample reasons, both operational and political, to come to grips with the
gas bubble problem. This was managed in the period between 1978 and 1980 in a
very committed joint effort by the institutes of KfK (in particular INR, IMF, and IRE),
the operator, KBG, and above all the vendor, Interatom. Dr. Höchel, in his company,
coordinated all the studies, making the whole issue his very own problem child. Over
this period of two years,
the "gas bubbles" item
was permanentlyon the
agenda of all project
meetings and was de-
bated in all its ramifica-
tions. The project docu-
mentation covering this
problem runs to several
meters of files. In reality,
r'~"-+''''' the problem was so diffi-
L__ j REACTORCORE cult to address because
the events took place in
the core of a reactor in
operation, to which ac-
cess was possible only to
a limited extent because
of radiation protec-
tion. 140
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Very soon it was possible to exclude radial core oscillations, levitation of fuel ele-
ments, and absorber osciliations as potential causes of the reactivity changes. 141 ,142
Instead, it had become apparent that argon was transported from the cover gas ple-
num into the primary system through a degassing li ne for the old KNK I plant. When
this pathway was blocked by a throttle, the amount of gas entering dropped to
approx. 1% of the original volume. The remaining sources now were only the plena
of the primary sodium pumps.143
It was also seen that the entrained gas accumulated in certain spots for some time.
Potential locations could have been the valve tops, the flow orifice adjustment sys-
tem and, possibly, the internal sodium plena. The gas then gushed through the core
when this gas accumulator was discharged sporadically. This produced negative reac-
tivity effects which, after registration by the very sensitive setting of the reactor pro-
tection system, initiated scrams. When many experiments with deliberate additions
of gas to the primary sodium turned this assumption into a certainty, ways were con-
sidered to discharge these accumulators in a safe way. Spin separators located in the
region of the so-called grid plate inserts underneath the core were considered a pos-
sibility. They were to pass the argon bubbles released in the accumulator in such a
way that they had to flow not through the active core region, but through the reflec-
tor zone, which had no impact on reactivity.144, 145
This turned out to be the correct solution. The mode of action of these gas separators
was tested in sophisticated air and water test rigs at Interatom. 146,147 Their installa-
tion together with the second core of KNK 11 was a complete success. Together with
certain modifications and the instrumentation of KNK 11 (reactimeter!) the gas bub-
ble problem has been solved in a way compatible with plant operation, and the sub-
ject soon ceased to be of interest to the publie.
3.1.3 100,000 MWd/t Burnup Attained
Let us return to the operating history of the first core in KNK 11.
After a solution had been found of the gas bubble problem which was tolerable
from the operational point of view, irradiation of the test zone and the driver zone
was continued. However, very soon after full power operation had been reached in
April 1979, the xenon activity in the cover gas was observed to rise suddenly. Every
indication pointed at a fuel element c1adding defect, the first ever in KNK, as the old
KNK I plant was known to have suffered from no such event. At that time, no exper-
ience existed in localizing failed fuel elements in the core structure. Therefore a de-
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cision was taken in favor of individual tests to be conducted in the fuel handling ma-
chine. After some three weeks, the failed fuel element had to be identified; it was a
special test element which, for lack of standby elements of the same type, had to be
replaced by an ordinary test zone element.148
When another fuel element failed approximately one year later, in May 1980 - both
cases c1early being early defects -, a little more courage was demonstrated. The ele-
ment was left in the core for some months as a so-called gas leaker until it was possi-
ble to detect the emissions of delayed neutrons by the DND system. Also the further
development of the defect was observed for another eighteen days, in which KNK 11
was operated under part load and load tilting conditions. This mode of operation
provided important findings for the localization of failed fuel elements, which are
valuable especially for the second core of KNK 11 because of the much larger number
of fuel c1adding failures. In addition, experience was accumulated about the disper-
sion of fuel into sodium; these findings were of immense international interest, es-
pecially in the exchange with Japan.149, 150
The deadline was reached on
August 30, 1982: the 400 full-power days
were attained without any further c1adding
tube defects. In the test zone, a local peak
burnup of 100,000 MWd/t was attained,
which corresponded to an average of
66,100 MWd/t. Reaching this impressive tar-
get level was an immense source of motiva-
, '
An important milestone was reached in August 1981: 5 U02/PU02 fuel elements of
the test zone, with more than one thousand fuel rods, had reached the contractual
target burnup of 60,000 MWd/t after 255 full-power days. This achievement was im-
portant also to colleagues working on the SNR 300 project, the design of the fuel ele-
ments in both reactors being very similar. Be-
cause of existing reactivity reserves, apermit
for a so-called life extension was applied for
with the licensing authority; this was a kind
of extended operating permit, which was
granted up to 355 full-power days. When
310 full-power days had been reached in late
1981, another application for 400 full-power
days was filed and also approved by the
authority.
Cover page of the KNK calendar.
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tion for everybody involved in the KNK 11 project. It meant that the criteria set in-
house had been exceeded by far, an achievement significant also by international
standards. The French Phfmix at that time had just reached 90,000, the Japanese
JOVO only 50,000 MWd/t. The contractual target burnup of the SNR 300 had been
exceeded by a full 20%. The press took notice of that record burnup achieved by
KNK 11, as was reflected in many articles and reports. 151 ,152
Project Management used the event as a reason for having a calendar designed for
the following year, 1983, with Iithos drafted by an artist showing subjects related to
KfK. The calendar was a hit; the circumstances surrounding its production will for-
ever be cherished memories of all participants.
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This also applied to the steam generators,
which had been run for 19,000 hours. Only
in 1972, as reported above, there had been
one leak in a gas pore in the course of KNK 1
operation; the cause obviously had been a
manufacturing defect. Afterwards, no fur-
ther sodium-water interactions had oc-
curred - incidentally, up to the end of the
project in 1991. Also other important com-
ponents, such as the cold traps for sodium
purification, worked without any failure.
On the other hand, the pump tubes of the
electromagnetic pumps had had to be re-
placed several times because of minor leak-
ages. 153
In 1982, an aggregate operating experience of roughly ten years was available for
KNK I plus KNK 11. This applied in particular to the components of the sodium loops
which, irrespective of any reactor outages, were in operation almost continuously.
The main sodium pumps and intermediate heat exchangers, for instance, had at-
tained 84,000 hours of operation, for they
had been in operation almost continuously
since the sodium had been loaded. No ma-
jor defects or failures had occurred.
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One reason for this smooth functioning of the components certainly had been the
regular preventive maintenance within the annual revision and repair phase. This
was normally organized in the autumn and c1aimed four weeks, sometimes even
more, of the time of the KBG crew headed by Erich Zimmermann. 154 At the same
time, all maintenance and repair jobs were painstakingly recorded statistically with
the assistance of the process computer. 155 In a joint effort with Interatom, these re-
liability data were entered also into risk analyses of important safety systems, e.g. in
the SNR 300, or caused improvements in design whenever replacement parts had to
be ordered. In this way, the mean values of faultfree periods of use, repair times, pe-
riods of unavailability, etc. were determined for several hundreds of components
and taken into account in reliability analyses. 156
All in-service inspections were listed in the inspection manual with respect to type,
scope, deadline, etc.; in addition, the manual contained detailed instructions and
step-by-step programs. Additional special inspections had already been conducted in
the conversion phase, especially of the vessel and the primary piping. Most of these
inspections comprised pressure tests and leak tests as weil as internal and external in-
spections. The pressure test was run in the primary sodium system at 1.1 times the de-
sign level, i.e., at 13.1 bar over a holding time of 30 minutes. Internal inspections
were conducted of the reactor vessel, among other components; also the gap be-
tween the vessel and the rotary top, which was known to be susceptible to blockage
by sodium aerosols, was inspected by means of endoscopes. 157,158
3.2. Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
3.2.1 Fuel Reprocessing and Recycling
One man's food is another man's poison.
This dictum also applied to the operation of KNK 11 with the first core. The premature
defect arising in a mixed oxide fuel element at the modest burnup of 17,500 MWd/t
certainly was no source of joy to the operator, KBG, and even less so to the manufac-
turer, Belgonucleaire, which had made the element available free of charge to KfK
for irradiation. At the same time, the event sparked off many practical and theoreti-
cal activities within the external fuel cycle, which will be described below. 159
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Disassembly into Fuel Rods
The failed fuel element with the number NY 208 BN - another element was added
later with a burnup of 48,000 MWd/t - was taken out of the sodium store, after
17 months of cooling time, and blown with argon for some thirty minutes within the
fuel handling machine. Further c1eaning in the washing plant was omitted deliber-
ately, as the defect was to be preserved in its original form, and fuel was to be pre-
vented from escaping. The element was taken to the adjacent Hot Cells in the so-
called fuel element transport flask. After fifteen years of experience in disassembling
small bundles from the FR2, MZFR, and KNK I reactors, this was the first element
reaching the Hot Cells which had more than 200 rods.160, 161
The Hot Cells had facilities to cope even
with this situation, a five meter long dis-
assembly unit having been built as a
matter of precaution which accommo-
dated two of the three work stations in
the entrance cell. First, the wrapper tube
was removed from the element; this re-
quired the relatively high force of
7500 Newton because the adhering so-
dium residue acted like a strong adhe-
sive. Next, the screw connections in the
rod support plate were drilled out,
which then allowed the individual rods
to be disengaged without too much of
an effort. The time required for disas-
sembly of the KNK 11 fuel elements later
decreased more and more; initially, sev-
eral weeks were needed, but the disas-
sembly time of the second failed ele-
ment had already dropped to 110 hours,
and for the third (intact) fuel element
only 40 hours were required in
1983.162/163
Multi-purpose system for fuel element
examination and disassembly in the Hot
Cells of KfK.
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Searching for Defects
After the fuel element bundle had been singulized, the suspected defect was to be
detected by visual inspection of the fuel rods, but this attempt failed. Instead, a sur-
prisingly large number of fretting marks were discovered at the level of the spacer
pads. Metallographie examinations indicated materials wastage down to a maxi-
mum depth of 80 pm. As the wall thickness of the c1adding tube was 350 pm, the fis-
sion gas leakage could not have been caused by these fretting marks. Later, oscillato-
ry movements of the fuel rods were found to be the cause of the wastage, which was
particularly pronounced at the level of the third spacer.
Even a leak test in a silicone oil bath did not help in finding the failed rod. Identifica-
tion was produced finally by weight measurement: One rod was almost five grams
heavier than the others, and this weight gain could have been due only to sodium
entering through the defect site. In this way, a new method of detecting fuel ele-
ment failures had been discovered. Now the precise location of the defect in the fuel
rod had to be found. This was done bya so-called sipping test at a higher tempera-
ture, at which sodium leaked out. The fault had been localized: It was a hairline
crack in the c1adding tube extending over roughly one quarter of the circumference.
In the other failed element, which had been left in the reactor for more than two
weeks, the cause of defect did not have to be looked for expressly: The longitudinal
crack some 30 mm long was openly visible over an area of approx. 20 mm2 and could
be seen with the naked eye. 164
Fuel Dissolution
New, but adverse, experiences were associated with the dissolution tests of spent
fuel in the Hot Cells of KfK. Prior to the planned reprocessing of fuel bundles, short
fuel rod sections, from which the hulls had been removed, were put into nitric acid
and dissolved for approx. six hours at boiling temperature. Surprisingly, the fuel was
dissolved only in part; asolid residue of some 14%, relative to the mixed oxide, was
left over. The situation was not changed very much by variation of the acid molarity
or the length of exposure.165, 166
Other dissolution tests resulted in the important finding that the method of manu-
facturing the fuel pellets was the reason for the large residues. In the standard pro-
cedure applied by Alkem at that time, U02 and PU02 were still blended mechani-
cally; after pressing and sintering this obviously did not produce a satisfactory solid
solution. On the other hand, the homogeneity of the fuel determined its dissolution
capability, as was found out in a number of subsequent studies. It was influenced
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positively, e.g., by high rod powers, because they allowed more diffusion processes
to take place. On the other hand, this was counteracted by radial U/Pu segregation
of the fuel, especially at PU02 concentrations above 35%. As higher fuellosses in the
breeder cycle had to be avoided under all conditions, the development of an im-
proved way of manufacturing mixed oxide for breeders was imperative. This subject
will be discussed in the section following the next section.
Fuel Reprocessing
The MILLI 11 pilot reprocessing plant at KfK/IHCh.
In the second cycle,
uranium and pluto-
nium were sepa-
rated and the fis-
sion products were
further reduced.
The fuel elements made available by KNK 11 were reprocessed in the MILLI pilot plant
of the Institute for Hot Chemistry (IHCh). MILLI used the so-called PUREX process
based on liquid-liquid extraction and was designed to a throughput of approx. 1 kg
of fuel a day. As a rule, uranium, plutonium and the fission products were separated
in three extraction cycles, which will be briefly described below. 167
Dissolution of the fuel, of course, produced fractions of insoluble residues as high as
described above. However, as all parts and process phases of MILLI had been de-
signed in the light of criticality safety, this created no safety problems. The first ex-
traction cycle, also called co-decontamination cycle, was designed to separate the fis-
sion products from uranium and plutonium. At the end, the particularly notorious
fission products, zirconium 95 and ruthenium 106, were contained in the U/Pu solu-
tion to the tune of only 0.4%, while all the other fission products contributed even
lower shares. The
plutonium concen-
tration of approx.
1 mg/I at the dis-
charge end of the
aqueous solution
implied a lass in the
waste of less than
0.01%.
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The third extraction cycle served for the so-called purification of the uranium prod-
uct. The Zr 95 and Ru 106 fission products meanwhile had dropped to 10-5, and the
decontamination factors of the other fission products were even better. In retro-
spect, it can be said that reprocessing the KNK 11 fuel elements in MILLI posed no
problems. The Institute for Hot Chemistry later optimized the separation process still
further; when electrochemical methods were applied, a single extraction cycle was
sufficient. This result, which had an immense impact on the economics of reprocess-
ing, was widely acclaimed internationally (Impurex process).168
Fuel Recycling and Refabrication
The uranyl nitrate and plutonium nitrate obtained in MILLI was subsequently
shipped to Hanau for further processing into mixed oxide fuel rods by Alkem. Be-
cause of the unsatisfactory dissolution results, the decision was taken to abandon
the current mechanical method of fuel manufacture. In order to produce a homoge-
neous solid solution, the uranyl nitrate and plutonium nitrate solutions were to be
mixed (in a 75:2 ratio). A similar procedure, but for uranium only, had been used by
the RBU sister company for many years already and had allowed reliable production
of several tons of U02.
The fuel produced by co-precipitation as ammonium uranyl plutonyl carbonate and
subsequent calcination was characterized by its excellent microscopic homogeneity
and dissolution capability even prior to irradiation. It is referred to in the literature
as the AUPuC process. Some of the fuel pellets were loaded into a so-called KNK 1I
ring element for test purposes, while another part was used for making the third
core. 169
In this way, the cycle for fast breeder fuel on a kilogram scale had been c10sed in Ger-
many for the first time.
SP e nt Fu e I Man a 9 e m e nt in K N K 11
"Spent fuel management" - a phrase coined in the seventies - had to be ensured also
for the spent cores of KNK 11. The appropriate provision in Section 9a of the German
Atomic Energy Act at that time was interpreted to imply that the core material had
to be reprocessed and separated into uranium, plutonium, and waste. As the MILLI
plant of KfK was not designed for the throughputs now required, only the MOX re-
processing plants of the French CEA at Marcoule and of UKAEA in Dounreay could be
employed. Tenders were invited from both plants; at the end, CEA was commis-
sioned to reprocess the fuel, which was quite in line with German-French coopera-
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tion in the fast breeder field, as laid down in a government agreement in
1976/77.170
The plant in Marcoule, situated close to the famous vineyards of Chateauneuf-du-
Pape, mainly comprised the existing SAP extraction part and the TOR head end under
construction. The plant was used preferably for reprocessing MOX fuel from the
French Rapsodie and Phenix breeder plants and was designed for a total capacity of
47 t. KfK bought 2.44 t for three cores (KNK 1111-3), which is the reason why the con-
tracts show the rather odd numbers of the respective shares, 2.44/47.171
The agreement with CEA Marcoule was signed in December 1980 and, as was cus-
tomary at that time, included a provision for the return of all fuels and of the high-
level vitrified waste. CEA also agreed to accept failed fuel elements contained in
cans, and MOX elements of lower dissolvability. For these latter elements, a modified
process flowsheet had to be designed, for which detailed experiments were run at
the French research center of Fontenay-aux-Roses, albeit with little success.
Initially, the French want-
ed to accept only fuel
rods, no bundles; KfK
therefore made extensive
provisions for disassem-
bling the fuel elements in
the Hot Cells. Before dis-
assembly, the elements
had to be washed and
canned in astation spe-
cially built for this pur- French TOR - SAP reprocessing plant in Marcoule.
pose. However, it became
increasingly more difficult in the following period of time to obtain the permit un-
der the Atomic Energy Act for handling some 70 kg of plutonium in the Hot Cells;
costly conditions were Iikely to be imposed for internal and external plant safety. For
this reason, disassembly of the KNK 11 fuel elements at the Nuclear Research Center
was soon abandoned, and another agreement was signed with CEA, under which
complete bundles could be delivered.
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3.2.2 KNK 11 Studies of the External fuel Cyde
KNK 11 operation gave rise to a number of ideas about the steps of the external fuel
cycle. They were presented at a seminar held at the Nuclear Research Center in Octo-
ber 1981, and they demonstrated the close cooperation of KfK institutes with its in-
dustrial partners. 172,173 Thus, roughly half a dozen ways to remove sodium from fuel
elements were identified and compared in their respective pros and cons. 174 Disas-
sembling fuel elements was another topic of technical and economic optimization,
especially with regard to the expected bowing of fuel elements due to burnup. The
Central Engineering Department (IT) of KfK was busy designing economically viable
shipping containers meeting the technical specifications of KNK 11 fuel elements. 175
Some of these project studies were particularly remarkable for their scope and im-
portance and will therefore be described briefly below.
Repairing Breeder Fuel Elements
The operation of KNK so far had indicated that, in most cases, only one fuel rod
failed in a fuel element bundle. Consequently, it was economically attractive to 10-
calize and replace only this failed rod instead of changing the entire bundle. The
IMF 111 Institute of KfK developed a number of ideas on this problem. In their opin-
ion, future fuel elements were to be designed so that the rod bundle was accessible
from below, could be dismantled in the installations of the Hot Cell and reassembled
after the failed rod had been replaced. 176
Detection of failed fuel rods
(basic principle).
One problematic point un-
doubtedly was the reliable
detection of the failed fuel
rod. For this purpose, a small
pressure cell was to be intro-
duced into each fuel rod
which was able to record the
internal fission product gas
pressure. A major compo-
nent item of this measuring
device was a ferritic core
within a bellows; it was dis-
placed by a certain amount
if a cladding defect had
caused the pressure in the
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fission product gas plenum to drop. The position of the ferritic measurement core
was to be determined by inductive displacement measurement by means of chokes.
For the third core of KNK 11, one element was equipped with these measuring cells;
unfortunately, it was never used, as KNK 11 was shut down prematurely.
Interim Storage of Fuel Elements
Extensive work was devoted also to the interim storage of breeder fuel elements on
the premises of the Nuclear Research Center. Three storage variants, namely wet
store, dry store, and cask store, were studied separately by three different groups
and, finally compared. Each store was to be able to accommodate ten core loads of
KNK 11; specific criteria had been laid down, e.g., on technical design, the demonstra-
tion of Iicensability and, of course, the estimated cost.
The wet store was a conventional storage pool cooled by light water, but equipped
with provisions against airplane crash and blast waves. 177 The fuel elements were to
be stored under water in cans with inert cover gas. The dry store consisted of a vault-
type building protected against external impacts, in which the fuel elements, also
contained in cans, were to be suspended. 178 The decay heat was to be removed by
free atmospheric air convection. The cooling system was described as being self-
regulating and inherently safe. Another variant was dry storage in shipping-storage
casks of the type also used for light water reactors. Casks with type-B approval and
storage qualification were to be stored in a light hall only for protection against the
weather and against radiation. 179
The final comparison showed certain advantages in favor of the wet store, because it
was based on a proven technology. In addition, it offered a possibility for decompos-
ing the fuel elements under water. 180 The dry store was the most compact unit and,
consequently, also the most inexpensive one. A certain risk was seen in remote han-
dling systems in case of an accident. The cask store was the most flexible variant in
terms of construction, expansion, and decommissioning. It was erected in a short pe-
riod of time and offered the added advantage of the capital costs arising only step
by step. Had any of these stores been built, the cask store probably would have been
chosen on economic and licensing grounds. 181
The MILLI 11 Reprocessing Plant
Another important piece of work was the study about the MILLI 11 pilot reprocessing
plant. As the name implied, it was to be a follow-on project after the successful MILLI
laboratory-scale reprocessing plant. MILLI 11 was designed for a throughput of 50 kg
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of heavy metal (U +Pu) a day. This would have served KNK 11 and SNR 300 and a cer-
tain capacity reserve for foreign customers would still have remained.182
The block diagram of the plant comprised the head end store with disassembly,
chopping and leaching, the extraction section, and the product store. In addition,
there were installations for offgas treatment and the usual utility systems. Reproc-
essing was to follow a three-stage PU REX process. The plant capacity listed above
was determined on the basis of the minimum throughput of the pulsed columns
used. In addition, especially the process steps of waste minimization developed at
KfK were to be tested, such as the low-salt process and the Electro-Redox process. Al-
so the centrifugal contactor was to be demonstrated. Remote exchange techniques
were to be employed in maintenance and repair, as KfK had invested a great deal of
development work in these fields.
The confusion engulfing the Kalkar and Wackersdorf projects unfortunately also has
caused the MILLI 11 concept to be discontinued.
4. Operation with the KNK 11 Second Core
4.1 New Fuel Elements for Kalkar
The operating record of the fuel elements in the first core of KNK 11 was ample cause
for satisfaction. The elements not only had reached the contractual target burnup of
60,000 MWd/t, but even had exceeded it considerably. Only two fuel rods out of
more than one thousand had developed leaks; these defects, in turn, had triggered
off extensive R&D activities in the fuel cycle area. Also the finding, new at that time,
that exposed fuel does not enter into a violent exothermal reaction with sodium,
and that a dispersion of fuel into the coolant must not be expected to occur under
normal circumstances, was owed to these two failed fuel rods. Had KNK 11 been an
"ordinary" nuclear power plant, the operator certainly would have ordered reload
fuel elements of the same, or perhaps slightly modified, specifications.
ßut KNK 11 was nO,t an ordinary power plant.
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Let us recall that, in negotiations with the Federal Ministry for Research in the early
seventies, especially one argument pro KNK 11 had swung opinion in favor of building
the plant:
"The possibility to irradiate a statistically sufficient number of breeder fuel
rods in fuel elements of the kind planned for use in the SNR 300. 11
So, KNK 11 had to act as a kind of pathfinder for its bigger brother in Kalkar, with all
the opportunities - and risks - this entailed.183
And lots of requirements came in from Kalkar. While KNK 11 was still being operated
with its first core, SBK, the operators consortium of the SNR 300, was engrossed in
economic thoughts about reloads. The prevailing opinion was that both the design
specifications and the fabrication specifications for the second Kalkar core loading
had to be changed fundamentally to allow the plant to be operated on the basis of
economic principles. Some of the more important desiderata induded thicker fuel
rods and improved solubility of the fue!. However, these requirements entailed a
host of other changes in specifications, and the new Mark 11 design thus finally dif-
fered drastically from the old, proven Mark la version.184, 185
4.1.1 Design and Fabrication
Thinking was based initially on the fuel cyde costs for the SNR 300, which made up
some 20% of the total electricity generating costs. These costs were composed of
three fractions: the plutonium costs (20%), which were relatively difficult to influ-
ence; the costs of fuel element fabrication (40%), and the reprocessing costs (40%).
The latter two cost items simply had to be reduced.186
The fuel rod fabrication costs for rods of 6 mm diameter were much higher than had
been assumed in earlier strategic studies. More recent cost variation calculations in-
dicated that thicker rods would have a significantly positive impact on the fuel cyde
costs. For this reason, a fuel rod diameter of 7.6 mm was defined for the SNR 300 re-
load - and, hence, for the second load of KNK 11. At the same time, this came dose to
the specifications for the French Phenix reactor. That modification also had an im-
pact on the residence time of the fuel elements. While 255 full-power days had been
planned for the first core, the target burnup of the second core was to be reached at
455 full-power days.187
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A change was also made in the clad-
ding material for the fuel rods. While
the first KNK 11 core still combined
number 1.4988, 1.4981, and 1.4970
austenitic materials of various de-
grees of treatment, sometimes even
within one element, the reloads for
KNK 11 and SNR 300 were to use only
1.4970 material. The reason for this
change was the lower amount of
swelling and creeping under fast neu-
tron irradiation of this new mate-
rial. 188
Cost structure ofthe fast breeder
(status of 1980).
Also the way in which fuel rods were
bundled into fuel elements was
different in the second core, the fuel
elements of KNK 11/2 being packed
much more densely. The p/d ratio
characterizing the rod pitch, i. e. the ratio of rod center to rod diameter, was 1.32 in
the first core and had been reduced to 1.16 in the second core. As in the first core,
the required spacers were manufactured from solid plates by electrochemical ero-
sion to ensure satisfactory flow and cooling conditions. As was seen in the course of
in-pile residence later, the dense packing of the fuel rods may have been taken one
step too far.
In the first core, the spark eroded spacers were still held in place by six structural bars
in the corners of the hexagonal bundle. In the second core, that design was aban-
doned and the spacers were spot welded to so-called flow aprons which, in turn,
were welded to the wrapper tube.
Other major changes were made in the fuel. In KNK 11/1, the fuel smear density had
still been specified at 80%, which corresponded to a pellet density of 86.5%; the
smear density in KNK 11/2 was increased to 85% (corresponding to 92% pellet den-
sity). As a consequence, the fission products generated in reactor operation were as-
signed less space in the second core. Why this sudden courage? The reason was the
finding made in the meantime that mixed oxide fuel showed good plastic strain be-
havior at temperatures above 1400°(, which made large porosities and other void
spaces superfluous.
101
This latter concept was in good agreement with the wishes expressed by Alkem, the
fuel manufacturer. The company had been asked to improve the solubility of the fuel
in the second cores of KNK 11 and SNR 300. It was seen that pressing and sintering
"naturally" produced fuel of higher density whenever the new OKOM and AUPu(
manufacturing techniques were used. Moreover, this fuel had the specified higher
solubility because it was a good solid solution from the outset. 189 It is interesting to
note in this connection that also the Japanese had major problems manufacturing
low-density MOX fuel for their MONJ U prototype power plant, which resulted in a
delay by more than one year.
Alkem had progressed greatly in the development of new manufacturing techniques
for breeder fuel. Depending on the feed material, two alternative techniques were
available. If the material came as plutonium oxide, the "optimized co-grinding pro-
cess," called OKOM, was used. In that process, the MOX powder mix was ground to
such a degree of fineness that the following sintering step achieved complete solid
solution formation and, hence, full solubility. The alternative AUPu( process was
used when liquid plutonium nitrate was the feed product. Together with uranyl ni-
trate, a homogeneous solid solution was precipitated (ammonium uranyl plutonyl
carbonate), which produced a free-flowing, fully soluble mixed oxide powder in the
subsequent calcination step; this powder could be directly processed into pellets.
Most of the fuel rods for KNK 11/2 were produced by the OKOM process; a small num-
ber of rads were also made by the AUPu( process. Those were the failed fuel ele-
ments from the first core, which had been reprocessed in MILLI.190,191
Let us summarize the major changes in specifications for KNK 11/2 as compared to
KNK 11/1 : The fuel rod diameter was increased; the fuel rod pitch was reduced; the
spacer design was modified; the in-pile residence time was increased. Two new types
of fuel fabrication were applied, and the pellet density, an important parameter,
was changed.
Most of these modifications practically had no basis of experience. Only in the French
Rapsodie experimental reactor, a small bundle with nineteen rods had been irradi-
ated between 1976 and 1978. It had contained rods of 7.6 mm diameter, but both
the density of the fuel and the fuel production process did not agree with the new
specifications; only helical wires had been used for the spacers. 192
These circumstances should not be forgotten when looking at the operating perfor-
mance of the second core.
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4.1.2 A Mixed Operating Record
Operation with the second core of KNK 11 covered the period between 1983 and
1991, the year of permanent shutdown. It was aperiod of time rich in experience,
both positive and negative. The latter category included problems with the fuel ele-
ments and with the rod actuating equipment of the shutdown systems. They will be
discussed in more detail in the next section. On the positive side, there are the large
number of findings and activities of the experimental program. In the eighties,
KNK 11 inspired many breeder scientists of the then Fast Breeder Project (PSB) to con-
duct experiments with the KNK reactor. Aseparate chapter is devoted to those ac-
tivities.
However, let us first have a brief look at the operating experience with the KNK 11/2
core arranged by calendar years.193, 194,195
1983
This was a busy year. The fuel elements of the first core had to be removed from the
sodium store, and some of them had to be transported to the Hot Cells for post-
irradiation examination. The bearings of the turbo-generator set were overhauled
after 18,000 hours of operation, and the inside of the vessel was inspected with a vid-
eo camera. Finally, the discharge tubes of the gas separation unit, which had mean-
while been completed, had to be installed in the outer reflector row.
In June, at long last, the operating permit under the Atomic Energy Act was received.
Within just ten days, the fuel elements of the second core had been loaded, and the
reactor had achieved its first criticality on June 26, 1983. Everything proceeded ac-
cording to schedule and without any problems; one test element of the first core was
allowed to remain in the reactor by special permit of the authority. Especially the gas
bubble separators worked extremely weil; after they had been installed, no more
disturbing reactivity changes were observed.
Finally, construction of a storage hall for spent fuel and waste management compo-
nents was completed; aseparate chapter will be devoted to the problems associated
with that building.
1984
This was a year with many activities in the experimental program. Sixteen test rigs
had been installed in seven reactor positions throughout the year, including one ring
element with an inner carbide fuel rod bundle; a second ring element contained
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pressurized c1adding tube specimens. An electrically heated boiling generator was
operated in the central position for nearly two months in addition to several boiling
detectors on surrounding positions.
In May, the rotor of a primary sodium main recirculation pump was replaced by a
new unit for the first time. The pump had been in operation for fifteen years, accu-
mulating more than 90,000 hours of operation without requiring any special main-
tenance. However, in recent years, it had become a bit noisy at high speeds and was
replaced for that reason. The maximum individual personnel dose associated with
the replacement amounted to 52 mrem. 196
The test element from the first core, which had been left in the reactor, had reached
a burnup of 130,000 MWd/t by the end of the year, which corresponds to 600 full-
power days. The other test zone elements of the KNK 11/2 core load were around
200 full-power days.
1985
In this year, the risks of the fresh fuel elements loaded became apparent for the first
time: In April and in August, a rise in the activity of the cover gas indicated one failed
fuel element each. Operation was continued for another 28 and 50 days, respec-
tively, and the failed elements were subsequently localized by load tilting and indi-
vidual detection in the fuel handling machine.
Nevertheless, performance throughout the year was reason for satisfaction. The re-
actor had achieved 45% availability in terms of time, and 360 full-power days had al-
ready been accumulated. As only a small margin of approx. 100 full-power days was
left until the licensed level of 455 full-power days and, in addition, there were still re-
activity reserves, KfK and KBG as the permit holders filed an application with the au-
thority for an extension of the core life to 720 full-power days.197
An important personnel change took place: Managing Director Dr.
Gerhard Brudermüller, who had supervised the fate of KBG with his extensive knowl-
edge of detail and Swabian temperament since 1973, was appointed Managing Di-
rector of the Obrigheim Nuclear Power Station. He was replaced by Wer-
ner O. Steiger, former Operations Manager of FR 2 and experienced in plant decom-
missioning.
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1986
This was an unsatisfactory year of operation with only 13% availability in terms of
time and, again, two failed fuel elements. Surprisingly, in one case the plant was op-
erated for another 51 days until the leaker turned into areal DND defect.
For the rest, all the difficulties became apparent in this year which the operating
crew would have to grapple with also in the future. The failed elements removed the
year before had been examined in the Hot Cells and had shown defects in the region
of the spacers. The experts attributed these phenomena to oscillations, but were un-
certain about the source of excitation. Moreover, the outlettemperatures of the fuel
elements began to rise uncomfortably. This so-called temperature drift, which had
become apparent already at an earlier point in time, was the reason for extensive
studies of sodium purity. Finally, the most serious problem was encountered when a
shim-shutdown rod in the primary shutdown unit was found to seize in December;
an urgent report was sent to the authority immediately. However, no hazard to tech-
nical safety was implied, as another six boron carbide rods were available for shut-
down of the reactor.
1987
Again, not a particularly satisfactory year of operation, but the licensed 455 full-
power days were reached in November 1987. In the absence of a new permit for the
extended core life, the plant had to be shut down. Yet, the operating period was
long enough for two additional fuel element failures to develop. One was located in
the fuel element from the first core, which had been left in place. At 832 full-power
days (corresponding to a reactor burnup of 175,000 MWd/t) it had more than dou-
bled its originally planned in-pile time of 400 full-power days, thus proving the rela-
tive ruggedness of the earlier Mark-I specification for the first core. In November, the
tenth anniversary of KNK 11 operation was celebrated - an event reported in many
papers. 198, 199
For the rest, broad-based research was conducted into the causes of the problems
mentioned in the section above. For instance, the sodium of the primary system was
examined for entrained particles, with the reactor shut down, which might have
blocked the flow channels of the fuel elements. Experiments about the correlation
of neutron flux and fuel element outlet temperature were run to determine the os-
cillation behavior of fuel elements in the core. And as far as seizing of a shim-
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shutdown rod was concerned, the conjecture turned into a fact that this was less a
problem of operation than a problem of downtime and handling.
1988 and 1989
Anni horribiles. No operation for two years!
1988 passed with a multitude of maintenance activities, such as turbine revision, in-
spection of the vessel internals, installation of torque measuring shafts for the shut-
down units, etc. When the primary sodium pump was removed, loose and broken
screws from the flow baffles were found. The permit extending the core Iife arrived
a few days before Christmas.
Yet, no operation was possible also the following year, 1989; the seizing control rods
appeared to have turned worse. Alternately, torque measurements and attempts at
high-temperature c1eanup and gas sweep experiments were carried out. In Novem-
ber, finally, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards gave the green light,
permitting "easy" continued operation of the plant.200
On October 1, 1989, the author (after twenty years with KNK and eleven years with
PSB) changed to the EFR European Fast Reactor Project. The Executive Board ap-
pointed Gregor Schnetgöke his successor in KNK, who had been associated with the
project since 1965 and was weil versed in all its technical, financial, and contractual
ramifications.
1990
At long last, the reactor resumed operation.
In late January, approval from the supervisory authority to restart KNK 11 was re-
ceived; the maximum reactor power was not to exceed 60% of the rated power. This
"soft mode" had been discussed with the consultants in many expert rounds, had
been proposed by the applicants and, finally, had been ordered by the supervisory
authority. However, in order to set the so-called fj-temperature limits, the plant had
to be raised to 100% very briefly.
Despite this allegedly soft mode of operation, another fuel element developed a
leak this year; the leaker was localized relatively soon by load tilting and by using
the reshuffling system. For the rest, 1990 was a year with the relatively high availabil-
ity in terms of time, for an experimental plant, of 48%.
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199 1
The last year of operation of KNK 11.
Because of the sticking control rod actuating equipment, reactor operation had to
be stopped for almost six months after a brief phase of operation in January. After
the control rods had been moved individually and the route of the sweeping gas in
the reactor top shield had been changed, c1eanup soon proved to be successful, and
official approval to restart the plant was obtained in July.201
KNK 11 then ran for an uninterrupted period of almost six weeks and was shut down
permanently by order of the KfK Executive Board on August 23, 1991. The reasons
for that decision will be described in detail in the last chapter.
4.1.3 On the Availability of KNK 11
As far as availability is concerned, KNK 11
certainly was not equivalent to a mod-
ern light water nuclear power plant, as
its design and operation had served pur-
poses other than those of electricity gen-
eration only.202
The need to serve as a test bed for the
fuel elements of the SNR 300 has been
mentioned above. The large number of
fuel rod failures in the second core
turned out to be a major burden on the
operation of KN K 11, for localizing a
failed fuel element and obtaining the
official permit for replacing it always
took several weeks. On the other hand,
these defects proved to be a valuable
early warning system for the SNR 300.
Had the Kalkar plant ever been in opera-
tion, it certainly would have had to be
equipped with improved reload fue!.
KNK 11, in a way, was the technological
scout for the SNR 300.
Compact arrangement of KNK
components in the primary cells
(scale model).
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The extensive experimental program also reduced the theoretical level of electricity
generation. For some periods of time, the plant was loaded with 25 - 30 experiments
for scientists within KfK and outside. The requirements to be met in reactor opera-
tion ranged from the continuous mode at various power levels to cycling and even
zero-power operation, the latter during eight weeks of "irradiation" of a boiling
generator in the central core position. Also installing and removing the test rigs, six-
teen of which were loaded in the core in 1984, was very time consuming, because the
reactor top shield had to be dismantled in a very cumbersome procedure each time.
Especially the prototype character of KNK, the first-of-its-kind plant of a newly
founded, though committed, vendor, entailed many technical risks. Many defects,
even design errors, could not have been foreseen, such as the gas bubble problem or
the sticking shutdown rod actuating equipment. Nearly all components, just consider
the sodium pumps, were unique and first-of-their-kind designs, whose operating
characteristics and life expectancy could not possibly be estimated.203,204
Also handling the sodium coolant had to be learnt. Certainly it is due also to the cir-
cumspection of the plant and maintenance crews that no major accidents occurred.
Even the sodium fire and the steam generator accident in KNK I never put the per-
sonnel or the environment in any danger.
The permits under the Atomic Energy Act turned out to be no small obstacle. Solely
for KNK 11, a full 36 written permits had to be obtained from the authority in the pe-
riod between 1975 and 1988. For all of them, detailed applications had to be filed
whose technical contents had to be scrutinized by the Technicallnspectorate and the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, respectively, before the licensing docu-
ments were obtained in many discussions with the supervisory authorities and the li-
censing authorities. Not infrequently, KNK 11 had to be stopped for some time when-
ever a necessary operating permit had not been issued early enough. This happened,
for instance, for a full year between 1987 and 1988, when the permit for the exten-
sion of core life took much longer to come forth, in the wake of the Chernobyl de-
bate, than could possibly have been assumed.
The conditions imposed in the permits inter alia referred to the maintenance rules
for the plant. Most of these duties and inspections were completed in the major an-
nual revision outage which, because of the extent of the work at hand, sometimes
took 6 - 8 weeks to complete. They also reduced the number of unplanned scrams by
improving the electrical and mechanical components. In 1980, there were still twelve
scrams while only one scram was recorded in 1987.205
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Finally, also the consequences of political developments cannot be overlooked. AI-
though KNK 11 was not an object of strong opposition the way the SNR 300 was, it
nevertheless was under continuous observation. Whatever happened in the opera-
tion of KNK 11 was registered by the media and frequently exaggerated with respect
to its potential impacts on the Kalkar project. One case in point is the gas bubble
problem. Also for this reason, the operating crew untiringly sought to avoid inci-
dents and the resultant headlines.
In Europe, KNK 11 for a long time was overshadowed by such breeder power plants as
the British PFR and the French Phenix and Superphenix. However, since those plants
also have become the subjects of examination by independent external authorities,
require licensing and can no longer escape political influences, also their availability
has declined drastically and is no longer better than that of KNK 11. The technical
problems encountered by the British and French plants were discussed in detail by
the AGT 8 tri lateral Working Group, among other agencies.
4.2 Phenomena and Problems
4.2.1 Experience with Failed Fuel Elements
Let us return to the in-pile performance of the second core, and let us remember the
statistics offailed fuel elements. 206
The first two years of operation, 1983 and 1984, were without fuel element failures.
Two failures each occurred in the three following years, 1985 - 1987, and two more
failures were encountered in 1990 and 1991. If one subtracts the fuel element left
over from the first core, which achieved arecord in-pile time of 832 full-power days,
a total of seven fuel elements of the second core load developed leaks at burnups be-
tween 27,000 and 47,000 MWd/t. Of these elements, three were in the test zone and
four were in the driver zone. 207,208
The standard procedure followed in case of a fuel element failure included leak de-
tection, localization of the leaker and, finally, its replacement by an unirradiated
fuel element. Detecting a c1adding defect mostly turned out to be possible in the
very early phase of a fission product gas leak. Continuous monitoring of radioactivity
in the argon cover gas, for instance, allowed the xenon 133 added to be detected by
the 81 keV line. Further c1arification, especially in the distinction between test ele-
ments and driver elements, was achieved by mass spectroscopic determination of the
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ratio between the Xe 131 and Xe 134 gaseous xenon isotopes. As a rule, operation
with a "Ieaker" was continued for a couple of days or even weeks until the so-called
DND failure had developed. At that point in time, two neutron monitors applied to
the primary sodium pipes were able to measure the concentration of emitters of de-
layed neutrons. Once a certain count rate had been reached, e. g. 2000 counts per
second, preparations were made to replace the defective element in order not to
contaminate the primary sodium unnecessarily.209
Localizing such a failed fuel element frequently developed into a fascinating com-
petition between the operating crew of KNK 11 and the scientists of adjacent insti-
tutes, such as IRE and IHCh. All available measured data were analyzed, entered into
computer programs, such as COCOSS, and a "hit list" of particularly suspicious fuel
elements was compiled. 210 The "winner" who had betted on the right element, of
course, was overjoyed. But occasionally all experts were far off the mark in their pre-
dictions.
Operation of the reactor with load tilting -
which also required a license - allowed the
number of potentially failed fuel elements
to be limited. Final confirmation was ob-
tained in the next, final step: The suspicious
elements were pulled into the fuel handling
machine and c1eared of sodium by blowing.
Subsequently, cooling was reduced, and the
pressure in the flask was lowered. When
there was a leakage, failed fuel elements
then emitted fission product gas, which was
collected and analyzed. This procedure took
about four hours; examining the core re-
quired at least one week.
DND MONITOR WEST WEST
8-
PRIMARY
SYSTEM 2
PRIMARY
SYSTEM 1
8-
DND MONITOR EAST EAST
DND monitor arrangement in KNK 11.
Only some of the experiences accumulated with failed fuel elements can be reported
here. Thus, the period of time passing between the occurrence of a "Ieaker" and the
DND signal was very much shorter in test elements than in driver elements. This was
due to the fact that sodium reacts much more strongly with Pu02/U02 than with
U02 alone; the reaction product generated initiated a much larger volume increase
in mixed oxide, which caused the point of failure to expand and a DND signal to be
generated ,211 ,212
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Whenever the DND instruments supplied unequivocal readings, it was known from
experience that the plant now had to be shut down speedily so that as little sodium
as possible was sucked into the fuel rod through the defect. Prolonged operation
with open failed rods was bound to cause a rise in the Cs 137 fission product in the
primary system. As a sort of countermeasure, incidentally, the installation of a
cesium trap was planned within the experimental program. 213 ,214
Once a fuel element had been recognized as having failed and had been removed
from the core, the next burning question was, what is the defect like, and what can
have caused it. This will be outlined in the next section.
4.2.2 Fuel Rod Vibrations
Within two years, from 1986 on, three fuel elements were taken to the Hot Cells of
KfK for post-irradiation examination. They all showed evident fret marks between
the fuel rod c1addings and the spacers, especially at the 6th and 7th levels, i. e. the
upper rod end. The fuel elements in the driver zone showed more pronounced wear
than those in the test zone; abrasion was minimal in the zero-power moderator
rods.
Fret mark in KNK 11 fuel rod.
Wear at the spacer level obviously was a cause
also of ensuing leaks in c1adding tubes. Rod fail-
ures always occurred in the regions of maxi-
mum wear. In the test zone rods, they produced
longitudinal cracks in the c1adding tube; in the
driver zone rods, circumferential cracks. These
differences in the types of defect can be ex-
plained conclusively with the different reac-
tions of uranium oxide and mixed oxide fuels
with sodium, as described in Section 3.2.1
above.
Investigating the causes of wear marks turned out to be an extremely complicated
affair, which kept scientists occupied for a full ten years. Starting from the "chatter
marks" in the first core, which simply appeared to be due in 1981 to the gas bubbles
passing through KNK 11/1,1989 - 1991 saw the so-ca lied THIBO experiments, in the
course of which the phenomenon finally was verified as thermohydraulically induced
rod vibrations. In between these two dates there were many futile attempts at ex-
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planations never supported by experimental data, and there was also an extended
study of international experiences in this field.
Gas bubbles could not have excited the vibrations for two reasons: on the one hand,
because bubbles deliberately injected into the coolant in an out-of-pile test were un-
able to excite vibrations in the dummy fuel elements; on the other hand, because
the second core continued to show wear marks although (because of the separators
installed) the gas bubble problem no longer existed. Consequently, different sources
of excitation in the plant had to be found. Connecting rods were employed and com-
plicated coherence analyses conducted to study, over many months, the vibrations of
the grid plate, the reactor vessel, the primary pipes, and the main sodium pumps - all
in vain.
In mid-1987, when no new explanations were believed to come forth any more, the
situation changed when the post-irradiation examination findings of a Mark 11 ele-
ment irradiated in the French Phemix reactor became known. That element was al-
most identical in design with the KNK 11/2 element, and after the end of its in-pile
time it showed the same defects. From now on, the explanation was based on the hy-
pothesis that the cause for fuel element wear was to be found not in the reactor but
in the design of that very element. "Far-field" excitation was abandoned in favor of
"near-field" excitation. 215
Further corroboration was found in international exchanges of experience. Scientists
from the Japanese JOYO and the American EBR 11 plants reported about similar (al-
beit less pronounced) fret marks in their facilities. A piece of particularly interesting
information came from the French CABRI reactor at Cadarache, where rod move-
ments had been detected in some CABRI experiments and in heated Mark 11 bundles.
From now on, "thermal wobbling" was the explanation of the vibration phenom-
enon. It was thought to happen like this: Differences in temperature around the rod
circumference cause the rod to bow, which has repercussions on thermohydraulic
conditions in ~he cooling channel and, ultimately, gives rise to periodic helical wob-
bling movements of the fuel rod.
These low-frequency fuel rod oscillations now had to be demonstrated also experi-
mentally. This was achieved by the Institute for Materials Research, IMF, in the THIBO
test beds in which an electrically heated, generously instrumented rod was operated
in a sodium loop. Experimental results indicated that fuel rods may start moving al-
ready at relatively low enthalpy rises even if the rod c1earance in the spacer was set
at low levels. 216,217
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These experiments, whieh were published in
1991, completed the range of experiments
started a full decade aga: At the Institute for
Neutron Physics and Reactor Engineering, INR,
the reactivity signals of the KNK 11 in-plant in-
strumentation had been analyzed in 1981,
and very sensitive correlation measurements
had indieated nearly harmonie oscillations,
which were explained as being due to fuel
element vibrations. 218 The mechanism excit-
ing those vibrations at that time had been feit
to be either vortices or fluid jets.2 19,220
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Reproduction of KNK 11 fuel rod
movements in THIBO experiment.
The failure analysis of the fuel elements of the
second core, of course, had direct repercus-
sions on the design of the elements of the
third core to follow. As major parts, such as
the fuel rods and structural components, had already been manufactured in 1989,
not all design parameters could be chosen at random. Actually, the only parameters
whieh could still be influenced were the reduction in the diameter of the cell and the
radial displacement of the spacers. Nobody will ever know whether these modifiea-
tions would have been sufficient to ensure later satisfactory reactor operation.
When the operation of KNK 11 was discontinued in 1991, before the third core was
loaded, this probably protected fuel element designers from further criticism, but it
may just as weil have prevented their achieving high distinctions.
4.2.3 Temperature Drifting at the Fuel Element Outlet
The fuel element vibrations described above were accompanied by another strange
phenomenon throughout the whole period of operation of the second core, the so-
called temperature drifting at the fuel element outlet, which made it very difficult to
separate individual problems and understand their causes. 221
Temperature drifting manifested itself in a rise in the outlet temperatures of the test
elements, not the driver elements, by roughly 1/3°( per full-power day without any
changes having been made in the coolant flow through the elements. This tempera-
ture rise, which was called temperature drifting, after roughly 100 full-power days
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caused a fuel element outlet temperature increase by 20-30°C, thus reaching the
saturation level. When the reactor had been shut down, this phenomenon disap-
peared entirely or in part and, with increasing length of operation, returned ap-
proximately to its earlier, higher, level. The phenomenon in no way jeopardized the
technical safety standard of the plant. 222
Nobody was able to make head or tail of the situation for almost an entire year until
a serendipitous result of an experimental program pointed the right way. In the irra-
diation of the boiling generator in the reactor core it was found in mid-1984 that the
temperature drift previously accumulated had been reduced to zero. Obviously, the
pressure impulses generated by the collapsing sodium vapor bubbles had been suffi-
cient to return the outlet temperatures to normal levels. The same results were
achieved later by means of an ultrasonic generator deliberately introduced into the
core. This at least showed one way of undoing the temperature drift; however, now
it was imperative to learn more about its causes.
There were some indications of deposits in the fuel elements partly blocking the
cooling channels. Consequently, the IRE institute at KfK performed calculations with
the BACCHUS code and arrived at particles in the diameter range of 0.3 to 0.7 mm as-
sumed to have accumulated at the level of the spacers. 223
However, filtering experiments in the in-plant sampling station did not confirm this
assumption, probably because of the non-isokinetic sampling technique. For this rea-
son, special screens were produced for a grid plate location and, in addition, a dum-
my bundle with 37 rods was operated in the reactor core for some 300 hours. Now,
indeed, it was possible to extract particles from the primary sodium. However, their
diameter of 0.1 mm and less made them much smaller than had been assumed. In ad-
dition, there were agglomerations of even smaller particles, a kind of sludge which,
together with the particles, must have caused partial blocking of the cooling chan-
nels. The chemical composition mostly showed Fe, Cr, and Ni - elements which had
been dissolved out of the surfaces on the hot side of the primary system. 224
Final confirmation was produced by way of findings in the Hot Cells in 1986. These
findings had indicated large areas of depositions structured like rough piaster on the
fuel rods, especially at the level of the sixth spacer. These deposits changed the hy-
draulic drag and the pressure loss, wh ich explains the temperature changes at the
outlet of the fuel element. As the KNK 11 plant was operated in the 60% "soft mode"
after 455 full-power days, the phenomenon of temperature drift no longer played
any role in subsequent years. 225
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4~2.4 The Rod Actuating Equipment Problem
A difficult problem in operation, not a safety problem, was posed by sticking in the
shutdown systems of KNK 11. These phenomena were discovered in the actuating
equipment of these components between 1986 and 1991 and each time were re-
ported to the supervisory authority as "special events." The rod actuating equipment
comprised components which, as the name implies, were located between the ab-
sorber effecting shutdown and the drive unit located above the reactor vessel. It in-
corporated a mechanical coupling, the scram magnets, and the rotating spindie and
was located partly within the sodium of the reactor vessel, partly in the argon cover
gas plenum, and partly even above the rotating top. This extension over various
compartments handling different media finally gave rise to the problems of the com-
ponent. The four events will be briefly described below; the numbers refer to the
consecutive numbers in the reporting record of KNK to the supervisory authority in
Stuttgart. 226,227
(1) Event No. 64
In December 1986, a control rod of the primary shutdown unit for the first
time was found to stick while the reactor was down. The cause was found to
be sodium aerosols plated out during prior handling steps, when the rod ac-
tuating equipment had not been swept with gas. 228
(2) Event No. 83
In December 1988, deposits were founa! on a rod of the secondary shutdown
system; they impaired the mobility of the component, but not the shutdown
function. Probably the fact that the primary system had been opened for
maintenance purposes a number of times before had caused the quality of the
cover gas to deteriorate and thus produced the deposits. 229
(3) Event No. 97
This occurred in the primary shutdown system in June 1990, when the reactor
was operated with 17% load tilting. The sudden downward movement of the
absorber initiated a reactor scram via the temperature change rate at the fuel
element outlet. When the rod actuating equipment was inspected in the Hot
(ells, no deposits were found, but a metal chip was detected and assumed to
be the cause of the temporary obstruction of movement in the driving func-
tion. 230
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(4) Event No. 103
As in event No. 97, the scram (in January 1991) at 15% reactor operation was
initiated by a sudden absorber movement after an obstruction in movement
had been overcome. This blockage in the primary shutdown system again was
caused by depositions in the rod actuating equipment in a phase in which the
cover gas quality had been insufficient.231
The role played by the different
chief construction supervisors dele-
gated by Interatom, as listed in the
Annex to this report, in helping
solve plant problems together with
the parent company at Bensberg,
must be mentioned especially. In as-
sessing and repairing the sticking
control rods, close cooperation of
Chief Construction Supervisor Klaus
Brockmann with the KNK 11 Plant
Operation Managers at that
time (Messrs. Finke, Zimmermann,
Pleesz) surely helped to get things
done.
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Schematic representation of the shutdown rods in
the primary and secondary KNK 11 shutdown systems.
All events, except for the unique event No. 97, had in common their having been
caused by sticking in the rod actuating equipment. When the quality of the cover gas
is insufficient, the sodium in the rod actuating equipment is oxidized to sodium ox-
ide whose dough-like consistency impedes lifting movements of the equipment. This
diagnosis already includes the therapy: Cover gas had to be free from oxygen and
moisture, especially during revision and handling outages. For requalification, a
method of flushing the rod actuating equipment in hot sodium Was developed. The
authority in addition demanded
regular measurements of the
torque at the drive end, and veri-
fications of the dropping times of
the absorbers which, ultimately, are
responsible for safe shutdown of
the reactor. 232,233
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International exchanges of experience revealed similar problems at the British PFR
and the French PhEfmix reactors. In those plants, successful remedies had included pe-
riodic single-rod operation (" rod exercising"), e.g. during outages. Also in the
SNR 300 in Kalkar, depositions were found in some shutdown systems in 1986. They
had been caused by outgassing of the granulate contained in the reactor c10sure
head. In that process, moisture must have entered the shutdown rod actuating
equipment, causing deposits up to 10 mm thick and very hard, and blocking the
movement of six actuating rods.234
4.3 Spent Fuel and Waste Management and (ore Life Extension
Between 1975 and 1988, a total of 36 permits of all kinds under the Atomic Energy
Act had to be obtained for KNK 11. No less than 529 conditions had to be met. With
the exception of one permit for a storage hall, insignificant with respect to reactor
operation, which was successfully delayed by court action, and the difficult permit
required to extend core life after the Chernobyl accident, proceedings under the
Atomic Energy Act required a tremendous effort, but ultimately went surprisingly
weil. The problems with the two licensing procedures mentioned above will be de-
scribed in greater detail; however, first a few comments should be made on the way
in which the applicants usually worked with expert consultants and supervisory and
licensing authorities.
The applicants, i.e. KfK, KBG, and Interatom, followed the principle of openness and
transparency in dealing with expert consultants and authorities. The principle was
put into practice at the so-called Completeness Meetings at which, as a rule, KfK,
KBG, and Interatom met with the Technical Inspectorate, the supervisory authority
and the licensing authority. The special features of a licensing application which, in
KNK 11, normally included unique aspects, were presented in every technical and le-
gal detail by and for all participants. Each participant at the meetings was allowed to
join in the debates, irrespective of his rank or position. This procedure had the ines-
timable advantage of ensuring that everybody feit informed from here on and
worked along the same Iines. There were no political demonstrations at c1erical or
expert levels; an effort was made for the common cause. Practically, Section 1 of the
German Atomic Energy Act, according to which these provisions serve to
"promote the research, deveJopment and utilization of nucJear power for
peacefuJ purposes, "
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was the general attitude prevailing in these discussions. Of course, this did not imply
that matters pertaining to safety were taken Iightly; however, the debates about
such points covered only technical aspects, not ideologies. This became particularly
evident in comparison with the licensing procedure of the SNR 300, which the au-
thor, as Project Leader at KfK, was required to go through at the same time.
The expert consultants of the Baden Technicallnspectorate (in particular Dr. Fendler,
Dr. Eitner, and Mr. Jurgutat) had a rich background of professional experience; they
concentrated on technical matters and never used bureaucratic formalisms as an ex-
cuse. Mr. Günther of the Stuttgart supervisory authority was a cautious person; he
regularly obtained first-hand impressions of reality by visiting KNK 11 or, even more
often, sending his staff members Dr. Heermann, Dr. Grözinger, Dr. Wörner,
Dr. Zimmermann, and Mr. Schwarz on inspection tours of the plant. Mr. Blickle, the
chief lawyer of the licensing authority, impressed especially by his grasp of technical
conditions in a legal setting.
In order not to be accused of describing the licensing procedure of KNK 11 under the
Atomic Energy Act as a smooth, undisturbed process, the author now would like to
discuss the only two proceedings fraught with long delays and unforeseen problems.
4.3.1 The Dispute about the Storage Hall
The only legal dispute associated with the KNK I-KNK 11 double project arose from a
rather unimportant building, the storage hall. Upon the urgent request of the KNK
plant operations management, and after some hesitation by KfK, it had been in-
c1uded in the KNK 11 budget in the early eighties and approved for construction. The
storage hall was to accommodate mainly large, bulky waste management compo-
nents; in addition, some chemical hoods for c1eaning small parts and a counting
room had been planned. The storage hall expressly was not intended for handling
spent fuel elements; the components to be introduced into the hall must not be con-
taminated more than slightly.
With the 4th Amendment to the 3rd Partial Construction Permit, KfK and KBG as the
applicants in July 1982 received the permit for building the storage hall from the
Stuttgart State Ministry of Economics in an amending decision. It was made the sub-
ject of litigation right away on the grounds of the absence of public participation,
and in December 1982, Department IV of the Karlsruhe Administrative Court surpris-
ingly accepted the case and decreed a halt of construction. 235 The plaintiff was
Mr. Hans Blöchle, a student of mechanical engineering and active member of a
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Karlsruhe action group against the Karlsruhe Nudear Research Center. He was afraid
the construction of the storage hall might result in "a concrete hazard to his health."
Arrangement ofthe storage
hall (Ieft),
the emergency Diesel power
plant building (right),
and the reactor (in the rear).
Soon after, in January 1983, the same court, but under a different presiding judge
(Dr. Jacob), in emergency proceedings reversed the preliminary injunction and can-
celed the halt of construction. The court had obtained information about the subject
matter on the spot and explained in a uncommonly detailed writ of 31 pages why
the unsettled complaint in the main cause "in all probability would remain ineffec-
tive. "236
That assumption, however, was amistake. The main proceedings took place in
March 1984, and the very same administrative court now again canceled the permit
for the storage hall, which building had already been completed. In the underlying
reasons for that decision it was pointed out that the construction plans should have
been laid open for public inspection. Especially in case of an earthquake, the build-
ing for the emergency Diesel power plant, which was very dose to the hall, would
have been endangered and could possibly have become inoperative. 237
What was to be done? The storage hall had been completed, but could not be used.
The State Ministry of Economics in Stuttgart, as the authority against which proceed-
ings were directed, lodged an appeal with the Mannheim Administrative Court by
way of the State of Baden-Württemberg, but nobody knew how long these proceed-
ings might take, and nobody was able to guarantee whether "our side" would win in
the end.
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"At sea and in court you are in the hands of God." The validity of this statement had
become apparent again.
At long last, the licensing authority and the applicant decided to remedy the "Iegal
deficiency" the court of law had criticized, and to agree subsequently to a public
hearing of the objections. In line with the rules of procedure under the Atomic En-
ergy Act, the application, the safety report, and abrief description of the building
project were laid open for inspection at the mayors' offices in the municipalities in
the neighborhood in 1984.238 One last delay was caused by the fact that, shortly be-
fore the end of the two-months period, the safety report was stolen from the
Eggenstein townhall. For formal reasons, it had to be laid open once more for the
period between September and November. The culprit, of course, was never found.
Cuibono?
The public inquiry was held at the Leopoldshafen "Rheinhalle" on Decem-
ber 12, 1984. Roughly one dozen of the 600 objectors had appeared; they faced an
equally large number of of KNK 11 experts. The sovereign director of the inquiry pro-
ceedings was Mr. Heitmann from the State Ministry for Economics. Of course, the de-
bate focused on the alleged safety deficits of the storage hall. The main objector,
Mr. Blöchle, again, and quite skillfully, recited the reasons for his opinion that seis-
mic safety had not really been proven, in addition referred to the hazard of airplane
crashes (in fact, one year before that date, an airplane had crashed 5 km south of
KfK), and finally raised the point of a "drastically increased danger of war" caused by
the recent stationing of Pershing 11 missiles. Other objectors referred to the "fire haz-
ards associated with sodium" in the chemical compartments. Finally,
Mr. Wilhelm Knobloch, the forester who wouldn't miss an inquiry, and who was later
awarded the Federal Cross of Merit, criticized the defective description of the site
within his beloved Hardtwald forest. After a few hours, all objections had been dis-
cussed thoroughly, and the parties separated peacefully, though not in agree-
ment. 239
Almost nineteen months later, in April 1986, the authority finally issued the permit
to use the storage hall, now complete with all the legal trimmings.240
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4.3.2 The Licensing Procedure on (ore Life Extension
A few months after the beginning of operation with the second core it had become
evident from the reactor physics data that it would be possible to operate the core
beyond the 455 full-power days conservatively assumed. More precise calculations
showed that utilization of the reactivity reserve of the core, and the addition of four
moderated driver elements, would be able to raise the core life to 720 full-power
days, corresponding to a maximum local burnup of 100,000 MWd/t. Accordingly, an
application for the so-called extension of core life was filed in May 1984.241
The State Ministry of Economics, still Iicking the wounds it had suffered in the law-
suit about the storage hall which it had lost just two months before, immediately ar-
ranged for the public inquiry into the desired extension of core life plus a few other
projects applied for. The application therefore ran as folIows:
"Extension of the life of the second core from 455 to 720 full-power days
and continuation of the experimental program, and canning of the fuel
elements for transport purposes. "242
This was announced officially by the Ministry, and the required documents, such as
the safety reports, were laid open for public inspection between January and
March 1986 at the mayors' offices in the surrounding municipalities. This time, the
documents were chained to the tables. 243 The inquiry was scheduled for
May 26, 1986.
Between March and May, on April 28, 1986, the accident at Chernobyl occurred. This
traumatic event for weeks and months confused the public, authorities, and also sci-
entists, and reason seemed to stand very little chance. Holding a public inquiry into
a fast breeder project in those turbulent times had to be considered weil in ad-
vance; some people thought it was sheer madness.
It would have been possible to postpone the inquiry by a few months. At the end,
however, KfK Executive Board member Professor Hennies decided to stick to the
original date in May, using the logical argument that our valid reasons for proIong-
ing the core life were independent of the events at Chernobyl and would not im-
prove if we waited for a couple of months. At the same time, however, he asked for
thorough preparation of the inquiry.
And thoroughly prepared it was. The objections received, which extended from
breeder politics through nuclear and engineered safeguards problems to legal mat-
ters, were analyzed and subdivided into almost one hundred issues of detail.244
121
A team of roughly fifteen experts from KfK, KBG, and Interatom drafted written an-
swers which were checked and doublechecked for correctness.
The public inquiry again was held at the Leopoldshafen "Rheinhalle" and was di-
rected by Mr. Ostberg of the State Ministry of Economics. Right away he was chal-
lenged for bias on the grounds that he had been instrumental in the permit issued
for the storage all, which the court then had rendered invalid. However, after a con-
sultation with the Ministry over the telephone, the motion was denied, as was a mo-
tion brought against the operator, KBG, for alleged unreliability.
The student Hans Blöchle, still masterminding the Karlsruhe antinuclear scene, rec-
ognizably was the moving spirit behind the two dozen or so opponents present. He
put things in a nutshell, followed up whenever he found the answers to be incom-
plete, and even went so far as to criticize what he called the "mess" on the Stuttgart
desk of the chairman of the meeting. For the rest, the event proceeded in an orderly
fashion; the questions were addressed to the author of this report, who mostly re-
peated them in order to ga in time, added a few sentences of his own and then
called upon one of his experts, who had been briefed before, to answer the ques-
tion. The list of technical objections had been exhausted by the afternoon. The ver-
batim record of the event was 124 pages long and later was sent to each of the op-
ponents who had attended.245
Although the inquiry took place in a calm atmosphere, it c1early differed from all
those organized before. Chernobyl was mentioned in many contributions, and the
chairman quite rightly did not suppress such references. People, who c1early were
no professional opponents, again and again expressed their shock at the fact that
such an accident could have happened. The complaint by a woman who introduced
herself as a mother of six children will probably be remembered by everybody
present. In her sober, non-technical way she made it c1ear to the nuclear experts at-
tending what responsibility they had in handling this risky technology.
The licensing authority then took another two and a half years to actually issue the
permit extending core life in December 1988,246 The reasons for this long period of
time in part were due to the fact that, after Chernobyl, any nuclear license auto-
matically was something "to be handled by the boss" and checked and
doublechecked even more painstakingly than before; in some way, also the prob-
lems associated with the operation of KNK 11 may have been a reason, such as the
deposits on the rod actuating equipment in the shutdown systems.
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Not unexpectedly, the permit became the subject of a court action just one month
after it had been issued; that action was brought with the Mannheim Administra-
tive Court in January 1989.247 The grounds cited were all the defects and distur-
bances which the operator, KBG, used to publish in the annual reports printed in the
ATOMWIRTSCHAFT and ATOM + STROM journals. They related primarily to fuel
rod defects, temperature drifting, sticking shutdown rods, and the spent fuel prob-
lem. In February 1990, KfK and KBG drafted a comment, and in June 1990 the plain-
tiff withdrew his application (because of the cost risk), which made the permit le-
gally valid for good. 248,249
4.4 The KNK Experimental Program
An experimental program was run in KNK 11 which actually had been started back in
1971, still in KNK I, and had then become more and more extensive. These R&D ac-
tivities were partly mixed with plant operation, for KNK 11, by definition, was an ex-
perimental nuclear power plant in which electricity generation was not supposed to
play the primary role. As a consequence, irradiation of the reactor cores, each of
them a first-of-its-kind unit, could also have been assigned to the experimental pro-
gram, as could have been the detection and localization of fuel rod failures.
The close connections between operation and research became particularly appar-
ent whenever reactor disturbances occurred, such as the temperature drifting or the
fuel rod vibrations described above. These occurrences, which gave little cause for
joy to the operating crew, did present welcome opportunities to the scientists of
KfK and Interatom to demonstrate their diagnostic capability, mostly with equip-
ment developed in-house. It is worth recognizing that the teams of operators and
research scientists assisted each other to the best of their capabilities, without espe-
cially being asked to do so, whenever an incident occurred.
A number of experiments conducted in KNK 11 also were very important for the
SNR 300, especially when the Kalkar project had been resumed in late 1982, after
the political obstacles had been overcome. One example to be mentioned are the
hydrogen detectors for the steam generators of the SNR 300, which had to be tested
first in KNK 11; this also applied to the fuel element check device, whose sensitivity
had to be examined in KNK 11. Most important, however, was the test of the core
outlet instrumentation for the SNR 300; its positive outcome even constituted a pre-
condition for the permit for that reactor. As an "important interim finding,"
WZE 2.02, it kept the scientists busy for a couple of years.
In order not to exceed the
framework of this descrip-
tion, only a few experiments
selected from three subareas
will be described below. The
whole experimental program
comprised 30 to 40 individual
experiments, which were co-
ordinated with circumspec-
tion by Werner Kathol, a
member of the PSB Project
Management Staff, and also
managed with respect to the
licensing procedure and in-
ternational exchanges of ex-
perience (AGT 8).250
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4.4.1 Physics Experiments
Positioning the in-pile experiments in KNK 11/2.
An important physics experiment was the use of a boiling generator in the central
position of KNK 11. It was to demonstrate that sodium boiling, which could have aris-
en, for instance, in fuel element blockages, can be found out by suitable detectors.
To generate the boiling signals, a dummy element with 18 electrically heated rods
was used in the position of the central fuel element. Specially designed micro-
phones were installed in various positions of the core to detect and transmit the
boiling noise. The experiments were run with the nuclear part of the plant shut
down, but with the full sodium flow in operation, in order to obtain representative
cooling and temperature conditions. The outcome of these safety experiments was
extremely satisfactory: Boiling could be detected unequivocally by the sensors in all
positions. 251
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Cross section through the KNK 11 reactor
vessel with the experiment plug.
The physics experiments in the
reactor core were moved into
place by experiment plugs 6 m
long. These were very sophisti-
cated special designs inserted
into the reactor top shield,
which transmitted signals from
the core position to the
experimentalist. A maximum of
four plugs were moved in posi-
tion simultaneously in KNK 11.
Detlef Artz was responsible for
the design and sourcing of
these important components as
weil as for the informative
pamphlet describing the KNK 11
experimental program.2 52,253
As the plugs were costly ob-
jects, they were normally
crammed with all kinds of mea-
surement probes. In the test
mentioned above of the core
outlet instrumentation for the
SNR 300, for instance, three
different types of acoustic transducers, two different flowmeters, and various ther-
mocouples were accommodated in one single plug. It was operated for nearly
7000 hours and supplied important findings about the long-term behavior of these
detectors under high reactor radiation and sodium temperature. Incidentally, most
of the defects encountered in the sensors were not caused by neutron radiation, but
by the temperature shocks unavoidably associated with reactor shutdowns. In most
cases, sodium entry caused the defects. Continuous improvement and quality insur-
ance, however, was able to reduce successively the failure rate in these transducers.
Another important topic pursued in KNK 11 were noise analyses. These were evalua-
tions of the signals of neutron flux, temperature, pressure, and acoustic signals
which had originated either from the in-plant-instrumentation or obtained through
special transducers.254 The scientists, especially those of the INR, IRE and IRB insti-
tutes at KfK, checked by autocorrelation whether parts of the noise were periodi-
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cally recurrent. 255,256 Often, the frequency revealed the cause of a repetitive noise
fraction, for instance when it agreed with the eigenmodes of a reactor component.
Cross correlations of various signals provided information about the propagation in
space of an event. One example to be cited here are the harmonic oscillations of
fuel elements described above, which were successfully demonstrated by this meth-
od.257,258
4.4.2 ln-pile Experiments
Irradiation experiments occupied most of the
capacity and time of the KNK 11 experimental
program. In most cases, c1adding materials
and structural materials, fuel rods, and ab-
sorber materials were irradiated. Technically
sophisticated in-pile facilities were required
for these activities; the IMF 111 institute of KfK
deserves credit for providing them, mainly
pressure tube test rigs, materials test elements
with and without instrumentation, and a vari-
ety of carrier elements and small bundles.259
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Tube specimen subjected to internal
pressure in the materials test element.
The pressure tube test rig allowed eight tubu-
lar specimens to be irradiated in the central
position at the same time. The specimens
were subjected to internal pressures of up to
500 bar; their temperatures could be con-
trolled with high precision up to 800 oe. The
pressure and the temperature could be set in-
dividually for each specimen. The eight speci-
mens were arranged in the bottom part of an
experimental plug, which accommodated also
the measurement and control lines. For reac-
tivity reasons, they had to be surrounded by a
ring-shaped carrier element in the central position. The phenomena studied in-
c1uded creeping and the creep-rupture strength of the tubular specimens as a func-
tion of radiation, temperature, and stress.
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The reloadable materials test elements had the contour of an ordinary fuel element
and were able to accommodate either open or encapsulated specimens. In the for-
mer case, they assumed the temperature of the sodium flow around them while, in
the latter case, they reached higher temperatures because of the absorption of
gamma radiation. In the capsule specimens, the specimen temperature was set by
means either of a gas gap or a heating tube. This heating tube kept the temperature
at the desired level even when the reactor power was changed,260, 261
The Fast Breeder Project, for some time, also looked into carbide fuels in addition to
the mixed oxide irradiated in many variants in the KNK 11 core. Carbide fuels have a
rather high melting point, better thermal conductivity and, consequently, allow
much higher powers per rod unit length to be achieved than oxide fuels. In conclu-
sion of the KfK activities in this field, therefore, a small carbide bundle was irradi-
ated in KNK 11. It consisted of 19 rods integrated in a carrier fuel element with
102 test zone rods. Irradiation was conducted between 1984 and 1988 and attained
a burnup of 80,000 MWd/t. The fuel is to be reprocessed in Dounreay.262,263
Mention should also be made of the
absorber irradiations, which were con-
ducted in connection with the ab-
sorber elements of the primary shut-
down system. On the basis of boron
carbide granulate, open and c10sed
pressurized absorber rods with B4C
pellets and europium oxide com-
pounds, which had the benefit of not
releasing any helium, were irradiated
in the second core.
Small bundle element with
19 carbide rods (inside).
Two very interesting in-pile experiments had been prepared for the third core load
of KNK 11: TOAST and TETRA which were never put to any practical use because the
reactor was shut down permanently in 1991. The tolerance expansion study, TOAST,
was to examine the specifications for unnecessary complications;264 the TETRA
temperature transient experiment was
to study fuel rod behavior under tem-
perature cycling and overload condi-
tions.
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In coordinating all these in-pile experiments, the Core Components Working Group
(AKK) headed by the late Professor Karl Kummerer played an outstanding role. The
objectives of the different irradiation experiments were defined, the design and
construction of facilities was started, and the in-pile results were analyzed at
113 sessions between 1973 and 1991. Over that long period of time, the cooperation
between AKK and the PSB Project Management Staff was characterized by absolute
mutual confidence.265
4.4.3 Sodium Chemistry and Operations
Considerable effort was devoted to studies of the sodium and the cover gas. This
was an area in which the activities of plant engineers and those of scientists fre-
quently overlapped. The experimental program on sodium chemistry, among other
topics, looked into the development of methods of analyzing the coolant and the
cover gas, the difficult area of sodium sampling, and tests of oxygen and carbon
probes. 266,267 In addition, corrosion and the development of protective coatings as
a function of various operating conditions were studied in the steam gener-
ator. 268,269
KNK I1 was the only breeder power plant
in which seven parallel specimens could
be extracted from the primary coolant
flow at the same time. An extensive pro-
gram was conducted to analyze a large
number of radionuclides in sodium, also
as a function of the coolant temperature
and the crucible material. Extensive ex-
periments run especially with nickel sup-
plied valuable information about the se-
lective sorption of nuclides.269 On the ba-
sis of further studies it was possible, in the
summer of 1988, to install in KNK 11 a so-
called cesium trap and run it successfully
for several campaigns. It removed from Cesium traps (plexiglass models).
the primary coolant the longlived cesium
nuclides, which contributed greatly to the exposure doses in plant compartments.
Sorbents, such as RVC and Sigratex, turned out to be most effective in these traps;
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they resulted in small volumes, albeit at the expense of certain problems associated
with the removal of these concentrated radiation sources.270
The tritium content of the tertiary steam system was determined for many years.
Tritium is produced in the nuclear fuel by ternary fission, also in the ß4C of the ab-
sorber rods and, because of its high diffusivity, migrates from the primary to the ter-
tiary systems. The influence of the secondary cold trap on the concentration of
tritium found in the steam generator region was of particular interest. 271
Plant engineering experiments concentrated on observations of the dose rates in
the primary cells, studies of aerosol behavior, and inspection of the sodium
valves. 272 Other activities were devoted to plant safety and plant dynamics, espe-
cially to the verification of theoretical models. 273 Also the natural convection of so-
dium after shutdown of the KNK 11 plant was the subject of extensive studies. In one
test, the outlet temperature of the reactor was used as a set point value in tempera-
ture contro!. To check the shielding calculations, finally, an experiment plug was
equipped with activation probes to determine the radiation fields actually existing
between the core and the reactor top shield.
For measurements of the dose rate in the primary cell, an immersion tube was built
which penetrated into the plant compartments in a vertical direction. Calibrated
ionization chambers were used to measure the dose rate as a function of the reactor
power and the duration of an outage, respectively, in positions planned for main-
tenance. Of course, Na 22 contributed most of the activity, but also sizable amounts
of Zn 65, Ag 110m, and Mn 54 were detected.
These were just a few examples meant to give an impression of the variety of items
in the experimental program conducted in KNK 11.
5 Termination of the Projeet
5.1 Situation Report
The two-year outage of KNK 11 in 1988/89 because of technical problems with the
rod actuating equipment and the lack of apermit to extend core life was ample rea-
son to consider the fate of the plant. Added to this was the de facto standstill of the
SNR 300 in Kalkar, which had become the subject of a political and legal tussle. 274
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Irrespective of future events, KNK 11 by that time had fulfilled all the objectives for
which the project had once been launched. In particular, its very existence had dem-
onstrated that it was possible to build and operate safely a sodium cooled fast
breeder in Germany, and do so in accordance with the severe licensing criteria ap-
plicable in this country. The first core attained a peak burnup of 100,000 MWd/t,
and one element was even operated up to 175,000 MWd/t. The second core devel-
oped not more than a dozen of rod failures with c1early defined causes, which surely
would have been avoided by future design modifications. The breeder fuel cycle
was c10sed for the first time in Germany, albeit only on a kilogram scale.
The achievements of the past had to be weighed against the risks posed by the fu-
ture, however.
5.1.1 The Situation of KNK 11
In evaluating the situation of KNK 11, especially technical, Iicensing and manpower
aspects had to be considered.
The technical situation was Iinked to the fact that the plant, which had been com-
missioned as KNK I in 1971, was almost twenty years old by now. Comparable so-
dium reactors in other European countries had been decommissioned after only six-
teen years: the British DFR (run between 1961 and 1977) and the French Rapsodie
(1967 - 1983). Certain problems in major components could not be overlooked, for
instance in the fuel elements (wear, sodium deposits), the absorber rod actuating
equipment (aerosol plate-out), and the primary pump (vibrations). Though they did
not jeopardize plant safety, they did impede operation and reduce availability. Any
future failure of major large components, such as the intermediate heat exchanger,
the fuel handling machine, or the impulse turbine, could have caused a bottleneck
in spare parts supply. Investigations of embrittlement of the vessel by IMF 11 were
still under way.
Also the licensing situation was fraught with risks. The permit under the Atomic En-
ergy Act for extending the life of the 2nd core had been applied for in 1984, issued
as late as in December 1988, and then immediately become a subject of litigation.
For the 3rd core, most of whose fuel rods had been fabricated by Alkem (now
Siemens), the safety report was being compiled. The authority had already an-
nounced its intention to hold an inquiry with a public disclosure of the documents
and a hearing of the opponents. In the light of the experience accumulated with the
second core, this meant that the operating permit would not come forth before the
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end of 1992. The risks which could arise from the "check of the technical safety as-
pects of the whole plant" al ready ordered by the authority were hardly calculable.
Certain conditions relating to fire protection, airplane crash, and core meltdown,
which had already been put into effect in the SNR 300, probably would have gone
beyond the backfitting possibilities of the old KNK 11 plant. Finally, also the licensing
problems associated with the Hot Cells had to be borne in mind. Although apermit
to increase the plutonium inventory had been applied for as early as in 1977, it was
only issued in 1989 and carried rather extensive measures of physical security.
Also the future manpower situation of KNK 11 had to be considered. Had the third
core been loaded, reactor operation would have had to be organized approximately
up until 1998 and, if unloading the fuel elements had been considered, even up un-
til the year 2000. This would have meant recruiting young technical personnel.
Whether this would have been possible with the required level of quality, in view of
the negative public breeder debate, is a mute point.
The situation in KNK I1 was covered in exchanges of information between
decisionmakers and other responsible parties in 1988/89.275,276 In addition to the
Executive Board of KfK and the Project Management Staff, especially Interatom,
KBG, and Alkem joined in those discussions.277,278 It should not be overlooked that
Alkem in particular was a strong advocate of the continued operation of KNK 11,
naturally also out of a certain vendor's interest. Especially Dr. Höchel conducted very
profound analyses of the situation of the plant and made remarkable technical and
administrative suggestions.279,280
The Supervisory Board was informed at the semiannual meetings and, in addition,
by detailed letters. 281 These deliberations were brought to an end, for the time be-
ing, bya letter of Executive Board member Prof. Hennies to the Chairman of the Su-
pervisory Board of KfK in October 1989. In view of the fact that KNK 11 had been
down for almost two years, the following decisions were announced:
"The 2nd core will be operated to the end of its life so as to make full use
of the present permit... Should no satisfactory long-term operation be
achieved, decommissioning will be reconsidered in the spring of 1991 at
the latest.
The question of loading the 3rd core will also be discussed finally in the
spring of 1991... "282
Let us now briefly look at the SNR 300 master project and its political environment.
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5.1.2 The SNR 300 and Its Political Environment
Construction of the SNR 300 was begun in Kalkar on the Lower Rhine River in
March 1973. After speedy initial progress, the project ran into trouble in the follow-
ing years. Numerous modifications demanded by the licensing authority in the field
of intermediate heat exchangers and the emergency core cooling systems required
time consuming and costly changes in planning. In addition, there were the condi-
tions imposed to manage core meltdown, the so-called Bethe-Tait event. By 1976,
the extra cost had al ready added up to DM 750 million, and the delay had grown to
20 months. The year after, the former responsible project officer, Dr. Klaus Traube,
left Interatom and changed into the camp of the nuclear opposition. 283,284
Between 1979 and 1982, a Committee of Inquiry established by the German Federal
Parliament spent almost four years scanning the Kalkar project and finally voted in
favor of continuing construction of the breeder power plant with a majority of
more than two thirds,285
When the Christian Democrat-Liberal Federal Government took office in Octo-
ber 1982, after the so-called "Wende," the previous stagnation came to an end.
Construction work now led by Wulf Bürkle progressed speedily, and when the pri-
mary systems had been filled with sodium in May 1985, plant construction as de-
fined in the delivery contracts was completed. After some reworking (recovery of a
vibration measurement lance, drying the c10sure head granulate) the plant could
have been commissioned in 1986.286
That step, however, did not take place, for the political wind had changed in the
meantime. The Social Democratic Party (SPD), which ruled the State of North Rhine-
Westphalia with an absolute majority, now propagated the so-called coal-first poli-
cy under Minister President Johannes Rau, and Minister Farthmann, who had been
responsible for the Kalkar permits so far, expressed himself against commissioning
the SNR 300.
In April 1988, Federal Minister for the Environment Töpfer decided to issue instruc-
tions to the State of North Rhine-Westphalia in the further execution of the licens-
ing procedure. The State responded by suing the Federal Government before the
Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. The court decision was not expected until
one or two years' time; in the interim period, the Kalkar project was kept dor-
mant,287
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In the meantime, in April 1989, an important decision was taken in a different field
of nuclear power: Mr. Bennigsen-Foerder, the CEO of Veba AG and one of the main
partners in DWK, decided rather abruptly (at least to outsiders) to withdraw his
company from reprocessing in Germany, thus terminating the Wackersdorf project.
The breeder reactor, which absolutely required reprocessing, thus had been robbed
of an important (national) component. It meant a sudden end to the Reprocessing
and Waste Management Project (PWA) of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Cen-
ter. 288,289
KfK, which had been neither a party to, nor had been informed of, this far-reaching
decision by the VEBA CEO, from now on had to represent its interests more vigor-
ously, for instance with respect to the breeder reactor and KNK 11. The Chief Execu-
tive Officer of the Nuclear Research Center, Professor Horst Böhm, expressed this
need in his address at the 1989 annual reception.
"The Wackersdorf decision once more has shown the limits tOI and the re-
liability of, long-term planning in many areas of applied research. At the
same time, it has made it clear that next to the quality of research, also
flexibility is a parameter just as important in evaluating a research institu-
tion as the detailed long-term R&D planning requested again and
again. "290
In October 1989, the Fast Breeder Project (PSB), which had been existing since 1960,
was terminated by agreement between the Executive Board and the Project Man-
agement Staff. The greatly reduced residual activities were combined with some
R&D topics in the light water reactor sector to make up the Nuclear Safety Research
Project (PSF). KNK 11 was separated from that area and came under the responsibility
of G. Schnetgöke, as mentioned above.
5.2 The Termination of German Breeder Projects
5.2.1 Discontinuing the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station
The ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in May 1990 came as a pleasant sur-
prise. The action brought by the State of North Rhine-Westphalia was dismissed on
all points; consequently, the Federal Government had been right in exercising its
competency to issue instructions. In the reasons underlying their ruling, the judges
found that the Federal Government has the so-called technical competency in pro-
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ceedings under the Atomic Energy Act, i. e. the responsibility for assessing the tech-
nical aspects; the federal state is required to obey the instructions issued by the Fed-
eral Government.291
Yet, the Kalkar project did not progress even after that court decision. The end of
the SNR 300 was decided at a meeting on March 20, 1991, for wh ich Federal Minister
for Research Dr. Heinz Riesenhuber had invited the representatives of the three
electricity utilities, RWE, PreußenElektra, and Bayernwerk, and Siemens. In review-
ing the situation, the participants agreed that the attitude taken by the State of
North Rhine-Westphalia made it unlikely that an operating permit would be issued.
To avoid further expenses, it was therefore decided to discontinue the project. The
press release issued the next day read:
"The responsibility for the discontinuation of Kalkar, in the opinion of the
participating electricity utilities, the vendors, and the Federal Ministry for
Research and Technology, clearly rests with the State of North Rhine-
Westphalia. "292
Paying a final tribute.
The participants also agreed
that the breeder option and
the expertise accumulated by
the experts were to be pre-
served by continuing the Eu-
ropean breeder association
within the framework of the
European Fast Reactor, EFR - a
promise which became null
and void already one year lat-
er as a result of the stop of
funding decreed by the Min-
istry vis-a-vis Siemens/lnter-
atom and KfK.293
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5.2.2 KNK 11 Is Shut down
The discontinuation of the SNR 300 changed the breeder scene in Germany and had
direct consequences, above all, for KNK 11. As no R&D activities were required any-
more for the Kalkar master project, the experimental program run in KNK 11 c1early
had to be reduced.294 This was true in particular of reactor-related research activi-
ties. A new trend had been initiated at Interatom, but also at KfK. The nuclear pro-
grams had been scaled down more and more in recent years in favor of new re-
search activities in nuclear fusion, the environment, and microstructure engineer-
ing. KNK 11 had become more or less superfluous as an experimental reactor.
When the Kalkar project had been given up, this also removed the need to test new
reactor core variants in KNK 11.295,296 Consequently, there was no need either to ir-
radiate the almost complete third core, for it should have been the precursor of the
reload for the SNR 300.297 There was an added new legal risk. Immediate execution
under Section 80 of the Administrative Court Rules certainly would have been more
difficult to attain in future permits under the Atomic Energy Act, because the
SNR 300 could no longer have been used as a reason. The benefit of apermit with-
out the possibility of simultaneous immediate execution would have been very
limited; a lawsuit, which had to be expected practically all the time, would have
made it impossible to use the permit.
In summer 1991, roughly three months after the discontinuation of the Kalkar
project, all technical and political aspects pertaining to KNK 11 had been discussed
with the partners and the Supervisory Board. It was up to the Executive Board of KfK
to take adecision, more specifically to Professor Hans-Henning Hennies, who had
been c10sely associated with the plant from the beginning. As a young scientist, he
had worked for the neutron physics experiments on KNK I at Interatom; in the early
seventies, he had been technically responsible for the core design of KNK 11 and,
from 1975 on, as an Executive Board member of KfK, argued with the partners in fa-
vor of converting KNK I to KNK 11, and subsequently had been responsible for the
operation of KNK 11. Now it was up to hirn to determine the fate of the plant.
In the light of all the conditions listed above, Professor Hennies decided that KNK 11
was to be shut down on Friday, August 21, 1991 after completion of the ongoing ex-
periments about control rod oscillation. 298 He handed a written instruction to this
effect to the Managing Director of KBG, Mr. Steiger, who had returned from his va-
cation, at 10.30 on the same day. Mr. Steiger, in turn, commissioned his Operations
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Manager (Mr. Pleesz) to carry out the instruction. The plant was to be shut down
around lunchtime by the early shift.
What followed was routine. 299
At 12.00 noon, Shift Supervisor Bernhard Kunle ordered his deputy Roland Lang to
reduce the feedwater flow by operating valve RD3R 1. The automatie reactor control
system reacted by reducing the coolant flows in the secondary and primary areas
and, subsequently, by inserting the control rods. At 1.36 p.m. the plant power had
dropped to approx. 2 MWe, and then the turbine was tripped and shut down.
The late shift led by Günter Theil took over at 2 p.m. They supervised the further de-
crease of the differential temperature between the reactor inlet and the reactor
outlet, and Günter Theil instructed his operator Rolf Zimmermann at 9.56 p.m. to
activate the primary and secondary shutdown systems. When Mr. Zimmermann, at
10 p.m., had unlocked the SS 63 "solenoid current off" key operated switch, the
shutdown process was completed.
KNK 11 was down for good.300
KNK 11 is shut down
for good.
From left:
Kunle, Lang,
Zimmermann,
Theil.
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Timetable
1955
August
October
1956
July
October
December
1957
The First United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy is held in Geneva.
A German Federal Ministry for Atomic Affairs is installed;
F.J. Strauß (CSU) is appointed Minister.
The Karlsruhe Reactor Center is established;
Kernreaktor Bau- und Betriebs GmbH is founded.
S. Balke (CDU) succeeds F.J. Strauß as Minister for Atomic Affairs.
The North Rhine-Westphalian State Parliament decides to establish
a research center, whose location later is decided to be JÜlich.
March The treaties establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
are signed.
August Construction of the FR 2 reactor is begun at the Karlsruhe Nuclear
Research Center.
December Breeder topics begin to be covered in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many at a seminar held by the Institute for Neutron Physics and Re-
actor Engineering (INR) of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center.
December 13 Interatom GmbH is founded; the head office of the company is in
Duisburg.
1958
January The European Atomic Energy Community, EURATOM, is founded.
December 15 Interatom moves to Bensberg (Old Castle).
1959
June
July
1960
April 1
April
1961
May
October
1962
December
December
December
1963
March
August
August
December
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The Gesellschaft für Kernforschung (GfK) is founded by the German
Federal Government and the State of Baden-Württemberg.
The Soviet BR-5 experimental reactor attains full power.
The Fast Breeder Project (PSB) is established at the Karlsruhe Nu-
c1ear Research Center.
The German Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy adopts the Ad-
vanced Reactor Program.
The Supervisory Board of KfK decides to step up activities in the Fast
Breeder Project.
The EBR 11 (25 MWe) in Idaho, USA, goes critical.
The German Federal Ministry for Atomic Energy is renamed Ministry
for Scientific Research (BMwF).
H. Lenz (FDP) succeeds S. Balke as Federal Minister for Research.
The FR 2 reactor at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center begins
full-power operation (12 MWth).
Construction of the 5 MWth Facility is begun at Interatom (sodium
is filled in late 1964).
The Badenwerk AG utility declares is willingness to finance the
turbo-generator for KNK I.
The Enrico Fermi fast breeder reactor (60 MWe) goes critical in the
United States.
General Electric (USA) is awarded the contract for the Oyster Creek
Nuclear Power Station; this is the first commercial order for a light
water nuclear power plant.
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1964
January
May
1965
May
October
1966
March 7
March 29
May 1
May 23
May 31
July 19
October
December
1967
February 16
October
October
1968
The Gesellschaft für Kernforschung and the Kernreaktor Bau- und
Betriebs-GmbH are merged.
The contracts for construction of the SEFOR reactor are signed (re-
actor transient experiment).
The EBR 11 experimental breeder reactor is commissioned in Idaho,
USA.
G. Stoltenberg (CDU) succeeds H. Lenz as Federal Minister for Re-
search (BMwF).
The KNK I construction si te is opened, the fence is built.
First regular Project Meeting.
Start of construction of KNK I at the Nuclear Research Center.
The 1st Partial Construction Permit is received.
The contract for construction of KNK I is signed.
Sinking the caisson is completed.
Accident at the Enrico Fermi fast breeder reactor (fuel meltdown).
The SNEAK facility at the Nuclear Research Center goes critical.
The steel dome of the KNK 1containment is put in place.
The Na-2 Study by KfK (with contributions by industry) is published.
Memoranda of Understanding are signed with Belgium and the
Netherlands.
July The steam generator is subjected to apressure test.
September Assembly of the sodium systems is completed.
September 12 Assembly of the turbo-generator.
December The Nuclear Reactors 111/1 Working Group proposes to discontinue
work on the steam cooled breeder.
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1969
February 5 Industrial activities for the steam cooled fast breeder reactor are
discontinued by order of Federal Minister for Research Stoltenberg.
March Acceptance of building construction at KNK I; start of F1 tests.
April AEG and Siemens merge their power plant activities in a joint sub-
sidiary, Kraftwerk Union (KWU).
October 6th German Parliament, SPD/FDP coalition (Chancellor: W. Brandt).
October H. Leussink (independent) succeeds G. Stoltenberg as Federal Min-
ister for Research.
October 28 First delivery of sodium to KNK I.
November Start of F2 functional tests with sodium.
December The Soviet BOR-60 experimental breeder goes critical.
December 31 Presentation of the SNR 300 Safety Report by the SNR Consortium.
1970
March
May
July -
October
September
October
Octoberl
November
December
Delivery of the fuel elements; precleaning of the QP1 12 primary sys-
tem.
Successful irradiation of 39 fuel rods typical of SNR completed in the
DFR.
Installation of new steam traps; revamping the trace heating
system; measures taken on the reactor top shield; c1eaning and
modification as weil as commissioning of the cold trap.
The R&D Programs Working Group is founded.
The Projektgesellschaft Schneller Brüter announces new site of
Kalkar.
Secondary systems are filled with sodium.
Primary systems are filled with sodium.
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1971
February 15
March 20
April
May
July
August 20
September
1972
Fast Breeder Status Report held at Karlsruhe;
public debate about reasons for abandoning the steam cooled
breeder line.
Sodium leakage in the QU 1H1 heater (sodium fire).
The HDR reactor is decommissioned because of fuel element failure.
First Agreement on Breeder Cooperation concluded with Japan.
Inspection of top shield gap because of seizing.
KNK I goes critical for the first time with 38 fuel elements.
Start of F3 tests (zero power tests with 66 fuel elements, 2 solid ab-
sorbers, 14 dummy elements, complete core).
January K. v. Dohnanyi (SPD) succeeds H. Leussink as Federal Minister for Re-
search.
January 2 Termination of experimental operation with air cooler.
February 8 Floating of solid absorbers.
May 20 Delivery of the nuclear plant section of KNK I.
July 6 First water and sodium flows through the KNK I steam generator.
August 9 KNK I generator first connected to the grid at 45% plant power.
August 10 Essential A3 for SNR 300 met at 55% rated power of KNK I.
August KNK reactor produces first electricity.
Sepember 11 Vibrations detected in turbine shaft.
September18 Both reactor isolation valves close.
September 23 Steam generator defect (QS2E 1) in KNK I.
November 7th German Federal Parliament, SPD/FDP coalition (Chancellor:
H. Schmidt).
November Positive opinion on KNK 11 by Technicallnspectorate.
December H. Ehmke (SPD) succeeds K. v. Dohnanyi as Federal Minister for Re-
search.
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1973
January Positive RSK vote on conversion to KNK 11.
February 5 Delivery of KNK I to GfK/VA and KBG following acceptance opera-
tion at approx. 55% power.
April 1 Start of SNR 300 construction at Kalkar.
April The Nuclear Reactor Divisions of AEG and Siemens are merged with
Kraftwerk Union.
May 25 Prolonged drop time of secondary KNK shutdown system (signal
No. 1).
July 24 Increased enthalpy rise found in fuel element.
August 20 QS1A 14 rupture disk actuated.
September 4 Public discussion about KNK " at KfK Nuclear Engineering School.
1974
February 18 Permit obtained for 100% rated power.
April 29 Faulty turbo-generator synchronization.
May First operation of all five turbine extractions.
May 14 100% rated power attained
May H. Matthöfer (SPD) succeeds H. Ehmke as Federal Minister for Re-
search.
June KNK " contracts negotiated and signed.
July 14 The French 280 MWe PHENIX prototype breeder starts commercial
operation.
September Experimental program : completion of run" plug experimental pro-
gram.
September 2 Shutdown of KNK I; preparation for conversion to KNK 11.
December Start of replacement of fuel element storage drum.
December 13 Beginning of KNK I core unloading.
1975
February
March
May2
May
June
July
1976
February
March
March
October 25
1977
January
January 11
February
February
April
April
May
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Core unloading completed;
42 fuel elements shipped to Marcoule, 24 to the MZFR storage pool.
All fuel elements shipped to Marcoule.
1st Partial Construction Permit issued for conversion to KNK 11 (basic
permit).
Beginning of replacement of valve tops.
Installation of additional emergency Diesel power unit completed.
Beginning of conversion to KNK 11.
German-French Government Agreement on Breeder Cooperation
signed.
Leak rate test of KNK containment performed by Technical
Inspectorate.
Soviet BN-350 breeder attains full power.
QP2 primary system again filled with sodium.
Siemens takes over AEG holdings in Kraftwerk Union (KWU).
Permit obtained for process computer system.
Neutron shielding installed for dry fuel element store;
final acceptance of building.
British 250 MWe PFR prototype breeder attains full power.
Assembly of DND system in KNK 11 completed;
F3 commissioning programs completed.
U.S. President Carter announces new atomic energy program (no re-
processing, breeder activities scaled down).
Completion of seismic protections of primary piping and intermedi-
ate heat exchangers.
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July Acceptance and storage of 23 driver elements, 2 blanket elements,
6 test zone elements for KNK 11 first core.
August Seismic protection activities in primary system completed.
September 30 3rd Partial Construction Permit issued for old specifications.
September 30 2nd Partial Operating Permit issued for zero power tests.
October 10 KNK 11 goes critical for the first time.
December Commissioning measurements and setting of reactivity meters.
1978
January High temperature c1eanup operation of KNK 11 sodium systems.
February V. Hauff (SPD) succeeds H. Matthöfer as Federal Minister for Re-
search.
April 18 First scram via" negative reactivity high" reactivity meter limit (re-
port No. 4 of April 21, 1978).
April 26 First electricity generation in KNK 11.
July Vibrations of bearings and shaft found in KNK turbine.
July Japanese JOYO experimental breeder reaches full power.
September State Minister Riemer, North Rhine-Westphalia, recommends op-
eration of SNR 300 as a plutonium annihilation plant.
November 15 50% reactor power attained in KNK 11.
December 8 German Federal Constitutional Court finds licensing provIsions in
the Atomic Energy Act constitutional (" Kalkar Ruling").
1979
March
March 3
March
April 1
8th German Federal Parliament establishes Inquiry Committee 1,
"Future Nuclear Power Policy," (Chairman: R. Ueberhorst).
KNK 11 attains first full power.
Experimental programs begun: investigation of scrams via negative
reactivityeffect; noise analyses; neutron flux and acoustic measure-
ments.
First failed fuel element found in KNK 11/1.
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1980
February
March
April
May20
October 5
November
November 6
1981
American 400 MWth FFTF experimental breeder goes critical.
German Federal Ministry for the Interior promulgates Principles of
Waste and Spent Fuel Management.
Soviet BN-600 (600 MWe) breeder delivers first electricity.
Second failed fuel element in KNK 1111.
9th German Federal Parliament, SPD/FDP coalition (Chancellor:
H. Schmidt).
A. v. Bülow (SPD) succeeds V. Hauff as Federal Minister for Research.
Contractual acceptance of KNK 11 by KfK and KBG.
April German Federal Parliament establishes Inquiry Committee 2, "Fu-
ture Energy Policy" (Chairman: H.B. Schäfer).
July - August Experimental studies of the gas bubble problem.
August Contractual target burnup of KNK 11/1 (255 full-power days)
reached.
December 310 full-power days reached.
1982
February
May 3
August 30
September
October
December 3
Storage hall annex building: excavation and concrete construction.
"Startup chamber for Superphenix" experiment plug installed in
core position 100.
Target burnup of extended core (400 full-power days) reached.
Positive vote by "Future Nuclear Power Policy" Inquiry Committee.
Change of government in Bonn ("Wende"); Chancellor: H. Kohl.
H. Riesenhuber (CDU) succeeds A. v. Bülow as Federal Minister for
Research.
Reservation about commissioning SNR 300 rescinded by Federal Par-
liament.
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1983
April
May
June 20
June 26
July 10
August 22
1984
May
June 6
Dec. 4-6
1985
Installation of bubble tubes licensed.
Removal of NY 203-IA fuel element to Hot Cells.
Beginning of KNK 11/2 core loading.
First criticality of KNK 11/2.
Cesium trap started up for the first time.
First full power attained with KNK 11/2.
Replacement of main sodium pump rotor.
Government Agreement about Cooperation on Sodium Cooled
Breeder Reactors among Germany, France, and the United King-
dom.
Public inquiry in Wesel on Mk. la core modification of SNR 300.
April 6 First failed fuel element found in KNK 11/2.
May Construction of Kalkar Nuclear Power Station completed; sodium
filled into main system.
August 20 Second failed fuel element found in KNK 11/2.
September 7 1st criticality of Superphenix at Creys-Malville.
October SNEAK at Karlsruhe decommissioned and converted into tritium
laboratory.
1986
January
March
March 17
April 26
June
Experiments on sodium deposits in rotating top shield.
400 full-power days of burnup attained in KNK 11/2.
Third failed fuel element detected in KNK 11/2.
Chernobyl accident.
W. Wallmann (CDU) appointed Federal Minister for the Environ-
ment (BMU).
August 10
August 10
December
1987
March
March 31
May
June
October 10
October 20
November
1988
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SPD party rally at Nuremberg demands opting out of nuclear power
within ten years (proposal by Hauff Committee).
Fourth failed fuel element found in KNK 11/2.
Shim shutdown rod found to stick.
K. Töpfer (CDU) succeeds W. Wallmann as Federal Minister for the
Environment.
Third failed fuel element detected in KNK 11/1 (at 175,000 MWd/t).
KNK 11/1 fuel element unloaded after 832 full-power days.
THTR 300 delivered to operator.
10th anniversary of first criticality of KNK 11.
Fifth failed fuel element detected in KNK 11/2.
Licensed core Iife of 455 full-power days for KNK 11/2 attained.
January Major turbine and generator revision.
March Primary shutdown system equipped with torque meter.
April Loose screws discovered in primary pump.
May Requalification of dismantled pump rotor.
October Cesium trap commissioned.
December 19 Urgent report to authority because of problems with rod actuating
equipment.
1989
February 16
April
August
October
Agreements among Germany, the United Kingdom, and France
signed in Bonn about breeder cooperation on the European Fast
Reactor (EFR).
Materials test elements installed in KNK 11.
Cleaning campaigns for shutdown rod actuating equipment.
THTR 300 decommissioned.
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October 31 Fast Breeder Project (PSB) terminated at Karlsruhe;
LWR and Breeder Safety Programs merged in Nuclear Safety Re-
search (PSF) Project.
November 1 Management Group for Research and Development (MGRD) found-
ed for the European Fast Reactor (EFR).
December 20 Permit issued to extend core life of KNK 11/2 to 720 full-power days.
1990
January 29
May 22
June 9
August
October 3
1991
January
March 20
March 21
April 10
May
July 15
August 10
August 23
KNK 11/2 restarted after two-year outage.
German Federal Constitutional Court dismisses as unfounded all
points of the action brought by the State of North Rhine-
Westphalia: "SNR 300 Ruling."
Sixth failed fuel element detected in KNK 11/2.
Chip discovered in absorber rod actuating equipment during inves-
tigations in Hot Cell.
Unification of Germany.
New term of CDUICSU-FDP government coalition (Chancellor:
H. Kohl); H. Riesenhuber confirmed as Federal Minister for Research
and Technology.
The contracting parties and BMFT decide to discontinue the
SNR 300/Kalkar Nuclear Power Station project.
Press release by the Federal Minister for Research and Technology
accusing the State of North Rhine-Westphalia of bearing responsi-
bility.
Delivery contracts for SNR 300 terminated by SBK.
Single-rod exercising in primary shutdown system (because of event
No. 103); various c1eanup steps.
KNK 11/2 recommissioned.
Seventh failed fuel element found in KNK 11/2.
Permanent shutdown of KNK 11.
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Persons *
1. Nuclear Research Center
Dr. Rudolf Greifeid
Dr. Walther Schnurr
Dr. Josef Brandl
Dr. Helmut Armbruster
Heinrich Schöller
Dr. Hubert Tebbert
Dr. Gerhard Brudermüller
Gregor Schnetgöke
Dr. August-Wilhelm Eitz
Dr. Willy Marth
Prof. Dr. atto Haxel
Werner Kathol
Detlef Artz
Prof. Dr. Hans-Henning Hennies
Prof. Dr. Rudolf Harde
1956-74
1960-70
1961-68
1961-65
1961-63
1963-
1964-68
1965-91
1968-73
1969-89
1970-73
1972-91
1974-91
1975-
1976-83
(Managing Director, K land GfK)
(Managing Director, K 1and GfK)
(Managing Director, GfK/VA and K 11)
(" Prokurist," MZFR and GfK/VA)
(Managing Director, K 11)
(" Prokurist," GfK/VA, EKM)
(Project Leader, KNK)
(Project Leader, KNK)
(Managing Director, GfK/VA)
(Project Leader, KNK and PSB)
(Managing Director, K 1and GfK)
(Project Engineer, KNK)
(Project Engineer, KNK)
(Executive Board member, GfK/KfK)
(Chief Executive Officer, GfK/KfK)
* Holders of management and project management functions, respectively, for KNK or
the preparatory project; in each case, the top ranking position is listed;
names are arranged by year of entry.
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2. Kernkraftwerk-Betriebsgesellschaft
Dr. Helmut Armbruster
Burkhard Reuter
Erich Zimmermann
Günter Finke
MaxWerner
Dr. Gerhard Brudermüller
Dr. Hermann Richard
Heinrich Semke
Werner-O. Steiger
Robert Pleesz
Karl Korn
1966-73
1966-
1966-91
1966-88
1967-70
1969-85
1969-
1970-76
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1987-93
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(Managing Director, KBG)
(Deputy Plant Manager, KNK)
(Plant Manager, KNK)
(Plant Manager, KNK)
(Deputy Plant Manager, KNK)
(Managing Director, KBG)
(Deputy Plant Manager, KNK)
(Deputy Plant Manager, KNK)
(Managing Director, KBG)
(Plant Manager, KNK)
(Plant Manager, KNK)
3. INTERATOM (Bergisch Gladbach)
Dr. Rudolf Harde
Dr. Klaus Berke
Karl-Walter Stöhr
Dr. Hans Mausbeck
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Bernd Gubo
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Dr. Klaus Traube
Elmar Guthmann
Dr. Lutz Mentrup
Alfred Griesenbach
Dr. Jochen Höchel
Horst Schott
Isidor Weissbrod
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1960-75 (Managing Director)
1960-91 (Managing Director)
1960-72 (Project Leader, KNK)
1963-85 (Group Executive)
1965-72 (Project Leader)
1965-73 (Division General Manager)
1965-73 (Project Administrator)
1969-84 (Managing Director)
1970-78 (Project Leader)
1970-78 (Project Engineer)
1971-91 (Project Leader)
1972-76 (Managing Director)
1973-77 (Senior Project Manager)
1974-91 (Division General Manager)
1974-91 (Project Administrator)
1976-91 (Division General Manager)
1976-92 (Project Leader)
1983-85 (Division General Manager)
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1965-68
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1971-72
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1986-91
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5. Ministries, Authorities, Expert Consultants
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Dieter Wildberg
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